MORE THAN A MERE CONTRACT:
MARRIAGE AS CONTRACT AND COVENANT IN LAW AND THEOLOGY\(^1\)

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Covenant Marriage vs. Contract Marriage

On August 15, 1997, the State of Louisiana put in place the nation’s first modern covenant marriage law. The law creates a two-tiered system of marriage. Couples may choose a contract marriage, with minimal formalities of formation and attendant rights to no-fault divorce. Or couples may choose a covenant marriage, with more stringent formation and dissolution rules. The licensing costs for either form of marriage are the same. But in order to form a covenant marriage, the parties must receive detailed counseling about marriage from a professional marriage counselor or a religious official, and then swear an oath, pledging “full knowledge of the nature, purposes, and responsibilities of marriage” and promising “to love, honor, and care for one another as husband and wife for the rest of our lives.” Divorce is allowed such covenanted couples only on grounds of serious fault (adultery, capital felony, malicious desertion, and/or physical or sexual abuse of the spouse or one of the children) or after two years of separation. Separation from bed and board is allowed on any of these same fault grounds as well as on proof of habitual intemperance, cruel treatment, or outrages of the other spouse.

\(^1\) This paper has been adapted from John Witte, Jr., *God’s Joust, God’s Justice: Law and Religion in the Western Tradition* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006).
Comparable covenant marriage statutes are now in place in Arizona and Arkansas as well. ² Twenty-six other states have covenant marriage alternatives to contact marriage under consideration.³

These new covenant marriages laws are designed, in part, to help offset the corrosive effects of America’s experiment with a private contractual model of marriage. Historically, in America and in much of the West, marriages were presumptively permanent commitments, and marriage formation and dissolution were serious public events. Marriage formation required the consent of parents and peers, the procurement of a state certificate, the publication of banns, and a public ceremony and celebration after a period of waiting and discernment. Marriage dissolution required public hearings, proof of serious fault by one party, alimony payments to the innocent dependent spouse, and ongoing support payments for minor children.⁴

In the last third of the twentieth century, many of these traditional rules gave way to a private contractual model of marriage grounded in new cultural and constitutional norms of sexual liberty and privacy. In virtually all states, marriage formation rules were simplified to require only the acquisition of a license from the state registry followed by solemnization before a licensed official—without banns, with little or no waiting, with no public celebration, without notification of others. Marriage dissolution rules were simplified through the introduction of unilateral no-fault divorce. New streamlined and inexpensive marital dissolution procedures aimed to release miserable couples from the shackles of unwanted marriages and to relieve

³ Alabama, California, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
⁴ For a comprehensive survey of these earlier American marriage laws, see Charles F. Vernier, American Family Law, 5 vols. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1931-1938).
swollen court dockets from the prospects of protracted litigation. Either the husband or the wife could now file a simple suit for divorce. No fault by either party would need to be proved—or staged. Courts would dissolve the union, often making a one-time division of marital property to give each party a clean break to start life anew.⁵

America’s experiment with the private contractual model of marriage has failed on many counts and accounts—with children and women bearing the primary costs.⁶ From 1975-2000, roughly one quarter of all pregnancies were aborted. One third of all children were born to single mothers. One half of all marriages ended in divorce. Two-thirds of all African-American children were raised without a father. Mother-only homes had less than a third of the median income of homes with a regular male present, and four times the rates of foreclosure and eviction. Teenagers who grew up in broken homes proved two to three times more likely to have behavioral, learning, and socialization problems than teenagers from two-parent homes. More than two-thirds of juveniles and young adults convicted of major felonies from 1970 to 1995 came from single- or no-parent homes.⁷

Covenant marriage laws have been one of several legal responses to these mounting social and psychological costs of America’s experiment with easy-in/easy-out marriage.

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Covenant marriage laws capture the traditional ideal that marriage is “more than just a piece of paper,” more than just a transient and terminal private contract for sexual intimacy. The foundation of covenant marriage is a pledge of presumptive permanent sacrifice—“to love, care, and honor one another as husband and wife for the rest of our lives.” The formation of covenant marriage is a public and deliberative event—requiring a waiting period, and at least the consent of the couples’ parents or guardians and the counseling of therapists or clerics, and by implication the communities whom those third parties represent. The dissolution of covenant marriage comes only upon betrayal of the fundamental goods of this institution or after a suitable period of separation and careful deliberation.

Covenant marriage laws reflect the historical lesson that rules governing marital formation and marital dissolution must be balanced in their stringency—and that separation must be maintained as a release valve. Stern rules of marital dissolution require stern rules of marital formation. Loose formation rules demand loose dissolution rules. To fix the modern problem of transient marriages, covenant marriage proponents have insisted, requires reforms at both ends of the marital process. A number of states have recently responded to the problem of transient marriage simply by tightening their rules of no-fault divorce, but without corresponding attention to the rules of marital formation and separation. Such efforts, standing alone, are misguided. The cause of escalating marital breakdown is not only no-fault divorce, as is so often said, but also no-faith marriage.

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9 See the chapter by Katherine Shaw Spaht, one of the principal drafters of the Louisiana covenant marriage statute, in John Witte, Jr. and Eliza Ellison, eds., Covenant Marriage in Comparative Perspective (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2005) [hereafter CM].
Covenant marriage laws allow prospective marital couples to contract out of the state’s laws of marriage contract by choosing a covenant marriage. Couples who consider covenant marriage must fully apprise themselves of the costs and benefits of protracting the process of marital formation and waiving their rights to no-fault divorce. But the choice of marital form is theirs. Having this choice encourages inaptly matched couples to discover their incompatibility before marriage, rather than after it. If one engaged party wants a contract marriage and the other a covenant marriage, the disparity in prospective commitment should, for many couples, be too plain to ignore. Couples should delay their wedding until their mutual commitment has deepened, or cancel their wedding if their respective commitments remain disparate. Better to prepare well for a marriage than to rush into it. Better to cancel a wedding than to divorce shortly after it. Such is the theory of the new covenant marriage laws.

These covenant marriage laws seek both to respect the virtues of marriage contracts and the values of enduring marriages. These laws have been attacked as an undue encroachment on sexual liberty and on the rights of women and children; as a “Trojan horse” designed to smuggle biblical principles back into American law; as an improper delegation of state responsibilities to religious officials; and as a reversion to the days of staged and spurious charges of marital fault which no-fault laws had sought to overcome. But, given the religiously-neutral language of these laws; their explicit protections of both voluntary entrance and exit from the covenant union; their insistence that religious counselors be restricted in the marriage counseling they can offer on behalf of the state; and the overriding commitment of these laws to the freedom of contract of both parties, such constitutional objections seem largely unavailing.10

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10 See ibid. and chapter by Margaret Brinig and Stephen Nock in CM.
Marriage as More Than a Mere Contract

Covenant marriage laws are not only a new form of social engineering, designed to counter the rise of privatized marriage and no-fault divorce; they are also a new forum for the expression of traditional common law teachings that marriage is “more than a mere contract.” In the American common law tradition, marriage has long been regarded as a natural if not a spiritual estate, a useful if not an essential association, a pillar if not the foundation of civil society. Marriage has required more than the general rules of private contact—of offer and acceptance, consideration and rescission, reformation and remedy. It has drawn to itself special rules and rituals of betrothal and espousal, of registration and consecration, of consent and celebration. It has also provided the basis for a long series of special rights and duties of husband and wife, parent and child that are respected at both public and private law. As the American jurist Joseph Story (1779-1845) put it in 1834:

Marriage is treated by all civilized societies as a peculiar and favored contract. It is in its origin a contract of natural law.... It is the parent, and not the child of society; the source of civility and a sort of seminary of the republic. In civil society it becomes a civil contract, regulated and prescribed by law, and endowed with civil consequences. In most civilized countries, acting under a sense of the force of sacred obligations, it has had the sanctions of religion superadded. It then becomes a religious, as well as a natural and civil contract; ... it is a great mistake to suppose that because it is the one, therefore it may not be the other.12

These traditional common law teachings that marriage is both a contract and something more were rooted in ancient Christian teachings. These Christian teachings, in turn, had

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11 See further chapters 11 and 12 in Witte, Jr., God’s Joust, God’s Justice.
12 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic, in regard to Contracts, Rights, and Remedies (Boston: Little, Brown, 1834), 100 (sec. 108). In his second edition, Story added this note to the quoted passage: “It appears to me something more than a mere contract. It is rather to be deemed an institution of society founded upon the consent and contract of the parties; and in this view it has some peculiarities in its nature, character, operation, and extent of operation, different from what belongs to ordinary contracts.”
antecedents and analogues in ancient Jewish and Islamic teachings. Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions alike have long taught that marriage is a contract—called the *ketubah* in Judaism, the *pactum* in Christianity, the *kitab* in Islam. But these traditions have also long taught that marriage is more than a mere contract—more than simply a private bargain to be formed, maintained, and dissolved as the two marital parties see fit. For all three traditions, marriage is an institution that is both private and public, individual and social, temporal and transcendent in quality. Its origin, nature, and purpose lie beyond and beneath the terms of the marriage contract itself.¹³

**Marriage as Contract.** It is important to recognize that, while the three traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam have long taught that marriage is more than a contract, they have also insisted that marriage is not less than a contract.

Nearly two millennia ago, Jewish Rabbis created the *ketubah*, the premarital contract in which the husband and the wife spelled out the terms and conditions of their relationship before, during, and after the marriage, and the rights and duties of husband, wife, and child in the event of marital dissolution or death of one of the parties. The Talmudic Rabbis regarded these marriage contracts as essential protections for wives and children who were otherwise subject to the unilateral right of divorce granted to men by the Mosaic law (Deut. 24:1-4). While the terms of the *ketubah* could be privately contracted, both the couple’s families and the rabbinic authorities were often actively involved in their formation and enforcement.¹⁴

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¹³ See analysis and primary texts on the theological, ethical, and legal teachings on marriage in these three traditions and others in Don S. Browning, M. Christian Green, and John Witte, Jr., eds., *Sex, Marriage and Family in the World Religions* (New York/London: Columbia University Press, 2006).

More than a millennium and a half ago, Christian theologians adopted the marriage pact or bond. These contracts forged a new relationship between husband and wife and their respective families. They adopted and adapted a number of the marital and familial rights and duties set out in the household codes of the New Testament, in the apostolic church constitutions canons, as well as in Jewish, Greek, Roman, and Patristic writings. The early rules governing these marriage contracts, as well as related contracts respecting dowries and other marital property, were later systematized and elaborated by Christian jurists and theologians—in the eighth and ninth centuries by Eastern Orthodox, in the twelfth and thirteen centuries by Catholics, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by Protestants.

More than a millennium ago, Muslim jurists and theologians created the *kitab*, a special form of contract (‘adq) that a devout Muslim was religiously bound to uphold in imitation and implementation of the Prophet’s example and teaching. The *kitab* ideally established a distinctive relationship of “affection, tranquility, and mercy” between husband and wife. It defined their respective rights, duties, and identities vis-à-vis each other, their parents and children, and the broader communities of which they were part. The signing of the *kitab* was a solemn religious event involving a cleric who instructed the couple on their marital rights and duties as set out in the Qur’an. While the Qur’an and Hadith set out basic norms of marriage life and liturgy, it was particularly the Shari’a, the religious laws developed in the centuries after the


Prophet, which crystallized much of this tradition of marital contracts, with ample variation among the Islamic schools of jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{17}

While these marriage contracts differed markedly within and among these three Abrahamic traditions, several broad features were common. First, Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions alike made provision for two contracts—betrothals or future promises to marry and spousals or present promises to marry—with a mandatory waiting period between them. The point of this waiting period was to allow couples to weigh the depth and durability of their mutual love. It was also to invite others to weigh in on the maturity and compatibility of the couple, to offer them counsel and commodities, and to prepare for the celebration of their union and their life together thereafter.

Second, all three traditions insisted that marriage depended in its essence on the mutual consent of the man and the woman. Even if the man and woman were represented by parents or guardians during the contract negotiation, their own consent was essential to the validity of their marriage. Jewish and Muslim jurists came to this insight early in the development of their law of marriage contracts. The Catholic tradition reached this insight canonically only in the twelfth century, after which it was absorbed in Orthodox and later in Protestant teachings. All three traditions continued to tolerate the practice of arranged marriages and child marriages, particularly when those were politically or commercially advantageous. But the theory was that


An exception to the usual rules of Islamic jurisprudence was the \textit{muta’a}, a temporary marriage contract traditionally recognized by some Shi’ite Muslims and now becoming newly popularly among the majority Shi’ite populations in Iraq. The \textit{muta’a} was traditionally reserved to circumstances when men were involved in protracted absences from home or on dangerous pilgrimages and became a way not only of channeling his incontinence but also devising some of his property to his temporary wife. Today, the \textit{muta’a} is also becoming a convenient form of effectively legalizing prostitution and concubinage, with \textit{muta’a} contracts as short as an hour being upheld by Shi’ite clerics. See Shala Haeri, \textit{The Law of Desire: Temporary Marriage in Shi’i Iran} (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1989); Abū
both the young man and the young woman reserved the right to dissent from the arrangement upon reaching the age of consent.

Third, while all three traditions taught that every person of the age of consent was free to choose a marital partner, persons were not free to choose just anyone. God and nature set a first limit to the freedom of marital contract. Parties could not marry those who were related to them by blood or by marriage—by bonds of consanguinity or affinity, as these relations were called in Scripture. Custom and culture set a second limit. The parties had to be of suitable piety and modesty, of comparable social and economic status, and ideally (and, in some communities, indispensably) of the same faith. The general law of contracts set a third limit. Both parties had to have the capacity and freedom to enter contracts, and had to follow proper contractual forms and ceremonies. Parents and guardians set a fourth limit. A valid marriage at least for minors required the consent of both sets of parents or guardians—and sometimes as well the consent of political or spiritual authorities who stood in loco parentis.

Fourth, all three traditions often accompanied marriage promises with elaborate exchanges of property, which sometimes gave rise to their own marital property contracts. The prospective husband gave to his fiancée (and, sometimes her father or family as well) a betrothal gift, sometimes a very elaborate and expensive gift. In some cultures, husbands followed this by giving a wedding gift to the wife. The wife, in turn, brought into the marriage her dowry, which was at minimum her basic living articles, sometimes a great deal more. These property exchanges were not an absolute condition to the validity of a marriage. But breach of a contract

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to deliver property in consideration of marriage could often result in dissolution at least of the engagement contract.

Fifth, all three traditions eventually developed a marriage liturgy. In the Jewish tradition, the Talmud provided detailed liturgies and prayers both for the betrothal and for the marriage, building in part on prototypes in the book of Tobit. The earliest surviving Christian marriage liturgies are from the eighth century. Particularly among the Eastern Orthodox, these liturgies became extraordinary visual and verbal symphonies of prayers, blessings, oaths, and rituals, including the Eucharist. These liturgies grew more slowly in the Christian West, not becoming mandatory among Catholics until 1563, and subject to wide and perennial variation and disputation among Protestants. The Islamic tradition mandated an engagement ceremony, which was a private, religious occasion involving the couple, their families, a cleric, and two or more witnesses. It began with readings from the Qur’an and marital instruction followed by final negotiation of the terms of the marriage contract, and execution and attestation by the parties. The wedding was a separate, secular, and optional celebration.

Finally, all three traditions gave husband and wife standing before their religious tribunals to press for the vindication of their marital rights. The right to support, protection, sexual intercourse, and care for the couple’s children were the most commonly litigated claims in all three traditions. But any number of other conjugal rights stipulated in the marriage contract or guaranteed by general religious law could be litigated. Included in all three traditions was the right of the parties to seek dissolution of the marriage on discovery of an absolute impediment to

20 See the chapter by al-Hibri in CM.
its validity (such as incest) or on grounds of a fundamental breach of the marriage commitment (such as adultery).

**Marriage as More than Contract.** The insistence on a marriage liturgy, with its solemn rituals, prayers, blessings, and oaths, is one important indication that, for Jews, Christians, and Muslims, marriage was more than a simple bilateral contract. It was also a fundamental public institution and religious practice. Other media complemented the liturgies in reflecting these higher dimensions of marriage—the beautiful artwork, ornate iconography, and lofty religious language of the marriage contracts themselves; the elaborate rituals and etiquette of courtship, consent, and communal involvement; the impressive production of love poems, household manuals, and books of etiquette. All these media, and the ample theological writings on them, helped to confirm and celebrate the deeper origin, nature, and purpose of marriage in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

First, all three traditions recognized that marriage has its ultimate origin in the creation and commandments of God. The Jewish and Christian traditions shared the teaching of Genesis that, already in Paradise, God had brought the first man and the first woman together, and commanded them to “be fruitful and multiply” (Gen. 1:28). God had created them as social creatures, naturally inclined and attracted to each other. God had given them the physical capacity to join together and to beget children. God had commanded them to love, help, and nurture each other and to inculcate in each other and in their children the love of God, neighbor, and self. “Therefore a man leaves his father and mother and cleaves to his wife, and the two become one flesh,” Genesis 2:24 concludes. Both the Jewish tradition and the Christian tradition
eventually built on this primeval commandment, and its later biblical echoes, many of the basic norms of heterosexual monogamous marriage and sexual ethics.\textsuperscript{21}

The Muslim tradition rooted marriage not only in the teachings of the Qur’an but also in the example of Mohammed. The Qur’an speaks of marriage as a “solemn covenant” (mithaqan) (Q. 4.20), indeed a form of worship (‘ibadat) and religious observance enjoined upon each Muslim as a way of keeping faith with the tradition of Islam. In the Hadith, the Prophet provided that “marriage is my Sunnah, so the one who turns away from my Sunnah, turns away from me.”\textsuperscript{22} Also in the Hadith, the Prophet set out in great detail the principles of proper marriage for a Muslim that were elaborated in later books of Islamic law and etiquette.\textsuperscript{23} A number of these teachings emulated, if not echoed, Jewish and Christian rules—the requirement of monogamy notably excepted.

Second, all three traditions recognized that marriage is by nature a multidimensional institution, whose formation, maintenance, and dissolution involves a variety of parties besides the couple themselves. Yes, marriage is a contract, formed by the mutual consent of the marital couple. But marriage is also a spiritual association, subject to the creed, code, cult, and canons of the religious community. Marriage is a social estate, subject to special laws of property and association, and to the expectations and exactions of the local community. Marriage is an economic institution, involving the creation and merger of properties, and triggering obligations of mutual care, nurture, and sacrifice between husband and wife, parent and child. And marriage is a ritual institution, formed through liturgical prayers, oaths, and blessings, and functioning


\textsuperscript{22} Quoted in chapter by al-Hibri in CM, at n. 80.

\textsuperscript{23} See detailed study in the chapter by Richard J. Martin in CM.
thereafter as a vital site of religious instruction, piety, and worship alongside the synagogue, church, or mosque.

Third, all three traditions recognized that marriage has inherent goods that lie beyond the preferences of the couple, or the terms of their marriage contract. Fundamental to all three traditions is the ideal of marriage as the divinely-sanctioned means of perpetuating the faith—not only by the couple maintaining their own household rites as vital sites of confessional identity, but also by the couple’s procreation and teaching of children who will form the next Schul, the next Church, the next Umma. Hence the emphasis in all three traditions of avoiding marriages with a non-believer.24

The Christian tradition devised the most elaborate lists of the inherent goods and goals of marriage, beyond the good of producing the next generation of the faithful.25 Among the most famous formulations was St. Augustine’s fifth-century discourse on the marital goods of fides, proles, et sacramentum. Marriage, said Augustine, is an institution of fides—faith, trust, and love between husband and wife, and between parent and child that goes beyond the faith demanded of any other temporal relationship. Marriage is a source of proles—children who carry on the family name and tradition, perpetuate the human species, and fill God’s Church with the next generation of saints. And marriage is a form of sacramentum—a symbolic expression of Christ’s

24 The emphasis on the procreation and nurture of children in the faith and the corresponding prohibition on interreligious marriage were particularly prominent themes in biblical and diaspora Judaism. These rules were not only fundamental safeguards against assimilation into (an often hostile) gentile culture. They were also essential conditions for the Jewish community to continue to flourish and grow despite its aversion to proselytism. These same emphases on procreation and against intermarriage also emerged among some later Christian and Islamic communities, particularly when they were placed in minority contexts. Think of Catholics in nineteenth-century America, and Muslims and Orthodox in twentieth-century America. See chapters by David Novak and Michael J. Broyde in CM, and also chapters by Novak, Broyde, and Jocelyn Hellig in John Witte, Jr. and Richard C. Martin, eds., Sharing the Book: Religious Perspectives on the Rights and Wrongs of Proselytism (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1999), 17-78.

25 For an elaboration of the arguments in the following paragraphs, see chapters 11 and 12 of Witte, God’s Joust, God’s Justice.
love for his Church, even a channel of God’s grace to sanctify the couple, their children, and the broader community. This trilogy of marital goods became axiomatic in later medieval Catholic theology, and remains at the core of Catholic marriage teaching to this day. An overlapping formulation, drawn from Roman law and Patristic lore, and popular among Orthodox and Protestants, argues that marriage provides husbands and wives with: (1) mutual love and support; (2) the mutual procreation and nurture of children; and (3) the mutual protection from sexual sin and temptation.

The Christian tradition, building on Graeco-Roman sources, also emphasized the broader social goods of marriage—teaching that marriage is good not only for the couple and their children, but also for the broader civic communities of which they are a part. Ancient Greek philosophers and Roman Stoics called marriage “the foundation of the republic,” “the private font of public virtue.” The Church Fathers called marital and familial love “the seedbed of the city,” “the force that welds society together.” Catholics called the family “a domestic church,” “a kind of school of deeper humanity.” Protestants called the household a “little church,” a “little state,” a “little seminary,” a “little commonwealth,” “the first school” of justice and love, authority and liberty, rule and citizenship. At the core of all these metaphors was a perennial Western ideal that stable marriages and families are essential to the survival, flourishing, and happiness of the greater commonwealths of church, state, and civil society. And a breakdown of marriage and the family will eventually have devastating consequences on these larger social institutions.
Marriage as Covenant

The idea of covenant is emerging in Western law, theology, and ethics today as a common trope to capture some of these higher dimensions of marriage. It is also emerging as a common term to connect the interreligious dialogue among Jews, Christians, and Muslims and the interdisciplinary dialogue among jurists, theologians, and ethicists about marriage. The connections between these layers of dialogue about marriage and covenant are still developing. But it is no coincidence that the covenant marriage movement in American law has been orchestrated, in ample part, by proponents of a covenantal theology and ethics of marriage.

“Covenant” is a common Scriptural term for Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike. It appears 286 times in the Hebrew Bible (as berit), 24 times in the New Testament (as foedus), 26 times in the Qur’an (as mithaq). “Covenant” has multiple meanings and purposes in these three sacred scriptures. But it is used most importantly and most frequently to describe the special relationship between Yahweh and Israel, God and His elect, Allah and His chosen ones.

In each of these three scriptures, “covenant” is also occasionally used to describe marriage. In the Hebrew Bible, Yahweh’s special covenantal relationship with Israel is analogized to the special relationship between husband and wife. Israel’s disobedience to Yahweh, in turn, particularly its proclivity to worship false gods, is frequently described as a form of “playing the harlot.” Idolatry, like adultery, can lead to divorce. The Hebrew Bible also


speaks about marriage as a covenant in its own right (Prov. 2:17; Mal. 2:14-16). The Prophet Malachi’s formulation is the fullest:

the Lord was witness to the covenant between you and the wife of your youth, to whom you have been faithless, though she is your companion and your wife by covenant. Has not the one God made and sustained for us the spirit of life? And what does he desire? Godly offspring. So take heed to yourselves, and let none be faithless to the wife of his youth. “For I hate divorce, says the Lord the God of Israel, (Mal. 2:13-16).

The Qur’an has comparable verses about marriage as a “solemn covenant” (mithaquan ghalihan) which cannot be easily broken:

But if you decide to take one wife in place of another, even if you have given the latter a quintal for dowry, take not the least amount of it back; would you take it by slander and a manifest wrong? And how could you take it when you have gone into one another, and they have taken from you a solemn covenant? (Q. 4:20-21).

Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike have long used these kinds of scriptural verses to speak of marriage, inter alia, as a covenant and to encourage the procreation of children and to discourage the practice of easy divorce. These verses have led some theologians to create a covenantal model of marriage that links the divine covenant between God and humanity and the marital covenant of husband and wife—in effect to make God a third party to the marriage covenant, and in turn to make marriage a forum for the expression of the divine-human covenant.

In the Jewish and Muslim traditions, the development of a covenant model of marriage is very recent, indeed. David Novak and David Hartman are pioneering the creation of a new

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covenantal theology, ethic, and law of marriage within Judaism. Azizah al-Hibri is doing the same in the Islamic tradition. What makes their respective efforts so promising is their insistence on grounding their covenantal models of marriage in long-neglected texts of the Hebrew Bible and Talmud and of the Qur’an and Hadith respectively, and rereading and rethinking their own traditions in light of these original canonical texts.

Covenant models of marriage have a longer pedigree in the Christian tradition. John Calvin (1509-1564), the sixteenth-century Protestant reformer of Geneva, was evidently the first to develop a detailed covenant model of marriage in place of the prevailing Catholic sacramental theology and canon law of marriage. Calvin followed conventional Christian teachings in distinguishing two interlocking biblical covenants: (1) the covenant of works whereby the chosen people of Israel, through obedience to God’s law, are promised eternal salvation and blessing; and (2) the covenant of grace whereby the elect, through faith in Christ’s incarnation and atonement, are promised eternal salvation and beatitude. These traditional teachings on the covenant were common among Catholics, Orthodox, and Protestants, many of them rooted in the earlier teachings of the Church Fathers.

Calvin went beyond the tradition, however, in using the doctrine of covenant to describe not only the vertical relationships between God and humanity, but also the horizontal relationships between husband and wife. Just as God draws the elect believer into a covenant relationship with him, Calvin argued, so God draws husband and wife into a covenant relationship with each other. Just as God expects constant faith and good works in our

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29 See the chapter by al-Hibri in CM.
30 See ibid. and another chapter by al-Hibri in Sex, Marriage and Family in the World Religions.
31 See sources and discussion in the chapters by Lawler, Martin, and Stackhouse in CM. See elaboration of this thesis in Witte, From Sacrament to Covenant, chap. 3 and in John Witte, Jr. and Robert M. Kingdon, Sex, Marriage and Family in John Calvin’s Geneva I: Courtship, Engagement, and Marriage (Grand Rapids, 2006).
relationship with Him, so he expects connubial faithfulness and sacrificial works in our relationship with our spouses.\textsuperscript{32} As Calvin put it:

God is the founder of marriage. When a marriage takes place between a man and a woman, God presides and requires a mutual pledge from both. Hence Solomon in Proverbs 2:17 calls marriage the covenant of God, for it is superior to all human contracts. So also Malachi [2:14-16] declares that God is, as it were, the guarantor [of marriage] who by his authority joins the man to the woman, and sanctions the alliance.\textsuperscript{33}

God participates in the formation of the covenant of marriage through his chosen agents on earth, Calvin believed. The couple’s parents, as God’s “lieutenants,” instruct the young couple in Christian marriage and give their consent to the union. Two witnesses, as “God’s priests to their peers,” testify to the sincerity and solemnity of the couple’s promises and attest to the marriage event. The minister, holding “God’s spiritual power of the Word,” blesses the union and admonishes the couple and the community of their respective biblical duties and rights. The magistrate, holding “God’s temporal power of the sword,” registers the parties, ensures the legality of their union, and protects them in their conjoined persons and properties.

This involvement of parents, peers, ministers, and magistrates in the formation of marriage was not an idle or dispensable ceremony. These four parties represented different dimensions of God’s involvement in the marriage covenant, and they were thus essential to the legitimacy of the marriage itself. To omit any such party in the formation of the marriage was, in effect, to omit God from the marriage covenant. On this foundation, Calvin worked out in great detail a covenantal theology of the origin, nature, and purpose of marriage and a covenantal law


\textsuperscript{33} Calvin, Comm. Mal. 2:14.
of marital formation, maintenance, and dissolution, spousal rights, roles, and responsibilities, child care, custody, and control and much more. This was the first comprehensive covenantal model of marriage in the Christian tradition, and it informed the policies of the Genevan church and state alike.

An analogous covenantal model of marriage emerged from the hand of contemporary Zurich reformer, Heinrich Bullinger (1504-1575), whose work was tremendously influential on both on the Continent and in England. By the later sixteenth century, the writings of Calvin and Bullinger, separately and together, catalyzed a veritable industry of Protestant covenant theology, jurisprudence, and ethics. These writings on covenant, which crested in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England and New England, provided a detailed integrated understanding not only of marriage per se, but also of the place of marriage in church, state, and broader society.34 In the last two centuries, covenantal language has also become prominent in Protestant marriage and wedding liturgies, more so than Protestant theology.

In the Catholic tradition, the Council of Trent closed the door firmly on covenant marriage language in 1563. In its decree Tametsi, the Council declared canonical the pervasive medieval teaching that marriage is a sacrament. Heretical Protestant teachings on marriage, including the emerging teaching on covenant marriage in Reformed circles, could henceforth have no place in the Catholic tradition.35 Four centuries later, however, the Second Vatican Council reopened this door, using the language of covenant as an organizing idiom to describe

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34 See chapter 10 of Witte, God’s Joust, God’s Justice and David A. Weir, Early New England: A Covenanted Society (Grand Rapids, 2005).
the origins, nature, and purpose of marriage. In *Gaudium et spes*, one of the Council’s most influential documents, the Vatican Fathers put in thus:

> The intimate partnership of married life and love has been established by the Creator and qualified by His laws. It is rooted in the marriage covenant of irrevocable personal consent.... [A] man and a woman, who by the marriage covenant of conjugal love “are no longer two but one flesh” (Mt. 19:6), render mutual help and service to each other through an intimate union of their persons and of their actions. Through this union they experience the meaning of their oneness and attain to it with growing perfection day by day… For as God of old made himself present to His people through a covenant of love and fidelity, so now the Savior of men and the Spouse of the Church comes into the lives of married Christians through the sacrament of matrimony.36

Since Vatican II, a number of Catholic ethicists, jurists, theologians, and catechists have come to adopt the language of covenant marriage, alongside the traditional language of marriage as sacrament. A number of these same Catholic scholars have used the language of covenant to engage in rigorous ecumenical discussions of the higher dimensions of marriage and to find common cause with Protestant, Jews, and others in pressing reforms state marriage law.

**Concluding Reflections**

The term “covenant” is emerging today as a convenient and cogent means to capture the higher dimensions of marriage—though this is by no means the only language available. “Covenant” is an ancient trope, with deep roots in Jewish, Christian, and Muslim canonical texts and with ample and diverse expression in the legal traditions that emerged under the influence of these religious traditions. In contemporary American law, “covenant” has the kind of neutrality

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and plasticity needed to signal that marriage has higher dimensions, even while leaving the definition of these higher dimensions to individual choice and community accent.

While, historically, the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim traditions found ways to reconcile the contractual and covenantal dimensions of marriage, American law today juxtaposes them. In all but three states, parties who wish to be legally married must choose the state’s contract marriage option. Contract marriage has minimal rules of formation and dissolution and hundreds of built-in state and federal rights and duties for the couple and their children. Couples may add rights and duties beyond those defined by the state’s contract marriage law. These can be set out in prenuptial contracts negotiated between the parties. Or they can be set out in the religious laws and customs of the community of which these marital parties are voluntary members.

But, even here, the contractual dimensions of marriage are preferred. Religious authorities are thus largely powerless to enforce their religious rulings on marriage against one of their members who sues in state court. They may apply spiritual pressure and sanctions to get a party to comply with their internal religious norms—even shun or excommunicate that party for defying their authority. But if the party persists in the civil suit, religious norms and forms of marriage and divorce are subordinate to the state's contract laws of marriage.

This is not altogether true in Louisiana, Arkansas, and Arizona today. In these three states, parties who wish to marry may choose either contract marriage or covenant marriage. The contract marriage option in these three states is largely the same as that available in any other state.

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37 Private prenuptial contracts will be enforced by state courts. Religious laws of marriage and divorce will not be enforced—even if the couple’s prenuptial contract stipulates that religious law should govern their contract in the event of dispute. New York’s get statute—which allows an Orthodox Jewish couple to divorce only if their rabbis first give them a Jewish divorce—is a rare and remarkable exception to the usual rules. See Michael J. Broyde, *Marriage, Divorce, and the Abandoned Wife in Jewish Law* (New York: Ktav Publishers, 2001).
state. The covenant marriage option, however, is unique in that tightens marital formation and dissolution rules considerably.\textsuperscript{39} Covenant marriage statutes serve a particularly valuable teaching function—instructing the community on the higher regard that the state has for marriage, instructing the couple of the higher rigor that marriage has for them, instructing religious communities that marriage is more than a mere contract.

It is the state authorities, however, not the religious authorities, who enforce covenant marriages in these three states. As with contract marriage, so with covenant marriage, parties may supplement the rights and duties set out by state law with voluntarily chosen or religiously mandated norms. But the same limitations on the enforceability of these supplementary norms by religious authorities will apply in these three covenant marriage states as prevail in contract marriage states. State formulations of what marriage entails in the individual case will still trump countervailing religious formulations—even if the state is interpreting the meaning of a “covenant” marriage.

Moreover, outside of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Arizona, the state will not even recognize a covenant marriage, only a contract marriage. An estranged spouse can thus escape a covenant marriage simply by moving to and filing for divorce in any of the forty-seven American states or any number of foreign countries without covenant marriage options. Current conflict of laws rules, both domestic and international, do not favor the enforcement of covenant marriage laws over the contract marriage laws of the forum state where the divorce case is litigated. And the trend in many non-covenant states and many foreign nations in the past decade has been to


\textsuperscript{39} See pages 1-6 above.
weaken, rather than strengthen, traditional forms and norms of marriage.\textsuperscript{40} These unfavorable conflicts rules, though not yet strongly tested through litigation, underscore the reality that covenant marriage laws are an important, but only a partial, legal response to the fallout of the modern revolution of marriage and divorce.

A fuller legal response requires additional strategies of reform and engagement, particularly on the part of religious communities.\textsuperscript{41} The most first step is for America’s religious communities to get their legal and theological houses on marriage and the family in order. Too many religious communities in America today, Christian churches notably among them, are losing the capacity to engage the hard legal, political, and social issues of our day with doctrinal rigor, moral clarity, and canonical authenticity. In centuries past, the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim traditions alike produced massive codes of religious law and discipline that covered many areas of private and public life, including domestic life. They instituted sophisticated tribunals for the equitable enforcement of these laws. They produced exquisite works of theology and jurisprudence that worked out the precepts of proper domestic living in great detail. Some of that sophisticated legal work still goes on among some religious communities today. Some religious jurists and ethicists still take up some of these questions. But the legal structure and sophistication of modern American religious communities as a whole is a pale shadow of what went on before. And their marital norms and habits are increasingly become simple variations on the cultural status quo.

American religious communities must think more seriously about restoring and reforming their own bodies of religious law on marriage, divorce, and sexuality, instead of

\textsuperscript{40} See detailed analysis and sources in the chapter by Peter Hay in CM.
simply acquiescing in state laws and culture. American states, in turn, must think more seriously about granting greater deference to the marital laws and customs of legitimate religious and cultural groups that cannot accept a marriage law of the common denominator or denomination. Other sophisticated legal cultures—such as England, India, and South Africa—grant semi-autonomy to Catholic, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, and other groups to conduct their subjects’ domestic affairs in accordance with their own laws and customs, with the state setting only minimum conditions and limits. It might well be time for America likewise to translate its growing cultural and religious pluralism into a more concrete legal pluralism on marriage and family life.42

42 For an elaboration of these themes, see chapters 11 and 16 of Witte, God’s Joust, God’s Justice.