

CHRISTIAN RESPONSES TO VIETNAM:
THE ORGANIZATION OF DISSENT

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Note to readers: this essay is excerpted from a longer piece that covers reactions of independent Christian journalism and organized Christian response to American activities in Vietnam, from the late 1950s through the end of the war.

Beginnings

Up to about 1965, the dissent expressed in the pages of *Christian Century*¹ and *Christianity and Crisis* had been fairly mild. The journals largely supported America's motive for its presence in Vietnam. Prior to the 1964 presidential election, support for American policy had been consistent. After 1965, editorials began openly to question the escalation carried out by Johnson. They criticized the failure to negotiate, and the impossible conditions expected before negotiations could take place. In the fall of 1965, Christians began to organize more effectively against the war. At that time, the existing dissenting Christian groups were largely composed of pacifists. Further, the newer dissenting groups representing the New Left, were often as willing to overlook violence on the left as they were to reject it on the right. There seemed to be no middle ground. Many Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish leaders sought a way to express their dissent without identifying completely with any of the existing groups.

Meanwhile, the existing groups, during their annual meeting in 1965 to remember the anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, gathered under the name of "The Assembly of Unrepresented People." A.J. Muste of the Fellowship of Reconciliation and others representing

Women Strike for Peace, the Committee for Nonviolent Action, the Catholic Worker Movement, and the War Resisters League all played roles in planning the Assembly. On the first day of the protest, Philip Berrigan addressed nearly one thousand protesters in front of the White House. On the last day of the three day Assembly, some 350 protesters were arrested for attempting to reach Congress with their petition for peace signed by more than six thousand people. The next day Congress passed a bill authorizing stiff penalties for the destruction of draft cards (five years and a ten thousand dollar fine). The biggest accomplishment of the weekend for the protesters was the emergence of a new National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NCCEWV), an umbrella organization with a membership of thirty-three separate organizations.

The NCCEWV planned an event for October under the title “International Days of Protest.” Leaders organized the event on both coasts. On October 15-16, the demonstration in New York City included nearly twenty-five thousand participants who paraded down Fifth Avenue. In Manhattan, a twenty-two year old Catholic Worker member burned his draft card. Television cameras caught the act. Tom Cornell, a leader among the Catholic Worker movement, a friend and veteran of draft card burnings, described draft card burning and the effect of Johnson’s legislation in the movement’s newsletter:

In psychological terms it’s a kind of castration symbol and an Oedipal thing. Your kid is flying in the face of authority. . . . There is a kind of civil or state religion which has subsumed large elements of Christianity, Judaism, whatever else there is, and it has its symbols, obviously secular symbols like the flag, George Washington, Abraham Lincoln. It’s subsumed a good part of our traditional real religion. And the draft card then becomes a sacrament. And there’s nothing worse that you can do in sacramental terms than defile a species of the sacrament. And this was a defilement, a real blasphemy against the state.²

Criticism of these protests appeared everywhere. James Reston of the *New York Times* declared that antiwar protests only contributed to the postponement of peace. Carl F. H. Henry, in *Christianity Today*, described burning draft cards as “certainly a far cry from ‘panty raids’ in

the springtime.” These students committed acts “perilously close to treason.” *America* theorized that the protests bore the “earmarks of a planned propaganda effort of dubious and suspect origin, whose real purpose was not so much to influence US policy as to arouse world opinion against it.” Such acts would only encourage the Vietcong and cost more Americans their lives. Bill Moyers, President Johnson’s press secretary at the time, quoted LBJ’s surprise that any American would “feel toward his country in a way that is not consistent with the national interest.”³ In other words, in one fell swoop, Johnson placed all those who questioned the wisdom of his policies in an anti-American position, even though most of these protesters believed they acted in the best interests of the country.

The response of religious leaders to these protests against protesting was swift. In St. Louis, five hundred delegates of the Sixth World Order Study Conference of the National Conference of Churches (NCC) adopted a resolution that concluded in part:

The First amendment preserves the right of even one man against a majority in this basic freedom. For the functioning of the democratic process, then, dissent is both legitimate and essential. Our government, thus, has an obligation to protect the right of dissent, especially in times of war or national emergency, when civil liberties are most threatened.

Another group of one hundred clergy representing America’s three major faiths signed a statement defending dissent. The co-chairs of the group were Rabbi Abraham J. Heschel, Father Daniel J. Berrigan, S.J., and Reverend Richard Neuhaus. The statement noted that “to characterize every act of protest as Communist-inspired or traitorous is to subvert the very democracy which loyal Americans seek to protect.”⁴ Responding to a reporter’s question about what was next, Rabbi Heschel announced, to the surprise of all clergy gathered including his fellow chairs, that the group would organize and work to protect and promote opposition to the war in churches and synagogues across the country. This ecumenical group assumed the name of Clergy Concerned About Vietnam.

Clergy Concerned, later renamed Clergy and Laity Concerned About Vietnam (CALCAV), became from these days forward the leading ecumenical organization in America protesting government policies in Vietnam. The National Council of Churches tried to provide leadership in this area. After the joint call for action issued by *Christianity and Crisis* and the *Century*, the NCC appointed a special study panel on Vietnam. Strictly an advisory committee, the study group was bound by NCC rules that forbid any educational group to speak in its behalf. Actually, the constituent member churches of NCC built this limitation into the organization from the beginning. In November 1965, the *Century* noted this problem and claimed the same limitations also affected the denominations themselves. Most denominational boards and assemblies were only empowered to speak for those gathered rather than for the denominations as a whole.

In most cases, the major fear behind these restrictions was the fear that controversial issues would lead to conflict and, ultimately, division. Therefore, the *Century* editor concluded, “most of the Protestant churches stand mindless and mute before the great events which shake the ecclesiastical, cultural and social foundations of our time.” Since Protestants want no one to speak on their behalf, “no one knows whether there is a majority opinion and commitment” about pressing issues. No one knows whether a consensus exists and, if it does, “no one knows whether it is Christian.” He continued:

It may be that in the United States Christians are now so thoroughly dispersed in and absorbed by the general fabric of society that it is wholly impossible to obtain a Christian opinion on anything. It may be that the churches are saying nothing about the issues facing the people because as churches they have no mind to speak. . . . If this is the situation we need to know it. Do the churches have anything to say to the world about the world's affairs that the world cannot say just as well to itself? We need to devise methods of answering this question, even though in the process we run the risk of conflict and division. Better turmoil in the church than total irrelevance.⁵

The Vietnam War did not really help to solve the questions raised here. “Christian” opinion found expression on all sides of the issue. Most denominations, living by their own built-in restrictions, did little to address the war itself. CALCAV, however, being a parachurch and voluntary organization, suffered no such restrictions. That is why it became the most effective instrument of Christian witness during the Vietnam War.

Editors at the *Century* and *Christianity and Crisis* expressed their opposition to American policies even more strongly as 1965 gave way to 1966. *Commonweal* increasingly expressed its doubts about the wisdom of the current direction of the war effort. Though none of them called for what might be described as a “precipitous” withdrawal of forces, they insisted on United Nations intervention and unconditional negotiations that would include a significant role for the National Liberation Front (NLF) in a post-war Vietnam. They condemned Johnson’s shift in policy that seemed committed to the mistaken notion of seeking an “all out military victory” in the “undeclared war” in Vietnam. *Commonweal* reversed its previous support for short-term bombing efforts and joined the other two journals in calling for an immediate stop to all bombing.⁶ Meanwhile, *Christianity Today* and *America* continued their efforts to encourage American resolve in Vietnam and to defend the continued bombardment of North Vietnam. The war would end the second the aggressors from North Vietnam stopped their aggression.⁷

Of these three journals with serious questions about the war, *Christianity and Crisis* found itself in the most unusual position. Its birth in 1941 came because it opposed Christian isolationism, especially the neutralist and pacifist sentiments so present in the Christian community at the time. Niebuhr and his colleagues at *Christianity and Crisis* took the lead in providing a strong Christian rationale for American intervention in World War II. But in 1966, they stood absolutely opposed to American military action in Vietnam. What had changed? Paul Ramsey, Professor at Princeton and mainline Protestant with little patience for the developing Christian dissent, posed the irony most succinctly when he wrote: “Even Reinhold Niebuhr signs petitions and editorials as if Reinhold Niebuhr had never existed.”⁸ In other words, Ramsey and others could not see how a primary architect of Christian realism, which itself offered a careful

analysis of the necessity standing behind any nation's use of power, could possibly be opposed to the realistic purposes being addressed in America's intervention in Vietnam. Hubert Humphrey made the same point when he addressed the *Christianity and Crisis* banquet honoring the twenty-fifth anniversary of the magazine in February 1966.⁹ But this view is overly simplistic, too much an "either-or" kind of scenario.

Two Visions of America

This is the same problem evident in the overly brief section treating Vietnam in James Davison Hunter's book, *Culture Wars*. On the one hand, Hunter is right in his generalization that the debates surrounding Vietnam had more to do with "America's role in the world community" than with "the fate of a peasant society in southeast Asia." On the other hand, he is wrong to say that the debates took either one of two different kinds of visions of that role. One vision, that of the defenders of America's role in Vietnam, held that, since America possessed vast power, it had to use that power "to intervene for the principles of good and fair play . . . deterring or thwarting the aggression of one nation against another" This vision appealed to those who were confident of "America's essential goodness." Belief in American institutions included the understanding that these institutions would also serve others in the world if only they would adopt them. A strong military presence is essential, not only to defend those institutions in America, but to use it to protect others in their desires to adopt them.

The competing vision, held by those who protested American involvement, wrote Hunter, is that "a strong military represents a misuse of America's power and resources." No matter how good America is, it does not have the "right to impose its institutions or its way of life upon other nations." That smacks too much of imperialism. America's wealth should not be wasted on a military, but rather it should be used to alleviate "social and economic inequality – the source,

more often than not, of such conflict.” In Vietnam, Hunter concluded, this “latter vision came to hold sway, and eventually forced the end of the war in defeat.”¹⁰ Hunter’s analysis, however, is overly simplistic and at best only partially true.

This second vision described by Hunter likely would fit most of the pacifist groups who dissented during Vietnam. But the pacifists groups were small in number and made up only a very small percentage, ultimately, of the Christians who protested American activity in Vietnam. The dissent against the war that by 1972, became so loud and far-reaching that it helped force America to withdraw, had very little to do with pacifism. That dissent was composed of liberals and conservatives with a vast array of moral philosophies and motives. Hunter is correct, however, in his brief description of the peace movement’s overall concern for the use of economic resources. Throughout the war, most protestors—pacifist or not—expressed regular concern about the effect of the war on Johnson’s “Great Society” program. The consistent theme resounded that billions of dollars spent annually in an unnecessary war effort could have been better used at home.

Perhaps the most important attribute dissenters shared was described by Robert Wuthnow. In his book, *The Struggle for America’s Soul*, he generalized that the tensions of the 1960s, particularly as exemplified in the struggles over civil rights and Vietnam, had something to do with an increasing realization among Americans of the widening gap between values and behavior. Americans valued democracy and the right of every people to determine their own destiny. But in Vietnam, America seemed to be involved in a war that denied this value. This theme appeared with routine frequency in the editorials denouncing the war. The South Vietnamese people deserved the right to determine their own destiny, and most, it appeared, did not support the destiny America was trying to give them, and did not in any way support the

various ineffective, even cruel, regimes American power propped up throughout the period. Dissenters continued to drive home the point that, even Americans, people with good values and the best of intentions, “could not always be counted on to manifest those virtues in their day-to-day behavior.”¹¹

Wuthnow pushed his discussion of values and behavior a bit too far, however. He wrote that conservatives emphasized instilling the proper values in individuals while liberals emphasized behaviors. Thus, liberals and conservatives were on the opposite end of the issues surrounding the war. Liberals were willing to take social actions to change the behavior of institutions, while conservatives emphasized changing individual values. Again, the divisions between liberals and conservatives during the war are likely far more complicated. But the division may be due, at least partially, to the fact that it took longer for conservatives to recognize the disjuncture that existed between the values Americans held and the behaviors they exhibited in Vietnam. By the end of the war, this realization had begun to sink in for a wide variety of people, not only liberals, but conservatives as well. In light of the events of the 1960s, Christians increasingly realized they could no longer take the goodness or the innocence of their country for granted.

The dilemma editors at *Christianity and Crisis* found themselves in resulted from a popular belief (similar to the mistaken generalization of Hunter), that one had to be a pacifist to oppose the war. Or, at the very least, one had to be a naïve idealist or isolationist who had trouble dealing with the hard realities of international life where power was a necessary part of the equation. This is why Ramsey claimed that even Niebuhr acted as if “Niebuhr had never existed.” But, as John Bennett put it when he answered these critics in 1966, “we still recognize the necessity for the military ingredient in national power and the moral obligation to use power

at times to check power.” The use of power in Vietnam, however, differed significantly from the use of power to defeat Hitler. Communism was neither as monolithic nor as unchanging as Hitler’s Nazism appeared to be. And communism had not expanded primarily through military means, which was at the root of Nazism.¹² Military power placed at the service of national values, as it was during World War II, was decidedly different from military power used in ways that contradicted those values, which seemed to many to be the case in Vietnam.

In a 1966 editorial signed by members of the board, *Crisis* editors made especially clear their objection to the deepening chasm in American values. America, the editors wrote, worked at cross purposes with itself. Sometimes the government claimed Americans fought and died in Vietnam to prevent the expansion of communism. At other times, the government claimed they fought “to give the people of Vietnam their free choice of a government – and that, everybody knows, may be a Communist government.” Such confusion demonstrated to many Americans that the government did not have a clear purpose standing behind its military actions. “Even if [the] best possible case is made, the US still finds itself engaged in a war that is destructive to the people whom we claim to be helping, to the peace of the world and to our best interests.”¹³

The Values-Action Divide

In the midst of numerous points that addressed the reasons why American action in Vietnam flew in the face of a realistic assessment of the situation, the editors also illustrated their awareness of the gap that existed between expressed American values and actual American behavior. Televised images of the war, like those dealing with the Civil Rights movement, began making their way into American living rooms. These images graphically portrayed the values divide. Americans burned villages, killed and maimed civilians indiscriminately, and used napalm and chemicals to destroy crops, all while claiming to be helping the South Vietnamese

people. Ironically, the editors pointed out, America has become the symbol of “neo-colonialism,” in the eyes of the world community, while at the same time it has professed its belief in the principles of democratic self-determination. America has demonstrated through its actions that it has been more concerned with its own honor, with saving face, than it has been interested in working toward achieving an honorable peace.¹⁴ In short, Americans have lacked the vision of their principles.

Scripture warns that “where there is no vision the people perish.” The failure of vision in our time is a blindness to realities no less than to ideals. The threat of this moment is a preoccupation with the enemy that destroys our society’s power to understand itself or its foes. In such a time the greatest service to the society comes from those voices – in church, politics and press – that risk the displeasure of the powers that be in order to challenge dogmatism that imperil ourselves and our world. To these voices we again add our own.¹⁵

From 1966 on, this kind of argument emphasizing the disjuncture between values and behavior became predominant in the journals opposing the war. In April 1966, the *Century* claimed that the use of idealistic arguments to support American involvement in Vietnam no longer worked. The “self-righteous argument” that Americans were in Vietnam “because a freedom-loving people summoned us to their aid” had “eroded and collapsed not because wise men exposed its error – . . . but because it can no longer stand against the relentless assaults of unfolding events.”¹⁶ Editors at *Commonweal* made the same point:

The Johnson Administration’s ability to cling to the old mythology staggers belief. The myth that we are in Vietnam to protect the freedom of a people who want us there has lost its remaining shreds of credibility. Anti-American sentiments – and demonstrations – are widespread. . . . the “freedom” which President Johnson speaks of for the Vietnamese should also include the freedom from Americans.¹⁷

Borrowing a phrase of Senator William J. Fulbright from the title of his well-known series of talks at Johns Hopkins University during the spring of 1966, American dissenters to the war were not so much bothered by the use of power; they were instead bothered by the “arrogance” that accompanied America’s use of power, an arrogance that violated America’s

expressed ideals.¹⁸ Fulbright compared the country's arrogance to that of Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany. These comparisons, especially the one to Hitler, upset many Americans, but such comparisons became frequent in many peace circles after 1966.¹⁹

The comparison came primarily at two points. First, the extensive violence of the American persecution of the war and the silence of the church in the face of it invited comment. Gordon Zahn, writing in *Commonweal* in 1966, claimed Americans were "accomplices in mass murder in Vietnam." He wrote about the massive bombing that resulted in the deaths of civilians and about the routine use of torture to get information from prisoners, both practices fairly well documented but largely ignored. Both activities violated the standards Americans proclaimed at the Nuremberg trials. Zahn reminded himself and others of the silence of German Catholics during the Nazi period, and encouraged Catholics today to speak, lest they be guilty of the same silence.²⁰ When the My Lai massacre came to light a few years later, it forced a greater number of people to face the reality that such atrocities were actually being committed by Americans.

The second point that invited comparisons to Nazism and Nuremberg grew out of the failure of the American government to make some kind of provision for selective conscientious objection. To force a young American male to serve in Vietnam when, based upon a religious commitment, he had reached the conclusion that the war itself was unjust was to hold submission to a governmental authority as a higher value than the sanctity of one's individual religious belief and conscience. It was to place loyalty to "Caesar's will" above loyalty to "God's will." If there was one lesson Nuremberg had taught the world, it was that those who obeyed the authority of the Nazi government rather than their individual consciences or religious beliefs were as guilty as the diabolical government they served. Whether America's action in Vietnam was equally diabolical or not was beside the point. If the individual conscience believed it was, then to force the individual to violate that belief was to violate the ethical standards Americans claimed to uphold at Nuremberg.²¹

It is clear, of course, that not all Christians agreed with this assessment. The National Association of Evangelicals, for example, met in April 1966 and passed a "Law and Order"

resolution that condemned an “unamerican mood which has invaded our society” as “godless, revolutionary, and disloyal to government.” The resolution pledged evangelical Christians to “obedience to the injunctions of Scripture to respect the authorities over us.”²² The important point to recognize, however, is that sometime around 1966, a good number of American Christian leaders began to view America differently than they ever had before. The activities of the government, concluded John Bennett, made “it difficult to be an American.” Or, as Reinhold Niebuhr put it that spring, “For the first time I fear I am ashamed of our beloved nation.” His statement illustrated well what most of these Christian dissenters felt; they loved the country, but were disgusted by its actions in Vietnam.²³ A growing number among Christian leaders began to question more openly their abilities to trust American leadership and its decisions.

Organized for Action

Clergy and Laymen (later Laity) Concerned About Vietnam (CALCAV) took actions to carry the message of dissent throughout the country. By the spring of 1966, CALCAV was well on its way to becoming a national network of clergy and laypersons opposed to the war. Membership was, and mostly remained, largely white, male, and middle class. In order to keep its moderate image, its leaders tried to avoid identification with the more radical dissenters in the country. John Bennett and others feared an outright association with Communist groups. The organization generally refused to participate in public ways with either of the newly formed antiwar organizations: the Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam or the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam.²⁴ Throughout 1966 and 1967, CALCAV’s leadership understood its purpose as an effort to raise awareness among Jews and Christians and to try to bring its resources to bear to avoid continued escalation of the war. During this first year and a half of its existence, it eschewed acts of civil disobedience.

The group hosted its first national meeting in Washington, D.C. where nearly 2,500 participants from 47 states and Canada gathered for two days, beginning on January 31, 1967. Carl F. H. Henry, editor of *Christianity Today*, watched the procession from his office window, the picture of “sanctimonious aloofness,” and concluded that the plea of these clergymen “gives enormous comfort to Communist aggression.”²⁵ Just before this gathering, Robert McAfee Brown gathered the collective wisdom of the executive committee of CALCAV in order to produce an “official position paper” to be distributed to participants and to members of Congress and the administration. The document began with an emphasis on now familiar themes:

A time comes when silence is betrayal. That time has come for us in relation to Vietnam. Our allegiance to our nation is held under a higher allegiance to the God who is sovereign over all nations. . . . Each day we find allegiance to our nation’s policy more difficult to reconcile with allegiance to our God.

Mitchell Hall’s history of CALCAV points out that due to its mainstream religious leadership, the organization immediately garnered more respect from the administration than other antiwar organizations. Shortly after the national gathering in Washington, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara met with John Bennett, William Sloane Coffin, Robert McAfee Brown, Rabbi Heschel, Richard Neuhaus, Rabbi Jacob Weinstein, and Catholic layman Michael Novak. In the meeting, the group summarized Brown’s position paper. Among other things, they called for an unconditional halt to the bombing in order to start serious negotiations, for American agreement to include the NLF as a party to the peace talks, and for full cooperation with the United Nations and other international organizations. McNamara listened, but made it clear that “pressure to escalate would mount” because the other side refused to negotiate. Hall records that once members of the group got outside after the meeting, they agreed “it was a dangerous world when so much evil could be done by a man who was really a ‘nice guy.’”²⁶

CALCAV and Christian dissent in general received a big boost in the winter and spring of 1967 when Martin Luther King, Jr. spoke out clearly against the war. He delivered his first

address in February to a conference sponsored by *The Nation* magazine in Beverly Hills, California. At a march one month later in Chicago, King described the war as a “blasphemy against all that America stands for.” As a result of these activities, the Spring Mobilization Committee invited King to serve as the keynote speaker for its April 15 demonstration at the United Nations. Like CALCAV, King feared the implications of his association with leftist groups clustered around the antiwar movement. When invited, King demanded that the name of the public relations director for the Communist Party be taken off the letterhead of the Spring Mobilization; he also made the demand that Stokely Carmichael be dropped from the program. When leaders of the Mobilization told him they could not do those things, King eventually agreed to speak anyway.²⁷ But to cover himself in a way that would show his independence from the left, he contacted CALCAV and asked to speak at Riverside Church in the period just before the Spring Mobilization. This April 4 address, rather than the speech delivered in front of the United Nations on April 15, is the speech that has been remembered. According to Hall, Andrew Young and Allard Lowenstein wrote the speech.²⁸

King’s speech linked the Civil Rights movement and Vietnam in a way that made many black leaders uncomfortable. Roy Wilkins and Whitney Young, Jr. both criticized his speech. The board of the NAACP passed a resolution to keep the two movements separate.²⁹ King’s speech recognized that the connections were not something one chose, but rather intrinsic to what both movements were about:

In 1957, when a group of us formed the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, we chose as our motto: “To save the soul of America.” . . . Now it should be incandescently clear that no one who has any concern for the integrity and life of America today can ignore the present war. If America’s soul becomes totally poisoned, part of the autopsy must read “Vietnam.” . . . So it is that those of us who are yet determined that America *will* be saved are led down the path of protest and dissent, working for the health of our land.

He called for a “radical revolution of values.” Revolutions were taking place all over the globe, he told his audience. “It is a sad fact that, because of comfort, complacency, a morbid fear of

Communism, and our proneness to adjust to injustice, the Western nations that initiated so much of the revolutionary spirit of the modern world have now become the arch anti-revolutionaries.”

King offered a five-step program “to atone for our sins and errors in Vietnam.” He called for an end to all bombing; a unilateral cease fire with the goal of beginning negotiations; the curtailment of all military build-up elsewhere in Southeast Asia, particularly in Thailand and Laos; acceptance of the NLF as a player in any future Vietnamese government; and the establishment of a date for all foreign troops to leave Vietnam. He urged the church to seek out “every creative means of protest possible.” To all ministers who held ministerial exemptions, he recommended giving them up in order to seek conscientious objector status, a status that most likely would be denied. The injustice of the war needed to be exposed in whatever ways were possible.³⁰ The next week, King’s name was listed as a national co-chair of CALCAV. On April 15, the Spring Mobilization gathered between 150,000 and 400,000 protesters (estimates vary) in New York City and another 50,000 in San Francisco. The antiwar movement had gained considerable strength. Meanwhile, some 438,000 troops were now in Vietnam.

Christian Differences

Catholic participation in CALCAV had, by and large, been very limited. During these years non-pacifist Catholic protest was fairly rare. The most active Catholic participants were John B. Sheerin, the editor of *Catholic World*, and Michael Novak. Father Daniel Berrigan had helped found it, but shortly after his return from forced exile, he left it behind for more direct acts of civil disobedience. The activism of the brothers Berrigan (Daniel and Philip) is well known.³¹ CALCAV had attempted to attract Catholic attendance for its January 1967 gathering in Washington, but had no luck in generating participation. They sent letters to all the bishops in the United States, but only about a dozen responded, some of them “in very ‘hawkish’ terms.”³² While 2,500 clergy attended, not a single Catholic bishop participated. The *National Catholic Reporter* sent surveys asking three questions about Vietnam to 225 bishops and received only six

replies. Three of these would speak for the record and they supported the government. Edward Fiske of the *New York Times* noted that the “main exception to the general trend” of discussion among clergy about the war “is the American hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church, which has been largely silent.” *Commonweal* complained that the “near-total silence” of the bishops about the moral issues involved in the war “must be judged a scandal.”³³

At a CALCAV event in February 1967, Archbishop Paul J. Hallinan was one of the first Catholic bishops to speak up about the war, but he soon backed away from any active participation in activities against it. Catholic participation in CALCAV slowly grew between 1967 and 1971. In a national conference held in Ann Arbor in the summer of 1971, 21% of the four hundred people attending were Catholic. However, the participation of Catholic bishops remained minimal. The most active Catholic bishop in CALCAV was James Shannon, an auxiliary bishop in the Archdiocese of St. Paul. His frustration with other bishops over this issue probably contributed to his resignation from the priesthood in 1969.

In December 1966, *Commonweal* finally declared the Vietnam War completely immoral and unjust, “a crime and a sin, despite good intentions.” A month later, the bishops issued a pastoral, *Peace and Vietnam*, which supported American participation in Vietnam. Cardinal Spellman, the military vicar for US troops, visited Vietnam in December and baptized the war by declaring his absolute support for his country “right or wrong.”³⁴ The bishops as a group remained silent about the war throughout 1967. In November 1968, they issued a pastoral letter entitled *Human Life in Our Day*. A significant portion of the letter dealt with Vietnam. Though they stopped short of calling the war unjust, they did raise moral questions about it and solidly endorsed the concept of selective conscientious objection, recommending that the government amend the Selective Service Act.

Throughout 1966 and 1967, the Johnson administration had taken small actions to attempt to discredit the antiwar movement. Johnson referred to dissenters publicly as “nervous Nellies.” The FBI and CIA infiltrated the peace movement and through “provocateurs” who engaged in outrageous actions made moves to embarrass protesters. Throughout these two years, reports of civilian casualties in Vietnam soared and the inaccuracy of bombing from high altitudes gained considerable attention. In December, U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, issued a statement suggesting Americans would be shocked if they knew the truth about the United States and Vietnam. The credibility gap between statements made by the administration and the actual events in Vietnam grew wider and deeper. Perhaps one of the biggest ongoing mistakes made by the Johnson administration was its unwillingness to allow medical supplies intended for civilians and noncombatants and shipped by ministerial organizations to reach the North. It deemed such activities as potentially traitorous for aiding and abetting the enemy.³⁵ As death tolls mounted, editorials contained an increasing level of desperation about American involvement. As the *Century* put the point,

It may seem cruel to tell Americans who have lost loved ones in Vietnam that the sacrifice was useless or to warn others of us that when our sons go to Vietnam they will fight and die in vain. But the cruelty lies in the fact and not in the revealing of the fact, in the war itself and not in the condemnation of it. We are wasting splendid young lives with all their immense possibilities in a needless, futile war.³⁶

Meanwhile, *America* and *Christianity Today* and other supporters of the war effort seemed to dig heels in a bit deeper. Editors attacked protesters and urged America not to give in. Negotiation, under current circumstances, would only mean that “International order would have been dealt a most serious blow.” Carl F. H. Henry chastised church leaders for their activity in political affairs and their lame attempts to approve or disapprove the “specifics of legislation or military strategy.” They should, he wrote, rather “proclaim the standards by which God will judge men and nations.”

. . . the cadre of ecclesiastics who have emerged as sacred specialists in political, economic and military strategy have unfortunately scarred the image of the clergy. . . . When churchmen enthrone their own fallible opinions as the high will of God, they inevitably encourage public distrust and unbelief that the Church truly bears any sure Word of God.³⁷

Evangelical supporters of the war never seemed to question their own support of the war, or to interpret it as an example of dabbling in political affairs or approving military strategy. They had no problem reporting that Billy Graham, after making a visit to Vietnam, “said that Americans should back their President in his decision to make a stand in Viet Nam.” In the words of the *Century*, “they have made their peace with this evil thing . . . Is it not ironic?”³⁸

In a letter to the editor, Graham chided the *Century* for attributing to him an opinion about the war. “I have been extremely careful,” he wrote, “not to be drawn into either the moral implications or the tactical military problems of the Vietnam war.” The *Century* responded by reminding Graham of the many ways he had passed judgment: his recent condemnation of King’s address, his protest against protesters, describing them as “giving comfort to the enemy,” and his many examples of vocal support of American policy in Vietnam. From “his position high above life’s sordid arena,” the editor wrote, “Graham plunged into the dangerous waters of opinion.” One wonders what the *Century* would have written if they had known that a few years later, Graham used his influence with Nixon to “gain draft exemptions for Campus Crusade staff members, contending that, though unordained, they were doing the work of ministers.”³⁹ Events during the Vietnam and Nixon years did not do much to draw out Graham’s better qualities.

Reaching Critical Mass

By February 1968, 16,000 of some 400,000 clergy in America were members of CALCAV. Their ranks continued to grow. George Davis, pastor to the president at National City Christian Church, represented many others with a contrary viewpoint. On the Sunday after the massive National Mobilization event in Washington in October 1967 that included a massive draft card burning, LBJ heard him condemn the “bearded oafs who listen to the strumming of

lugubrious guitars.”⁴⁰ But the tide was turning and religious protest to the war was growing considerably. Fewer pulpits were willing to tow the official line of the president. A few months later, for example, Johnson visited the Bruton Parish Church in Williamsburg, Virginia on a Sunday morning. The Episcopalian minister, Cotesworth Pinckney Lewis, took the opportunity to question American presence in Vietnam.⁴¹ About the same time, 215 clergy in Minnesota (not known as a particularly radical state in matters religious), signed and submitted an advertisement to the *Century* in January 1968 entitled “Silence is Betrayal.” “Like a cancer, Vietnam is eating away at the very life blood and bones of our nation,” the statement read. “Our ideals and values are in danger of destruction.” Statements like these were unthinkable just a few years earlier. They revealed the extent to which the war began to rob clergy and other Americans of their previously comfortable belief in the innocence of the nation.⁴² LBJ, feeling lost himself, announced on March 31 that he would not seek a second term.

The massive Tet offensive launched by the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) turned into one of the events that led to Johnson’s decision not to seek another term. Massive American casualties and an enemy offensive strong enough to debunk the administration’s claim the forces of the NLF were weakened and demoralized exposed the futility of much of the American war effort, even among some of the war’s supporters. After three months of Tet, a Gallup Poll showed that those believing America was making progress dropped from 50% to 33% in those short months. More importantly, 49% of the public in March 1968 believed America had made a mistake in entering Vietnam in the first place. Americans had begun to recognize Vietnam for the mire it had become.⁴³ Near the year’s end, Christian leaders were certain that the war was winding down. Little did they know that the number of Americans killed would nearly double before war’s end. Between March 1968 and March 1969, the total

number of dead grew from 19,670 to 33,641, (more than the 33,629 that represented the total number of Americans killed in the Korean War). The total count of the dead would grow to nearly 58,000 within the next three years.⁴⁴

Just as the great difficulties associated with civil rights and Vietnam hit the scene in America, Catholicism had arrived as one of the three major faiths in America. As a movement, it had to struggle with the meaning of its newfound status in society as a middle-class and thoroughly American church and with the changes wrought by Vatican II, all at the same time. Given these struggles in identity, it did not possess a stellar record either on civil rights or on dissent against Vietnam.⁴⁵

Catholic opposition to the war began to grow considerably beginning in 1967. By July, a plurality of Catholics opposed further escalation (52% opposed; 36% in favor). Editors at *America* lagged considerably behind. By January 1971, 80% of Catholics favored the return of all military personnel by the end of the year. That same year, in November, Catholic Bishops issued a collective resolution declaring that the Vietnam War no longer met just war criteria. "It is our firm conviction," their statement read, "that the speedy ending of this war is a moral imperative of the highest priority."⁴⁶ With this action, the bishops publicly declared the actions of the American government unjust. The statement revealed that, even a majority of the bishops, longtime supporters of Vietnam policy, had finally reached the conclusion they could no longer take the actions of their government for granted. *America* publicized the statement of the bishops with complete support and even advertised the gathering of CALCAV in Kansas City, referring to that "distinguished group of Protestant, Orthodox, Catholic and Jewish spokesmen." By May of 1972, the weekly declared that Nixon's policy had failed.⁴⁷

What about *Christianity Today*? Shifts were later and much more subtle. After My Lai and the invasion into Cambodia, the credibility gap did finally hit home. An editorial in March 1971 called for “honesty in government,” urging the government to tell Americans what they should know about the war. In May, the editor (now Harold Lindsell), noted that “perhaps we should never have gotten into Viet Nam in the first place.” But, in the same month, when 200,000 marched on Washington in an attempt to interrupt the government, during the so-called “May Days,” Lindsell concluded that “radicals like these are termites eating away at the vital structures of American life and democracy.” In August, an editorial supported the establishment of diplomatic relations with China and expressed the hope that it might help end the war. When Nixon decided to bomb the Haiphong harbors, Lindsell called for support of the American people for this “fallible president, even if they think his policy is mistaken.” As these snippets indicate, the hawkish nature of the journal was moderated some. But support for the war remained. After the war ended, Lindsell concluded that the whole war had been a “fiasco” and a “mistake” but still supported sending military aid right up to the end.⁴⁸

There were evangelicals who felt otherwise. CALCAV counted in its membership some conservative to evangelical groups, including the Church of God in Anderson, Indiana. The 1968 CALCAV statement signed by student leaders included signatures from students at schools associated with the Southern Baptist Convention, Missouri Synod Lutheran Church, and several other independent conservative and evangelical colleges and seminaries. An “Evangelicals for McGovern” committee formed during the election of 1972. Composed of well-known evangelical figures from Messiah College, Fuller Theological Seminary, Asbury Theological Seminary, Wheaton, and other schools, the committee opposed the war and argued that McGovern was the candidate that “most closely adheres to biblical principles of social justice.”

Ron Sider, a member of the committee, summed up his opposition to Nixon with the comment: “If Vietnamese boys mean as much to God as American boys, then a solution that kills Vietnamese instead of us is not a just solution.”⁴⁹

The most radical dissent among evangelicals came from the *Post-American* (later *Sojourners*) community.⁵⁰ Led by James Wallis and founded in 1971, this community of students at Trinity Evangelical Seminary in Deerfield, Illinois, came under the watchful eye of the FBI for their protests against Vietnam. They took the name “post-American” for their journal because they had given up on America’s values. They regarded American society as “oppressive” and beyond redemption. Christians needed to assume a post-American posture. Wallis viewed the Christian response to Vietnam as proof that the church in America was “captive and . . . morally impotent.” For the *Post-American* crowd, allegiance to America in the Vietnam era meant disobedience to God. Wallis and his community represented a new movement among young evangelicals, one far to the left of the *Century* in its view of social revolution and Vietnam. After the war, other evangelicals accused Wallis of being blind to the plight of the refugees because of his blind support for the unification of the country at all costs under the revolutionary principles of North Vietnam.⁵¹

After the War: Lasting Effects

The turmoil of the war left Christian groups fragmented and split, but perhaps less so and in different ways than they were before the war started. The evangelical community developed a strong leftist movement through the war, one that has continually challenged the lack of social conscience on the evangelical right. In the years since, that left has moved toward an activist middle posture, retaining its willingness to work toward a significant social agenda but without the anti-American rhetoric of its earlier years. Both mainstream Catholicism and Protestantism

experienced considerable shifts as well; the bishops reached a new maturity through the travails of the war and the Catholic Church was much more united concerning Vietnam at the end of the war than it was nearer the middle of it.

In 1978, James Wall, the new editor of the *Century*, took a nostalgic look back at the 1960s, “when the civil rights movement and opposition to the war in Vietnam made the church’s liberal posture so right.” The church could be sure in those days, on those issues, that it was on the right side: “the cause was just and the issues clear-cut. Or so they appeared.” Living through that period caused some to believe that the church could always speak with clarity and authority in the public arena. There is a tendency when things seem so clear to assume that God’s blessing absolutely supports your position. The danger lurking in this assumption is illustrated by the *Century*’s endorsement of Johnson over Goldwater in 1964. They were sure Johnson was God’s man for the job, so sure that they were willing to lose their tax exempt status to say so. As Wall pointed out, it is dangerous to ignore the ambiguity that exists in every human situation. The Christian position has to be willing to embrace “ambiguity” and the willingness to recognize that God “sanctifies no single political solution.”⁵²

Though the Christians who protested the war in Vietnam, and those who did not were both overly confident that God absolutely blessed their viewpoint, through the experience each learned something about the ambiguity of politics. Before the war began, most Christians in America possessed a naïve belief in the inherent goodness of all things American. Even though they knew their government could make mistakes, they trusted their government implicitly to act properly in the long run, when ultimate matters were on the line. In the years following Vietnam, and later Watergate, this trust in American institutions and government officials dissipated as one of the options truly available to thoughtful Christians. Each of these journals, in their own ways

in the years during and following the war, witnessed to a “lost innocence” where America was concerned. An editorial that appeared in *Christianity Today* after the negotiated treaty in 1973 expressed a considerably different tone than had been common for the journal. The editor asked whether America had

learned these important lessons: that great nations have power limitations; that no nation can police the world, or make it safe against Communism; and that no country should resort to war unless its necessity and justification can be made plain and understandable to its people.⁵³

And then 9/11 brought a complete lapse of memory . . .

¹ The *Christian Century* operates as a primarily Protestant ecumenical periodical. For its history, see Mark G. Toulouse, “The Christian Century,” in *Religious Periodicals of the United States*, ed. Charles H. Lippy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 285-290. The other journals analyzed in this essay are: *Christianity and Crisis*, founded by Reinhold Niebuhr and other Christian realists prior to America’s entry into World War II (see Edward Tabor Linenthal, “Christianity and Crisis,” in *ibid.*, 131-134); *Christianity Today*, an evangelical monthly founded by Billy Graham and Carl F. H. Henry and funded by J. Howard Pew (see John G. Merritt, “Christianity Today,” in *ibid.*, 134-140); *America*, a Catholic weekly founded by the Jesuit community (see Peter W. Williams, “America,” in *ibid.*, 9-14); and *Commonweal*, a generally progressive lay Catholic bi-weekly (see Shelley Baranowski, “Commonweal,” in *ibid.*, 153-158).

² The details of these protests, the draft card, and the quotation from Cornell are found in Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, *Who Spoke Up? American Protest Against the War in Vietnam, 1963-1975* (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1984), 51-58.

³ James Reston is quoted in Mitchell K. Hall, *Because of Their Faith: CALCAV and Religious Opposition to the Vietnam War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 13; Henry’s editorial is “Dodging the Draft,” *CT* (5 November 1965): 36; “Peace Demonstrations: Rights and Wrongs,” *Am* (30 October 1965): 490; and Moyers is quoted in “Students’ Sturm and Drang,” *CC* (3 November 1965): 1339-1340.

⁴ These quotations are contained in “Defend Right of Dissent,” *CC* (10 November 1965): 1373; the story of the founding of Clergy Concerned is related in *Because of Their Faith*, 14.

⁵ “Mindless and Mute,” *CC* (10 November 1965): 1371-1372.

⁶ “Naïve Idealists and Wanton Realists,” *CC* (17 November 1965): 1403-1404; “Congress and the Undeclared War,” *CC* (16 February 1966): 195-196; Bennett, “Have Negotiations Lost Their High Priority,” *Crisis* (29 November 1965): 249-250; and “Ending the War,” *Com* (10 December 1965): 295-296.

⁷ William K. Harrison, “Is the United States Right in Bombing North Viet Nam?” *CT* (7 January 1966): 25-26; “Viet Nam: Where Do We Go From Here?” *CT* (7 January 1966): 30-31; “The W.C.C. and Viet Nam,” *CT* (4 March 1966): 31; “Scratch One Peace Overture,” *Am* (1 January 1966): 3; “Just as Dangerous as the Left,” *Am* (22 January 1966): 118; and “The Man in the White House,” *Am* (26 March 1966): 406.

⁸ Quoted in Bennett, “From Supporter of War in 1941 to Critic in 1966,” *Crisis* (21 February 1966): 13-14. There were significant mainline leaders who expressed impatience with the views of Niebuhr, Bennett, and others. Paul Ramsey, ethicist at Princeton, became one of the major proponents, publishing essays in several forums advocating a defense of Vietnam as a just war. His counter-view can be read in Ramsey, “Dissent against Dissent,” *CC* (20 July 1966): 909-913; see also Ramsey, “Counting the Costs,” in *The Vietnam War: Christian Perspectives*, ed. Michael P. Hamilton (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1967), 24-44.

⁹ A *Century* editorial recorded this event; see “Humphrey’s Dilemma,” *CC* (16 March 1966): 325-326.

¹⁰ Davison Hunter, *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America* (New York: HarperCollins, Basic Books, 1991), 289-290.

- ¹¹ Robert Wuthnow, *The Struggle for America's Soul: Evangelicals, Liberals, & Secularism* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989): 33-34.
- ¹² Bennett, "From Supporter of War in 1941 to Critic in 1966," 13-14.
- ¹³ Editorial Board, "We Protest the National Policy in Vietnam," *Crisis* (7 March 1966): 33-34.
- ¹⁴ The *Century* made the same argument often; see especially "Saving Face in Vietnam," *CC* (27 April 1966): 317-318.
- ¹⁵ Editorial Board, "We Protest the National Policy in Vietnam," *Crisis* (7 March 1966): 33-34.
- ¹⁶ "America Non Grata," *CC* (20 April 1966): 483.
- ¹⁷ "No More Myths," *Com* (10 June 1966): 325-326.
- ¹⁸ *Who Spoke Up?*, 82-83.
- ¹⁹ As an example of Christians who were upset by the comparison, see "Agony, Yes: Arrogance, No," *Am* (28 May 1966): 767-768.
- ²⁰ Gordon C. Zahn, "The Crime of Silence," *Com* (17 June 1966): 354-356.
- ²¹ This comparison is made in "Toward Caesarism," *CC* (3 May 67): 579-580; and "The Hershey Assault," *CC* (3 January 1968): 3. Other Nazi comparisons of similar kinds are made in Haig A. Bosmajian, "The 'Nonmorality' of Cruelty and Killing," *CC* (23 August 1967): 1065-1067; Joseph Martin Hopkins, "I'm Sorry You Came," *CC* (3 January 1968): 14-15; "Carnage and the Incarnation," *CC* (24 December 1969): 1633; and "What Can Concerned Churchmen Do about the War in Indochina?" *CC* (20 May 1970): 622-623.
- ²² "'National University' Proposed at NAE," *CT* (13 May 1966): 47-48.
- ²³ Both these quotations are found in *Because of Their Faith*, 30. The original source of the Bennett quotation is "It Is Difficult to Be an American," *Crisis* (25 July 1966): 165-166; Niebuhr's quotation is also found in Richard W. Fox, *Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography* (New York: Pantheon, 1985), 285.
- ²⁴ See *Because of Their Faith*, 31-33.
- ²⁵ "War and Peace in Vietnam," *CT* (17 February 1967): 29. Kyle Haselden, editor of the *Century*, participated in the march and noted Henry's "sanctimonious aloofness." See Haselden, "Concerned and Committed," *CC* (15 February 1967): 197-198.
- ²⁶ *Because of Their Faith*, 34-37.
- ²⁷ This story is related in Edward P. Morgan, *The 60s Experience: Hard Lessons About Modern America* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 148; the story is also found in *Who Spoke Up?*, 110.
- ²⁸ *Because of Their Faith*, 42.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, 44; *Who Spoke Up?*, 109.
- ³⁰ See King, "Declaration of Independence from the War in Vietnam," in *The Vietnam War: Christian Perspectives*, 114-130.
- ³¹ Other well-known Catholic participation in the peace movement included an assortment of pacifist groups. The Catholic Worker movement (founded by Dorothy Day), PAX (founded in 1962 to promote peace in the institutional church), and the Catholic Peace Fellowship (founded in 1964 specifically to attempt to change government policy in Indochina) were all united in opposing Vietnam. But all these groups were viewed as fringe groups within Catholicism as a whole, even though their prophetic witness against the war served Catholicism well during these years. Their story is told in Patricia McNeal, *Harder Than War: Catholic Peacemaking in Twentieth-Century America* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 139-172. Her book also contains an excellent chapter on the witness of the Berrigans and another on Dorothy Day. The witness of the Berrigans is also covered in *Who Spoke Up?*, 230-237. The Catholic Worker activity concerning the Vietnam War is also treated in Anne Klejment and Nancy L. Roberts, "The Catholic Worker and the Vietnam War," in *American Catholic Pacifism: The Influence of Dorothy Day and the Catholic Worker Movement*, ed. Klejment and Roberts (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996), 153-169.
- ³² *Because of Their Faith*, 33.
- ³³ The *National Catholic Reporter* survey and the Fiske quotation are both referenced in the *Commonweal* editorial; see "The Bishops and Vietnam," *Com* (15 April 1966): 93-94.
- ³⁴ Quoted in *Harder Than War*, 146. Both the *Century* and *Commonweal* condemned Spellman's comments: see "Cardinal Spellman's Holy War," *CC* (11 January 1967): 36; and "Cardinal, Pope, and War," *Com* (13 January 1967): 391-392. See also "Danger on the Home Front," *CC* (25 January 1967): 99-100; "Catholics Picket Cardinal Spellman," *CC* (1 February 1967): 133; and "Bowl Us No Googlies," *CC* (8 February 1967): 163-164.
- ³⁵ Citations for the paragraph are as follows: LBJ made the "Nervous Nellies" comment in a prepared speech on May 11, 1966 at Princeton University; see "Is Dissent Traitorous?" *CC* (1 June 1966): 703-704; "The Season's Speeches," *Com* (3 June 1966): 301-302; and "Dissent in Wartime," *Com* (27 May 1966): 269-270. LBJ continued

his critique of critics in an address to the Tennessee Legislature and in other locations, see “Johnson Condemns Critics,” *CC* (29 March 1967): 397-398. On FBI and CIA infiltration, see *Who Spoke Up?*, 219-224. For Christian concern about civilian casualties and bombings, see Marjorie Hope, “Vietnam’s Wounded Waifs,” *CC* (14 September 1966): 1111-1112; “US Bombs: Vietcong Terror,” *Am* (3 September 1966): 218-219; “Vietnam Pilot,” *Com* (14 October 1966): 221-222; “Bombs in the North . . . The Moral Issue,” *Am* (14 January 1967): 32; and “News and Views,” *Com* (20 September 1968): 612. For a discussion of U Thant’s comment, see “U Thant’s Secret,” *Com* (16 December 1966): 311-312; see also “Up with U Thant!” *CC* (22 February 1967): 228-229. On the credibility gap issue, see “Establishing Credibility,” *Com* (21 October 1966): 67-68; “Vietnam Settlement,” *Com* (24 February 1967): 581-582. Even *Christianity Today* admitted the existence of a “credibility gap,” but continued to defend the war: “Viet Nam: A Moral Dilemma,” *CT* (20 January 1967): 27-28. The stories of the government’s blockage of medical supplies is found in “Bombs and Balms,” *CC* (1 February 1967): 131 and “The US Says No,” *Com* (31 March 1967): 37-38.

³⁶ The quotation is from “A Tragically Self-Defeating Policy,” *CC* (17 May 1967): 643-644. For other expressions of desperation, see “Getting Out,” *Com* (23 December 1966): 35-36; “Hiding Blunders under More Blunders,” *CC* (8 March 1967): 301; and “What the Vietnamese Want,” *CC* (12 April 1967): 461-462. It is interesting to note that recently, both Senators Barack Obama and John McCain have had to apologize for saying Americans were “wasting” the lives of soldiers in Iraq. See Dana Bash and Ted Barrett, “McCain Says He Misspoke in Saying U.S. Lives ‘Wasted,’” CNN.com (available at: <http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/03/01/mccain/index.html>, accessed 18 May 2007).

³⁷ The indented quotation is from “America Faces Crucial Decision,” *CT* (20 January 1967): 24-25; the first quotation about negotiation is “If the American People Lose Heart,” *Am* (9 July 1966): 25; the other quotations from Henry are from “Viet Nam: A Moral Dilemma,” *CT* (20 January 1967): 27-28. Similar criticism is found in “Millennium Tomorrow,” *CT* (4 February 1966): 30-31.

³⁸ On Graham’s visit to Vietnam, see “Graham Preaches Peace in Viet Nam,” *CT* (20 January 1967): 36-37; for the *Century* quote, see “Danger on the Home Front,” *CC* (25 January 1967): 99-100.

³⁹ This quotation is from William Martin, *With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America* (New York: Broadway Books, 1996), 146. Martin also wrote a biography of Graham; see Martin, *A Prophet With Honor: The Billy Graham Story*. The other references for this paragraph are: “Not What He Meant,” (Letter to the Editor from Billy Graham), *CC* (29 March 1967): 410-411; and “Graham Denounces Dissenters,” *CC* (17 May 1967): 645.

⁴⁰ Membership for CALCAV is provided in *Who Spoke Up?*, 153. Davis’s sermon is quoted on page 141. A sample of Davis’s preaching about the subject is available in full: see George R. David, “The Vietnam War: A Christian Perspective,” in *The Vietnam War: Christian Perspectives*, 45-62. The sermon was preached on Sunday evening, March 17, 1967 at the Washington Cathedral.

⁴¹ “The President and the Little Minister,” *CC* (29 November 1967): 1516-1517.

⁴² “Silence is Betrayal!” *CC* (3 January 1968): 27.

⁴³ See Young, *The Vietnam Wars*, 216-226; poll information is also provided in *Who Spoke Up?*, 155-156. See also Gabriel Kolko, *Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 303-337. Concern about the increase of American casualties is expressed in “We’re Still at War,” *CC* (29 May 1968): 703-704; and “Translating Disgust,” *Com* (12 July 1968): 452-453.

⁴⁴ For reactions to events at the Chicago Democratic National Convention, see “Chicago’s Blitzkrieg,” *CC* (11 September 1968): 1127-1128; “Here and There,” *CC* (18 September 1968): 1163; and Richard J. Neuhaus, “Incident at 18th and Michigan,” *CC* (9 October 1968): 1277-1278. For Catonsville, see “Civil Disobedience at Catonsville,” *Am* (26 October 1968): 372-373; and Philip J. Berrigan, “Statement at Sentencing,” *CC* (4 December 1968): 1539-1540. For reactions to the bombing halt in the North, see “The Bombing Stops at Last,” *CC* (13 November 1968): 1423-1424; “And Now Saigon,” *Com* (15 November 1968): 235-236; and “The Total Bombing Halt,” *Am* (16 November 1968): 460-461. For reflection of the confidence that the war was near an end, see William Pfaff, “This Way Out,” *Com* (14 February 1969): 611-612; Roger L. Shinn, “After Viet Nam, What Next?” *Crisis* (9 December 1968): 293-294; “After Vietnam, What?” *Com* (21 March 1969): 7-14. About the number of war dead: (509 Americans had been killed the week before March 15, 1968 alone, with an additional 2,766 wounded) 19,670 is the number of Americans killed between January 1, 1961 and March 15, 1968; see *Who Spoke Up?*, 159; the number 33,641 is found on 245; 33,629, the number of Korean war dead, is recorded in “Vietnam Nondebate Continues,” *CC* (9 April 1969): 468.

⁴⁵ See the discussion in David O’ Brien, *Public Catholicism* (New York: Macmillan, 1989): 233-241.

⁴⁶ Quoted in *Harder Than War*, 168.

⁴⁷ Donald R. Campion, "Of Many Things," *Am* (11 December 1971): 501. See "Vietnam: The President's Gamble," *Am* (20 May 1972): 526.

⁴⁸ "Honest in Government," *CT* (26 March 1971): 25; Lindsell, "Editor's Note," *CT* (7 May 1971): 3; "Shutting Down the Government," *CT* (21 May 1971): 35; "Vietnam: Continuing Impasse," *CT* (6 August 1971): 25; "Plain Talk on Viet Nam," *CT* (26 May 1972): 27; and "The Indochina Fiasco," *CT* (25 April 1975): 27.

⁴⁹ See "Students on Conservative Campuses Dissent, Too," *CC* (29 May 1968): 704. Information about Evangelicals for McGovern is found in "The Religious Campaign: Backing Their Man," *CT* (27 October 1972): 38-39.

⁵⁰ Originally published as the *Post-American*, *Sojourners* generally represents a progressive evangelical perspective on public issues; see Mark G. Toulouse, "Sojourners," in P. Mark Fackler and Charles H. Lippy, eds., *Popular Religious Magazines of the United States* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995), 444-451.

⁵¹ Wallis, "The Desire to Forget," *Post-American* (March-April, 1973): 1-3. For evangelical condemnation of the community's view of refugees, see Lloyd Billingsley, "Radical Evangelicals and the Politics of Compassion," in *Piety & Politics*, ed. Richard J. Neuhaus and Michael Cromartie (Lanham, MD: University Press, 1987), especially 211-212.

⁵² Wall, "Living in the Political Briar Patch," *CC* (1 November 1978): 1027-1028.

⁵³ "The Viet Nam Pact," *CT* (25 April 1975): 34.