

104. Exercice du budget 1961, ANOM 81F 832.

105. Letter from Ministre de l'Intérieur to Ministre d'Etat chargé des Affaires Algériennes, 10 March 1961, ANOM 81F 832.

106. Exercice du budget 1961. According to Si Hamza, the Institut's library had never been adequately stocked. A collection was created covering 1926 through 1938, but nothing was added from then until 1957; in fact, the existing collection was plundered by a former imam who sold most of the works to individuals. Thus not only did the library need to be brought up to date on two decades' worth of research, but the classic works which made up the initial collection needed to be replaced.

107. See Lucine Endelstein's interesting account of the growth of kosher restaurants and businesses in contemporary Paris: "Les juifs originaires d'Afrique du Nord, acteurs du développement du commerce caché aujourd'hui. Itinéraires professionnels et stratégies de localisation (Paris, 19ème)." *Actes de l'histoire de l'immigration*, Ecole Normale Supérieure 2003.

108. Service de Coordination des Affaires Algériennes, Section de Renseignements. Objet: Tous renseignements sur cinq personnes interpellées lors de l'attentat à l'intérieur de la Mosquée de Paris, le 25 mai 1961, 17 June 1961, APP H<sup>1b</sup> 23. Aside from the three French women, the rest of the thirty-three people brought in for questioning were male, Muslim, and of North African origin. The only exception was the women's Lebanese classmate. Of the men, four were Algerian, four were Tunisian, and the rest were Moroccan, which confirms that Algerians were even more scarce than usual at the Mosquée during the war.

109. Ibid.

110. "Paradoxically," Si Hamza noted, these pieces of furniture were easily found in Paris. Nevertheless, he was disappointed by many members of the Muslim elite who, finding themselves settled in Paris, chose to "deprive themselves" of the "traditional" decor they were used to and replace their furniture and decoration with "modern knickknacks."

111. Exercice du Budget 1961.

112. These accusations are taken from Colonel Amirouche of Wilaya III's letter to Si Hamza, dated 11 November 1958, APP Hb 23.

113. Si Hamza took on French nationality in March 1963.

## Chapter 6

1. In 1973, the Algerian state halted emigration to France, and in 1974, France suspended labor immigration while allowing for "*regroupement familial*," which permitted families to join relatives already present in the metropole. By 1976, there were 872,000 Algerians, 304,000 Moroccans, and 164,000 Tunisians living in France, with much of that population residing in the Paris region and Marseille. West Africans made up a smaller percentage of immigrants from France's former colonies, with 80,000 individuals from the entire region present in the metropole by 1976.

2. Secrétariat d'état aux travailleurs immigrés, *La nouvelle politique de l'immigration* (Paris, 1976), 25–27.

3. Ibid.

4. On the politics of this agreement, see Alexis Spire, *Étrangers à la carte: L'administration de l'immigration en France* (Paris: Grasset, 2005), 208.

5. *Ibid.*, 213. Spire and Todd Shepard explain that the principle of freedom of movement was intended for the benefit of French citizens living in Algeria, but the principle of reciprocity demanded that it also be extended to Muslim residents of France's former colony. See also Shepard, *Invention of Decolonization*, 156.

6. President Boumedienne explained this decision by denouncing the “insults, provocations, assassinations and other discriminatory measures” that constituted daily life for Algerians in France. He further stated that Algerians residents of the metro-pole should be proud of their “Arabo-Islamic authenticity” as a way of resisting any desire to integrate into French society. See Stora, *Ils venaient d'Algérie*, 422.

7. On racist violence against people of North African origin, see Gérard Noiriel, *Immigration, racism et antisémitisme en France* (Paris: Fayard, 2007). Between 1971 and 1977, approximately seventy Algerians were the victims of racist attacks in France.

8. “*Ratonnade*,” a violent physical attack on Maghrébins, is derived from *raton* (baby rat), a derogatory term used to refer to North Africans.

9. *Ibid.*

10. France's suspension of immigration was not only a reaction to the Algerian government's own decree: it was issued in the context of the 1973 oil crisis and recession and applied to all immigrants, not only those from Algeria. See Patrick Weil, *Qu'est-ce qu'un Français? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution* (Paris: Grasset, 2002), 166–67.

11. See Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, “L'intégration des populations musulmanes en France, trente ans d'évolution,” in *Histoire de l'islam et des musulmans en France du Moyen Age à nos jours*, ed. Mohammed Arkoun (Paris: Albin Michel, 2006), 800–821.

12. On earlier programs designed to cope with immigration, see Amelia H. Lyons, “Social Welfare, French Muslims, and Decolonization in France: The Case of the Fonds d'action sociale.” *Patterns of Prejudice* 43, no. 1 (2009): 65–89. One example is that of the Fonds d'action sociale (FAS), created during the Algerian War to cope exclusively with Algerian immigrants (the FAS was renamed in 1964 as the Fonds d'action sociale pour les travailleurs étrangers). On the place of culture in immigration policies, see Angéline Escafré-Dublet, “L'État et la culture des immigrés, 1974–1984,” *Histoire@Politique* 4, no. 1 (2008).

13. Secrétariat d'état aux travailleurs immigrés, *La nouvelle politique de l'immigration* (Paris, 1976), 37.

14. *Ibid.*, 41.

15. *Ibid.*, 83.

16. The Algerian state was also concerned about the effects of immigration on their emigrants, though these fears were born out of the hope that these workers would eventually return to Algeria to build up the newly independent country. To this end, the government sponsored educational programs (Arabic lessons, classes about Islam) for the children of Algerian immigrants living in France.

17. For a discussion of the development of migration as an object of sociological study in the 1960s, see Noiriel, *Immigration, antisémitisme et racism en France*, chapter 7.

18. *La nouvelle politique de l'immigration*, 111.

19. *Ibid.*, 83.

20. *Ibid.*, 115.

21. Ibid., 118.
22. Ibid.
23. Comité d'information et d'études sur les migrations méditerranéennes. "L'Islam en France, Enquête sur les lieux de culte et l'enseignement de l'arabe" (Paris: 1978) 46–47.
24. A *circulaire* is a ministerial text interpreting recent legislation to provide directives to the ministry's public servants on new procedures.
25. Programme "Lieux de culte," circulaire du 2 septembre 1976.
26. "L'Islam en France," 49.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., emphasis added.
30. Ibid., 47.
31. Gilles Kepel, *Les banlieues de l'Islam: Naissance d'une religion en France* (Paris: Seuil, 1991).
32. Originally the SONACOTRAL (*Société nationale de construction de logements pour les travailleurs algériens*, with the final "al" representing Algerian workers), the group became SONACOTRA after 1962 and Algerian independence.
33. Marie-France Moulin, *Machines à dormir: Les foyers neufs de la sonacotra, de l'adef et quelques autres* (Paris: Maspero, 1976), 53.
34. Mireille Ginesy-Galano, *Les immigrés hors la cité* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1984), 83.
35. Alexis Spire traces the careers of former colonial administrators in the post-colonial metropole in his *Etrangers à la carte*. SONACOTRA was but one of many state agencies staffed by former colonial agents. In 1972, for example, no less than 95% of foyer directors were former military men stationed in Indochine, Africa, or the Maghreb. These directors were specially recruited by SONACOTRA administrators for their colonial experience. See Spire, *Etrangers à la carte*, 210–11. See also Choukri Hmed, "Loger les étrangers 'isolés' en France. Socio-histoire d'une institution d'Etat: la Sonacotra (1956–2006)," Ph.D. dissertation, Université de Paris I, 2006; and "'Tenir ses hommes': La gestion des étrangers 'isolés' dans les foyers Sonacotra après la guerre d'Algérie," *Politix* 76, no. 4 (2006): 11–30.
36. The study, completed before the strikes, was never made public. See the GISTI's response to the SONACOTRA's brochure explaining the strike: "'Grève des loyers' Re-mise au point. Réplique du G.I.S.T.I. à la SONACOTRA," *CIEMM* 5 (January 1979): 6.
37. Ginesy-Galano, *Les immigrés hors la cité*, 129. During the strikes, a collective of foyer managers published a booklet in which they anonymously described their backgrounds and thoughts on their roles at SONACOTRA in order to dispute their characterization as racist. Claudius-Petit, who wrote a brief introduction to the piece, painted a picture of the directors as unsung heroes: "Three hundred directors live alone with their families in the SONACOTRA foyer-hotels for foreign workers. Illegal aliens, drugs, girls, fights, this is everyday life in the foyers. One out of every three is currently not paying rent. The directors earn an average of 4500 francs per month. They have one day off per week. Two out of every three are former military men. At the beginning, they were the only ones who could or would cope with immigrant workers. Now, the recruitment is more diversified: overseers, workers, farmers, employees, priests . . . their work requires multiple skills and most particu-

larly management skills and readiness to ‘put their hands to the wheel.’ . . . When people talk about them, outside, far from the trash bins which need to be emptied every morning, it’s to call them ‘fascists’ or ‘racists.’” As one foyer director explained, “What I like [about the job] are the relationships that can exist between men. As Director, I see a lot of guys who come through my office, to talk about everything and nothing. ‘I have a little girl,’ ‘I have a little boy, he’ll be named Mohammed. What do you think?’ Another—like Ali—has a father who’s died. Work accident. He came to see me, in tears. Soon, I cried with him. And we talked, the two of us, trying to come up with a plan to figure out what to do with the body. . . . I’ve learned a lot about what immigrants are like, especially Arabs, Arab culture—because the foyer is mostly Arab.” See POGURE, *Non aux Gérants racistes* (Paris: Les Editions du cerf, 1979), preface and 26–27.

38. The *salles de prière* differed in each foyer: occasionally a room was permanently designated as a Muslim religious site, while in other cases a multipurpose room could be used for prayers on some occasions. Over the course of the strikes, the following SONACOTRA foyers acquired *salles de prière*: Meaux, Massy I and II, Aulnay-sous-Bois, Bagnolet, Bobigny, Montreuil, Romainville, Saint Denis, Sevran, Villemomble, Elancourt, Gargenville, Clichy, Colombes, Gennevilliers, Nanterre, Argenteuil, and Cormeilles-en-Parisis. “Foyers et Services” brochure published by SONACOTRA, 1978. Archives de l’Archeveque de Paris 3K1/13/SITI.

39. Ginesy-Galano, *Les immigrés hors la cité*, 54.

40. Moulin, *Machines à dormir*, 44.

41. The serving of alcohol was forbidden in a fair number of foyers not out of respect for Muslim religious restrictions, but because foyer directors argued that the consumption of alcoholic beverages led to fights and problems among residents.

42. “Non à l’Amicale briseuse de grèves,” *La Voix des Travailleurs Algériens* (June 1976): 8. The same article attacks the Amicale for negotiating with SONACOTRA, who had turned to the Algerian and Moroccan consulates in hoping they would help break the strike. “The Algerian bourgeoisie is trying to keep its control over us. It sends us to work but it has to guarantee our docility to the French bourgeoisie. On the other hand, it is also scared that the experience we gain in the struggles we’re waging here with our French and immigrant comrades may one day serve us to put into question the way it exploits our brothers still in the homeland.”

43. The MTA was created in 1972 by a group of intellectuals and workers who were members of the former Comités de Palestine in Paris and Marseille. These associations, created in response to the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in 1970, were comprised of members of the radical left, Maoists, and students. The MTA declared itself to “orientation, direction, and unification” for the “Arab national conscience,” yet it was also implicated in pursuing the rights of undocumented workers, deportees, and others. See Rabah Aissaoui, “Le discours du Mouvement des travailleurs arabes (MTA) dans les années 1970 en France: Mobilisation et mémoire du combat national,” *Hommes et migrations* 1263 (September–October 2006): 105–19.

44. Kepel, *Les banlieues de l’Islam*, 133.

45. *Ibid.*, 128–29.

46. *Non aux gérants racistes!* 103. Other directors described their attempts to provide foyer residents with North African cultural and religious celebratory events, sometimes seeming to blend the two. They often used funds from the FAS (Fonds

d'action sociale) for this purpose. One director organized a “gigantic couscous” for residents: “We made a couscous and gathered everyone downstairs, in the main room, the one with the TV, and we put out a big white table. . . . My wife went to get all the vegetables at the market with the North Africans: Tunisians, Algerians, Moroccans. . . . Some Senegalese and Malians had nothing to do, so I suggested they be the butchers. They slaughtered, skinned, and butchered the three sheep” (96–97). As we will see below, this director has (perhaps) unconsciously alluded to the divisions in the foyers between North and West Africans, while trying to unite them all with a culturally North African meal. Another director explicitly chose to celebrate a Muslim religious holiday, Aïd el Kébir. He began delegating responsibilities for the festive preparations a month before the holiday, saying that “for my wife and me, it was a rite of passage. We told ourselves, ‘If it works, we’ll stay, if it doesn’t work, we’re off.’” The director claims the men experienced “pleasure and joy” at the holiday celebration in spite of the mayor’s drunken speech, which he feared would upset them. It is interesting to note that the director’s carefully planned meal, including sheep ordered a full month ahead of time to be slaughtered, also included “a good Bordeaux, 28 francs a bottle,” on every table (99–101). Unfortunately, I do not know what residents thought of their director’s insistence on certain elements of Muslim religious celebrations coupled with ignoring the far more serious prohibition on alcohol.

47. Jacques Barou, in CNRS-RNUR, *Les OS dans l'industrie automobile* (Paris, 1986), 139–40.

48. Jacques Barou, Moustafa Diop, and Subhi Toma, “Des musulmans dans l’usine,” in *Ouvriers spécialisés à Billancourt: Les derniers témoins*, ed. Renaud Sainsaulieu and Ahsène Zehraoui (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995), 131–61. Not all employers were as accommodating of their Muslim employees’ religious observances or identities; many workers complained that their work routines left them little room for prayer or holiday observances. This large-scale insensitivity toward the needs of some immigrant workers also played itself out on a small scale. As a woman who taught a French class for recent immigrants criticized one factory director in an open letter in reference to the Christmas gift he had decided to give all his employees: a bottle of aperitif, a bottle of wine, a pork pâté, and a box of chocolates, which most of his Muslim employees would not consume. “Wouldn’t it have been possible, in planning these gifts, to think about the people who would be receiving them? Maybe you didn’t think about it? Maybe you could care less?” “Monsieur le directeur,” *Paris-Babel* 13 (January 1972): 9.

49. *Ibid.*, 133.

50. French sociologist Jean-Hughes Déchaux notes that these sites also offered factory owners and managers the opportunity to negotiate with imams, possibly side-stepping elected union officials. See “Les immigrés dans le monde de travail: un nouvel âge d’immigration?” *Revue de l’OFCE* 36, no. 36 (1991): 85–116.

51. The imam in the second *salle de prières* was associated with the Faith and Practice (Foi et pratique, or Jama’at al Tabligh) pietist movement, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

52. Barou, Diop, and Toma, “Des Musulmans dans l’Usine,” 157.

53. The West African *jalbab* blends local fashions with either North African or Middle Eastern-style djellababs. For a fuller discussion of choices in male Muslim religious clothing in the postcolonial West African context, see Ousman Kobo’s *Promoting the Good and Forbidding the Evil* (forthcoming).

54. “L’Islam en Afrique noire,” *Croissance de l’Eglise* 34 (April 1975): 13.
55. “Pourquoi prier seulement en Arabe?” *France-Islam* 1 (March 1967): 9.
56. *Ibid.*
57. See Manara Kamitenga’s narrative, written in Saint-Ouen, 25 April 1978, AN Fonds Claudius-Petit 538AP/99.
58. Michel Samuel, *Le prolétariat africain noir en France* (Paris: Maspero, 1978), 128–29.
59. *Ibid.*, 129.
60. Moustapha Diop and Laurence Michalak. “‘Refuge’ and ‘Prison’: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Adaptation of Space in Workers’ Housing in France,” in *Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe*, ed. Barbara Daly Metcalf (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 79.
61. Samuel, *Le prolétariat africain noir en France*, 146.
62. *Ibid.*
63. Kamel Djaider, “La Haine de l’émigré,” *El Moudjahid* 21–22 (March 1971): 4.
64. “Dossier: L’offensive de haine contre les algériens émigrés en France,” *El Moudjahid* (1 June 1971): 1.
65. The MTA was created in Marseille in 1970 and was responsible for much of the mobilizing that took place beginning in 1973 around immigrant workers’ rights.
66. Poster, Mouvement des travailleurs arabe, “Contre le racisme, 2 journées d’information les 26–27 avril 1975,” BDIC.
67. The association’s leader was a Muslim from Réunion. That he came from neither North nor West Africa was perhaps what enabled him to try to create a Muslim association that reflected Islam’s universalist aspirations.
68. El Mountaqid, “Les Musulmans en France: Faux problèmes et problèmes réels,” *France-Islam* 103–106 (September–December 1975): 1.
69. Gérard Noiriel argues in his most recent book, *Immigration, antisémitisme et racisme en France*, that on the contrary, racist words and discourse have been instrumental in the propagation of racist and xenophobic sentiments in French history.
70. All citations from Hamza Boubakeur, “Autour d’une manifestation antiraciste,” *Le Monde* (22 September 1973).
71. “Une lâche agression devant la Mosquée de Paris,” *France-Islam* 42–44 (August–October 1970): cover page.
72. The ad in question, which was reproduced in the article criticizing Boubakeur (with the name of the company omitted so as not to provide it with further publicity), showed a display of rugs arranged in front of the archway of the Patio/Cour d’honneur: “The Mosquée de Paris transformed into an advertising background set while its administration’s heavies forbid youth from studying the Quran before the Friday prayers.” Djebali Ali, “Offense intolérable à l’Islam,” *France-Islam* 52 (June 1971): back cover. The Amicale had a similar response to charge that Si Hamza was selling non-*halal* meat within the Mosquée complex: “His Imam, thus, can continue every Friday to blare his slogans in favor of the House’s business from the height of the Mimbar, while his henchmen keep the faithful from opening their mouths, even to glorify their Creator, in the Mosquée.” See “Hamza Boubakeur et la viande *halâl*,” *France-Islam* 68–70 (October–December 1972): cover page.
73. References to the Association culturelle islamique’s distribution of prayer schedules for the month of Ramadan abound in immigrant association newsletters

and bulletins, such as the Service interdiocésain des travailleurs immigrés' bulletin *Paris-Babel*, which suggests that these schedules were widely distributed. It is likely that the student distributing the free schedules at the Mosquée was a member of the ACI, which would also explain his ejection by Si Hamza.

74. Djebali Ali, "Les aggrèsions à la Mosquée de Paris se suivent et ne se ressemblent pas," *France-Islam* 4546 (November–December 1970): back cover. Ali was the president of the Association des étudiants islamiques en France (AEIF, founded in 1963), an apolitical, pietist, and ritualist association. The AEIF originally enjoyed the support of the Mosquée de Paris, which saw an opportunity to make a gesture toward other currents in Parisian Muslim life. After the incident in question, however, the AEIF moved into a small space in the 15th *arrondissement* with the help of Professor Muhammad Hamidullah, a CNRS scholar of Pakistani origin and founder of the Centre culturel islamique. The center was intended to serve an academic audience, with conferences and publications; Kepel argues that Hamidullah's audience increased through his association with the AEIF. See Kepel, *Les banlieues de l'Islam*, 96; and Sellam, *La France et ses musulmans*, 118–19.

75. Ibid.

76. Boubakeur's translation included the verses made famous by Salman Rushdie as "the satanic verses," which describe the goddess Al-Lat. The Amicale took the scholars of Al-Azhar University in Cairo to task for their positive review of his translation.

77. Rodinson, one of France's premier orientalist scholars and historian of religion was a professor at the Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales. A Marxist of Jewish origin, he published his *Mahomet* in 1961.

78. "Hamza Boubakeur, l'homme au chapeau magique et quelques interrogations," [Winter 1974].

79. "Le despotisme de la direction de la Mosquée de Paris," *France-Islam* 45–46 (November–December 1970): 2.

80. On Muslim-Jewish tensions in France, see Ethan Katz, "Jews and Muslims in the Shadow of Marianne: Conflicting Identities and Republican Culture in France, 1914–1985," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 2009; and Maud Mandel, *Beyond Antisemitism: Muslims and Jews in Contemporary France* (forthcoming, Princeton University Press).

81. "Manifestation à la Mosquée de Paris contre Hamza Boubakeur," *El Moudjahid* (January 4, 1974).

82. The document is signed by the Mosquée de Belleville, de Nanterre, D'Argenteuil, de Clichy, and de Montfermeil as well as by "workers and Maghreb students."

83. Citations from this tract come from "Manifestation à la Mosquée de Paris contre Hamza Boubakeur," *El Moudjahid* (January 4, 1974), which reprinted it in full.

84. M. Farah, "Le pacha de Paris," *El Moudjahid* (4 January 1974).

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. B.N., "Hamza Boubakeur ou l'incarnation de la trahison," *El Moudjahid* (12 January 1974): 3.

88. Ibid.

89. Les Associations religieuses Islamiques de France, “Hamza Boubakeur, l’homme au chapeau magique et quelques interrogations,” tract distributed during the winter of 1974 [n.d.].

90. “Johnny Hallyday champion de la lutte contre le racisme et l’antisémitisme,” *France-Soir*, 2 February 1972.

91. See Daniel Gordon, “Juifs et musulmans à Belleville (Paris 20e) entre tolérance et conflit,” *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* 67 (2003); and Michel Abitbol, “The Integration of North African Jews in France,” *Yale French Studies* 85 (1994): 248–61.

92. An extract from this letter was printed in the Union Musulmane Internationale Bulletin no. 26.

93. Communiqué à la presse, 31 January 1974. The Muslim religious authorities who signed this statement included the Egyptian Cheikh Amer, the grand muphti of France; Si Hadj Abderrahman Henni, the inspecteur général des imams de France and imam de la Gironde et de la Vienne (no nationality listed); the Algerian Si Hadj Ali Benhamida, imam of l’Hérault and of the Pyrénées; the Moroccan Hadj Chellaf, imam of Paris and delegate of the Alaouiyya Brotherhood in France; the Tunisian Abdelkader Farfour, imam social at the Mosquée de Paris and in the suburbs; the Senegalese Cheikh Moussa Touré, of the Tidjaniyya Brotherhood; the Algerian Mohamed Benouaou, imam social in Paris; Hadj Tahar Hamdaoui, imam of La Charente and head of the Khadiriyya Brotherhood in France (no nationality given); and the religious delegates of l’Aube, l’Eure, Normandy, and Loire-Atlantique. The press release, of course, does not give us any insight into the discussions that took place at the meeting of the Amicale (headquartered at the Mosquée de Paris) and whether there was dissension among the religious leaders in terms of support for Si Hamza. The diversity of nationalities and religious tendencies among those who signed this text is intriguing, but I would argue that the fact of such a varied group of Muslim leaders publicly voicing support for Si Hamza is less indicative of broad-based support in the diverse Muslim communities of France than a sign that the Mosquée’s subordinates were following their leader’s party line. Those Muslim religious figures who openly attacked Si Hamza did so from independent positions, not from posts in Paris or the provinces that depended on the Parisian institution for funding and support.

94. The “party” in question refers to the FLN.

95. Philippe Bernert, “Il se bat pour sauver la Mosquée de Paris,” *L’Aurore* (26 February 1974).

96. John Ruedy argues that in the years immediately following independence, the Algerian government emphasized the compatibility between Islam and socialism and devoted significant financial support to the construction of religious sites, Islamic education, and the training and salaries of Muslim religious leaders. The government also appropriated symbols of Islam by incorporating religious observances into public life. But the Ministry of Religious Affairs maintained strict control over the country’s religious personnel, even going as far as to distribute “suggestions” for Friday sermons. See Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 224–25.

97. G. D., “Croyants en dispersion vus par un travailleur social,” *Missi (Magazine d’information spirituelle et de solidarité internationale)* 9 (November 1976): 280–83.

98. “Des migrants comme nous sont à la recherche du Dieu-Vivant,” *Croissance de l’Eglise* 34 (April 1975): 9.

99. G. D., “Croyants,” 281.

100. For descriptive explanations of Muslim holidays for a non-Muslim audience, see for example “Regard sur l’Islam,” a special issue of *Fêtes et saisons* 315 (May 1977).

101. Gaston Pietri, “*Tous fils d’Abraham*,” *Paris-Babel* 96 (November 1980): 7.

102. The Jama’at al Tabligh movement was founded in India in 1927. Its goal was to bring India’s Muslims back to Islam and away from their ties to Hinduism through outreach with a simple message, intense personal engagement, and group cohesion. The principles of the Tablighi movement are as follows: the profession of faith, prayer, the acquisition of the knowledge of God, respect for all Muslims, sincere intentions, the devotion of time for preaching, and abstention from all futile or worldly words or actions. The Tablighis would leave the AIB’s mosque due to a schism between the two groups and go on to establish an important mosque in Clichy in 1970. 1973 marked the beginning of their presence on rue Jean-Pierre Timbaud, in Paris’ 11th *arrondissement*, which was followed by the opening of mosques all over Ile-de-France and in provincial centers with large Muslim populations. See Kepel’s chapter “Foi et Pratique” in *Les Banlieues de l’Islam*.

103. *La Croix* (16 September 1975), cited in Kepel, *Les Banlieues de l’Islam*, 97–98.

104. See letter from the Service interdiocésain des travailleurs immigrés (SITI), 15 March 1976. Archives historiques de l’Archidiocèse de Paris Dossier N.D. de la Croix de Ménilmontant.

105. *Ibid.*

106. A letter from Père Loubier to Church officials attempted to reassure them that the arrangement was a temporary one and that the entry to the crypt was completely separate from those to the church. He emphasized the Muslims’ respect for their Catholic hosts’ sensibilities, saying that the only negative reaction from a parishioner had come from a *ped noir*. However, Loubier worried that “in spite of these explanations, our initiative won’t please everyone, and racist reactions may yet come.” However, he was confident that the ONCPI would come to the church’s aid if need be. Letter dated 4 May 1976, AHDP Dossier N.D. de la Croix de Ménilmontant.

107. “A Paris, la crypte de l’église de Ménilmontant accueille la mosquée du quartier Belleville.” *Missi* 9 (November 1976).

108. “Ramadhan à Paris,” *L’Algérien en Europe* 113 (15–29 November 1970): 21.

109. “Ramadan 1396 à Paris,” *Paris-Babel* 58 (October 1976): 14.

110. See “Retour du pèlerinage,” *Fêtes et Saisons* 22.

111. Alain Boyer, *L’Institut Musulman de la Mosquée de Paris* (Paris: La Documentation française, 1992), 48. The Mosquée had begun to go into debt by the beginning of Si Hamza’s tenure as *recteur*. In an interview with French sociologist Mohammed Telhine, he explained that Si Ahmed had been guilty of financial mismanagement during his brief period as the institution’s leader and brought formal charges against him. He claimed to have eventually abandoned the charges of financial wrong-doing he laid against Si Ahmed at the request of the French government. See Mohammed Telhine, *L’islam et les musulmans en France: une histoire des mosquées* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2010), 207–8.

112. *Ibid.*, 208–9.

113. Legally, as it turned out, this decision was not binding because the association would have had to declare its own dissolution and the transfer of its patrimony in the *Journal Officiel*, followed by a *décret d’autorisation*, at which point a notary would

have been able to register the transfer. Since this procedure was not followed, the 4 August 1982 decision had no legal value but was nevertheless treated as binding by the Algerian government in staking its claim on the site.

114. This announcement was made on 16 September 1982.

115. Cited in Boyer, *L'Institut Musulman de la Mosquée de Paris*, 51.

116. In 1989, French political scientist Bruno Étienne estimated the total Muslim population to be approximately 2.5 million people by counting immigrants from Muslim countries and French citizens with origins in one or more Muslim country, with the addition of European converts and undocumented immigrants. See Bruno Étienne, *La France et l'islam* (Paris: Hachette, 1989). More recent estimates put the figure at approximately 5 million people, of whom half are North African Arabs, the rest divided between a majority of Berber North Africans and smaller groups of Turks, West Africans, Madagascarians, Comorians, South Asians, and European converts.

117. For an interesting discussion of the difficulties of identifying “Muslim” in France historically or in the present, given the prohibitions on census questions about race and religion, see the introduction to Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaïsse’s *Integrating Islam* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006). In conducting their own research, they explain that for their population estimates they considered “potential Muslims,” that is to say, people of “Muslim origin” at least some of whose ancestors were “Muslim” because of their place of birth and European converts to Islam. They also note that they consider to be Muslim people who might not consider themselves to be Muslim and would identify as atheist or members of another religion or would simply refuse to identify themselves as religious or not since they consider themselves first and foremost republicans. Their inclusion of these “sociological Muslims” offers a telling example of the extent to which race and national origin have been conflated with Muslimness by social scientists. They also provide a typology of generational investment in Muslimness, ranging from the immigrant workers of the 1970s to their children, the *beurs* of the 1980s concerned with racism and social justice, and then finally the “Muslims” of the 1990s, who identify themselves explicitly as Muslim and demanded rights as such. See Laurence and Vaïsse, *Integrating Islam*, 25–27.

## Conclusion

1. The project was originally known as the Institut des cultures musulmanes.

2. These citations, as well as those that follow, are taken from the Paris City Hall’s *Projet de Mission: Assistance à la Maîtrise d’Ouvrage pour la définition du programme de réalisation d’un “Institut des cultures musulmanes” dans le quartier de la Goutte d’Or* (23 November 2005).

3. Ibid.

4. For concise discussions of the headscarf controversies and analyses of their implications, see Joan Wallach Scott, *The Politics of the Veil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); and John Bowen, *Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). On other dimensions of the controversies, see, for example, Leora Auslander, “Bavarian Crucifixes and French Headscarves: Religious Signs and the Postmodern European