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that when they arrived home, they found that they were dying for nothing. Slowly they had come to the conclusion that they were going to die for something. Now they were willing and ready to sacrifice everything, even unto life, for the simple, constitutional, American right to vote.

In Selma, that is not idle talk. Numerous people have been threatened with death for their participation in the voter-registration drive. "As a matter of fact," he said, "we are not even allowed to assemble peacefully and to indicate our grievances by marching through the streets without being put in jail and subjected to the most primitive kind of treatment. Not long ago we were in jail, many of us, for ten days. There were sixty-five of us in one room with only one container of water and one cup from which to drink. We were fed bread and peas in the morning and bread and peas at night. The floors were kept wet so that we could not sit or lie down. It was below freezing and we had nothing with which to cover ourselves except the clothes that we had worn in the march." We learned that the white people had given practically no support to the Negro community in its desire to secure its constitutional rights. Later, one Negro pastor said that he had been in Selma for four years. No white minister had spoken to him during that period until ten days before when, in the dead of night, a white minister had come to him to ask forgiveness.

The situation in Selma that day is hard to communicate. After moving around for a couple of hours and discussing all sorts and kinds of things including a Ph.D. program with one of my students who is out of residence (it seemed a little incongruous even to think about it), I went into Brown's Chapel and found a seat in the back of the room. The leaders were giving instructions; they were indicating what should be done in case of the use of gas. They were telling how one should run through the gas and not away from it since the gas would follow one if he moved away from it. They were indicating how to protect one's self with a handkerchief over the nose and mouth. One person used an umbrella to illustrate how best to ward off blows and how best to protect one's self in the face of swinging billy clubs.

Then began a long wait for the decision to march. Speaker after speaker explained the meaning of the march, expressing his deep conviction that if we were to march that day it would be simply to indicate that we have a right to protest against the injustice suffered by the Negro in not being permitted to vote. Preston Browning from the Divinity School sat down next to me with his bed roll ready for the march. Most of us were naively unprepared. We talked about the need for people to commit themselves, to be present in this movement, to accept the responsible leadership of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and to do what they asked us to do. There was no long argument or rationale. The purpose of our being there was to indicate that the struggle to secure justice in the South was the struggle of everybody everywhere. By our presence and by our willingness to follow their lead, we indicated that this was our struggle too, and that those who had paid the price over long years of suffering by receiving the blows of injustice were the ones who had the right to determine what should be done.

Finally we learned that an injunction had been served against the march by Judge Johnson, that all of us would be subject to federal prosecution if we marched on Tuesday or on any day until Judge Johnson had ruled. It was clear from what had been said that the NAACP had asked for an injunction against the state troopers, an injunction to restrain them from repeating the bloody beatings and the use of tear gas as on Bloody Sunday. Judge Johnson had been asked for an injunction against the troopers but instead of that he had issued an injunction against the marchers. One could tell that the leadership of the Protesting Movement was deeply hurt and embittered by the use of federal power. Finally, about noon, word came that it had been decided that we would march; and one by one representative leaders from around the country, Protestant, Catholic, Jewish indicated why the march was necessary and why each one had decided to march.

A professor from Princeton repeated the argument of Thurgood Marshall that in breaking the law we were willing to take the consequences, that in breaking the law we acted openly, and that this was far different from breaking the law in the dead of night, and without any willingness to suffer the legal consequences. This weakens, if it does not refute, the argument that those protesters who break the law simply encourage violation of law by those who are seeking to perpetuate injustice. Consequently, some people felt that this made it possible for them to march. Other speakers called upon us to march in loyalty to a higher law, the moral law that takes precedence over human law, or a divine law that stands above any human law. At one point, a white speaker indicated that we had come to Selma to stand with the movement and that he thought that every white person in the chapel would take his place in the line of march. At this point, hundreds of white people stood up to indicate that they were there in body
and many think it would have been a good tactic if Governor Wallace had let us march. Nevertheless, we walked back slowly, passing some pretty glum faces among the young people who were ready to march under almost any circumstances. We wended our way back through the town, through the hostile glares of the white people, and found ourselves again at Brown's Chapel. I sat on the step at the back of the stage listening to the efforts of leaders to build up Martin Luther King and to explain that what seemed like defeat to many of them had been really a victory. I watched the apathy with which many of the young people sat silently or applauded without heart. One knew that the struggle for justice was very complex and that it is difficult to keep people together in any program. One sensed it—one felt it and one knew it by the looks on many of the faces.

After a while, I wandered outside again and looked for a familiar face. There were none around, so I decided to catch a bus to Montgomery and to return home. We arrived at O'Hare Airport with mixed feelings about twenty-four hours after we had left it—with some sense of satisfaction that we had been present, if only for one day; but also with a kind of dissatisfaction. As one of my colleagues put it, "We are present for a day. They remain to absorb the blows." (At the airport in Atlanta we learned that three white ministers had already absorbed the blows that were meant for us.) We came home with a strange feeling of having done something and of having done nothing in the face of the issues at stake.

Therefore, when the call came to go to Washington on Friday, there was little hesitation in taking another step. We were called to Washington by the National Council of Churches to protest the denial of the right to assemble, the use of force way beyond anything that was called for to prevent assembly, and the denial of the right to vote. The trip to Washington was quite different from the trip to Selma, and much more frustrating.

In Washington, these days, there is the problem of the Old Office Building and the New. We finally found Congressmen O'Hara and Yates in the New. Both had already spoken out on the Selma situation and Rep. Yates had even introduced a bill. We left their offices confident that some Congressmen, at least, were doing their best to represent a concern for the protection of every citizen.

We had an appointment with Senator Dirksen for 3:00 p.m. We told him what we had seen and felt in Selma. He told us that the staffs of the majority leader, the minority leader, and the Attorney General were working on a bill in the next room at that very moment. He said that one of his problems was the introduction of federal registrars, and that he thought perhaps the clerks of the federal courts could serve when federal intervention was necessary. I asked him whether he thought that the clerk of Judge Cox of Mississippi would serve such purposes adequately. He had to agree that this would not work. After several expressions of our appreciation for his leadership on the Civil Rights Bill of 1964, we reiterated our hope that he would support the President in using federal powers to protect law and order and to ensure constitutional rights.

THE MEANING OF SELMA

The spontaneous movement of thousands of religious leaders from Maine to California to Selma since the bloody Sunday of March 7 symbolizes the second phase of the human aspect of the civil rights revolution. The first phase, of course, began with Mrs. Rosa Parks' symbolization of the Negro will to protest in refusing to sit at the back of a bus. Now, by their willingness to be present, to do whatever is asked of them by the Negro leadership in Selma, these white people are finally saying, "The realization of equal justice before the law for the Negro from this point forward will be a fundamental goal of the religious forces of America." Further, these leaders are saying by their willingness to march on the Tuesday following bloody Sunday and on every day since then, "We are not willing to sit by and to let the cumbersome processes of the present federal legislation grind out justice in some distant tomorrow." By their willingness to share in absorbing the blows of the would-be guarantors of law and order, they said "no" to the forces of injustice represented in state machinery, legislative, judicial, and administrative; they said "no" in particular to the use of police power to perpetuate injustice.

The presence of thousands of religious leaders in Washington on the Friday following Bloody Sunday spoke a resounding "yes" to the use of federal power both to guarantee protection from the abuse of state police power and to provide a means to secure the right to vote.

In January, 1965, more than three years after restriction on voting had been taken to the courts, Dallas County, in which Selma is located, had registered only 335 out of the 15,145 Negroes eligible to vote. Until fairly recently, applications had been proceeding at the rate of 20-25 per day on two days each month. The registrars had been ordered to step up the rate to 100 per day, but still processing took place only on selected days of each
spread of tyranny — as well as to defend the "national interest." Now this sense of uniting purpose is in jeopardy. We are discovering that millions of persons who heretofore more or less passively accepted their role as second-class citizens are now asking to share in the American dream. They threaten to destroy the white man's sense of belonging because they are providing a visible and graphic demonstration of the emptiness of his symbols. By calling out violent reactions from those who are least loyal to the American vocation, they expose the latent weaknesses in the basis of our unity.

The consensus on the basis of which stable political institutions exist is threatened. As long as a people's interests are taken seriously and a measure of justice is realized or seems destined to be realized in the not-too-distant future, it gives its consent to the accepted political processes. Today we face a breakdown in that consent. The civil rights movement has represented the Negro's dwindling confidence that this nation intends to do justice by its minority groups. He has been convinced that the duly elected leaders will hem and haw, debate and procrastinate until they are forced into decisive action. Therefore the excluded, disenchanted Negro cannot be expected to abide by all of the decisions of the constituted powers. The recalcitrance of the white community to institute justice will result in resistance to the law and order that enforce segregation and discrimination. In response, certain elements of the white community will resort to even more extreme extralegal actions to maintain injustice. The outcome will be more conflict, violence, and disruption of the orderly processes of government. In short, unless something else happens soon, the American consensus will be destroyed. This is a threat in northern cities as well as in the deep South. Not content with the slow-moving political processes, the protests take new forms — boycotts, sit-ins, selective patronage, defiance of injunctions, and other measures designed to express the seriousness of the will to achieve freedom and equality now.

There is every reason to believe that the latent bitterness and hostility will erupt in unpredictable ways in the days ahead. If we move with reasonable speed it will be too slow. If the nonviolent leadership does not secure support from both the Negro and white groups new methods will be found to resist and to defy a system that has so flagrantly contradicted its birthright. Increasingly political candidates and public policies will be drawn into the debate and the battle. The insertion of the Negro as an active and determined political force will mean that more and more issues will be viewed in terms of black and white. Even as Negroes fight for the right to be judged apart from the color of skin, elections will more and more hinge on the issue of race.

The moral integrity and the psychological health of the nation are at stake. As Gunnar Myrdal pointed out, the American dilemma is the conflict between profession and practice. The ideals of liberty and equality taught and exalted in every corner of this land are flagrantly and openly defied in the continued existence of prejudice and discrimination. The result must be either a distortion of fact or a disavowal of the ideals. To suppress this contradiction is to avoid social reality. Thus in 1956, 63 percent of the total white population (79 percent in the South, 60 percent in the North) indicated that they felt the U.S. Negroes were treated fairly. This radical distortion of what is "obvious" can only lead to destructive action. It is a threat to the psychological health of the nation and hence to the capacity of our people to function as responsible citizens. At the same time, those who openly challenge the ideals are able to use the distortions to build a political base for the un-American doctrines. They are aided and abetted in spreading the poison of racism and inequality. In deed and in word the moral ideals are denied, not only by the extremists but by everyone who permits the inequalities to persist. The insertion of this new will to overcome injustice in the public life of America has exposed the depth and height of American morality. It has revealed the hypocrisy of most protestations and celebrations of brotherhood. It has made every white man suspect until he has proven himself more than a fair-weather friend and a lip-service brother. The brutal exposure of the moral degradation of the white man represented in a century of inhumanity to the Negro threatens everyone's confidence in all professions of moral intention.

Finally, our leadership in the free world is being undermined. The most frightful prospect is the possibility of a world racial conflict. Everything points to race as the deepest chasm in the spiritual life of the world. Unless we bridge it at home and soon, Africa and large parts of Asia will have further justification for losing confidence in our ability to reverse the tides of history. White arrogance and exploitation remain most potent forces with which to rouse social and political forces against America. Little Rock, Birmingham, and Selma are well known all around the world today.
expect much of the white man. Therefore the white person must declare by his presence in every conceivable activity that he is more than open in his reception of persons regardless of pigmentation. One cannot be forced to respect another person. Respect may come from association but there is no guarantee. But those who do have respect and who at least want to accept persons regardless of race must go out of their way to make this plain. A radical shift in our way of life is necessary to meet the radical nature of the present crisis. For the time being (that time being perhaps a couple of generations) we must order our lives so that we are present where it is a matter of making clear that all men are truly basically alike. This means living in integrated housing, belonging to integrated organizations, sending our children to integrated schools, attending functions of civil rights groups, marching with those who march for civil rights, volunteering for work with civil rights groups, going to Mississippi, to Selma, or to our northern counterparts, defending the freedom fighters, going bond for those in jail, paying for court trials, publicizing civil rights activities, wearing some symbol of our willingness to be counted, integrating churches, etc. The white man will have to start integration in reverse, going to an all-Negro church or moving into an all-Negro neighborhood. The Negro will continue to move into the all-white area in order that some of the less courageous whites will have the opportunity to show respect.

Somehow the hypothesis of the Black Muslim, that the white community will never treat the Negro as a human being, must be demonstrated to be false. We cannot wait to say that we know his name, that he is a visible man, that we are not killers of a dream. The white man must be prepared to be distrusted for a long time. Perhaps he will always be suspect in our generation. But the response of the Negro cannot be the criterion for action.

The emphasis here on the responsibility of the white community is deliberate. The white community has set the conditions for the relationships, for the creation of a climate of disrespect. We can count on the white community’s continuing to excuse itself and to avoid its real guilt by insisting that the Negro earn the white man’s respect first. We can no longer hide behind this subterfuge. We can no longer depend on this “White Curtain” to hide the reality of black men systematically mistreated. The only way out today is—for a period of time—to insist that the color black is a cause for special respect. Why? Because there is a special need for this special respect in order to offset the damage we have done to the Negro and to ourselves.

This is a reciprocal action. We are told that he who disrespects others without cause cannot respect himself. We literally destroy ourselves by participating in a society in which disrespect is internalized in prejudice and institutionalized in discrimination. We have a stake in eradicating this psychic and social disease. Overcoming it requires, however, radical readjustments in social reality. This means finding ways for Negroes to increase their power and to express their anger as well as rapid increases in freedom and equality.

3. We must find ways to increase the Negro’s power and to overcome his sense of powerlessness.

The apathy and aimlessness as well as the violence and vindictiveness among Negroes can be explained by their sense of powerlessness. Not only must they suffer injustice and indignity but they have had little hope of changing the situation. In spite of many changes, as a minority they have little hope of securing enough power to bring about justice. They are treated with disrespect even when, against great odds, they have become as educated and respectable as the most cultured whites. They feel powerless to cope with the forces against them. They feel trapped, unable to do much about their own conditions, dependent on the good will and favors granted by a white majority.

In order to overcome this sense of powerlessness Negroes must find ways to influence the decisions that affect their lives. They must forge instruments that cause them to be taken seriously by the white community. They must be recognized as having the capacity so to affect the white community that it must negotiate with them, treat their representatives as equals, and include them in the councils of state—not simply as tools for communicating decisions to the Negro community but as partners in power.

The sense of powerlessness among Negroes must be overcome by events that indicate a capacity to influence the decisions of our common life, or that point to a potentiality for achieving power. Since the Negro does not have much power in the economic, political, labor, social welfare, and church organizations that control the city or nation he must develop special organizations.

There is a great deal of discussion about the merits of direct action. It is claimed that direct action does not accomplish very much except to arouse the antagonism of the white community, and that it should be replaced by action through regular channels. Each of these points has some merit but cannot be the determining factor.
Muslims and similar more radical and divisive leadership lurk around the corner if the present more moderate leadership fails. Thus we must choose the third alternative – to cooperate actively with the moderate leadership of the civil rights movement in ventures that give expression to a pent-up anger, even to a hatred of the perpetrators of injustice. All white men must accept the fact that they belong to this group. No one can claim exemption from the guilt for what has been done. Who has really taken the course of social justice seriously until it was thrust upon him by recent events? Somehow a way must be found to channel the anger while concrete improvement is sought in a number of areas.

5. We must rapidly increase equality of opportunity.

The main thrust of the civil rights movement is for equality of opportunity. There must be rapid advancement of equality in education, employment, housing, voting and legal treatment, and in public facilities.

All students of American life agree that education is the single most important factor in determining the destiny of an individual. We know that a Negro has a harder time in obtaining a good education than a white person. More Negroes come from homes where there is less encouragement and help in education. We know that white children from homes of lower income and education are much more likely to drop out of school than those from homes with more money and education. The fact that Negroes have been denied equal access to jobs and education operates in a vicious circle to keep them at the bottom of society. Students of education believe that the disadvantages of a poor beginning can be overcome if pupils are given special attention beginning at age three. But more money must be spent and more attention given if educational opportunities are to be anywhere near equal. This means special prekindergarten schools as well as special attention to drop-outs and others whose basic skills are below the average.

In addition the regular educational program must be revamped in order to concentrate talented teachers and special programs for the most disadvantaged. Perhaps as important as anything else is the development of additional personnel – persons who are committed to work where the need is greatest and who will identify with the community and its aspirations. This means teachers who are personally involved in the civil rights movement.

To meet the educational problems, however, requires realistic programs that change the Negro's anticipation of job opportunities. He must be given experiences along the way that indicate to him that there is some reason for getting an education. That sense of futility must be overcome which accompanies the knowledge that many high school graduates cannot secure work and that most of the jobs available are the least desirable. The use of already-developed skills to help those less fortunate, especially when linked to organized groups and with some remuneration may help provide the incentive to stay in school. More jobs for everyone in an expanding economy, necessary as this is, must be supplemented by all-out efforts to break down discrimination in plant and union. In order to increase equality of opportunity in employment several types of programs are necessary: fair employment legislation, limitation of governmental expenditure to firms with fair employment practices, voluntary organization for fair employment, continual review of policies and practices in organizations in which we are involved, selective buying campaigns where discrimination exists, support of special training programs to prepare nonwhites, and in some cases preferential hiring until some balance is reached.

Thus all efforts to increase employment, to end discrimination, and to provide real work experience while in school are essential not only in themselves but as a spur to educational achievement.

In the area of housing, legislation to ensure equal opportunity to purchase and to rent should be supported. Policies of real estate agents not to rent or to sell to nonwhites in all-white areas must be broken down. Efforts to prevent the promotion of panic selling by real estate agents must be increased. Owners must take the initiative in selling to nonwhites by working through organizations. Individuals should take the initiative in informing renting agents that they would welcome integration in their buildings. Human relations councils should be supported. Public statements in support of open occupancy should be signed and published. Members of churches and other organizations must support and encourage their leaders to lead rather than to remain neutral or to follow public opinion.

The right to vote and to equal protection of the law are so much a part of the American purpose that it is almost inconceivable that we have delayed so long in implementing them. Support for legislation and for projects designed to give all people the right to vote cannot be delayed. Some people will participate in the registration drive in the South. Some parents will risk the life...
should? I cannot accept the proposition that the four-
hundred-year travail of the American Negro should
result merely in his attainment of the present level of
American civilization. I am far from being convinced
that being released from the African witch doctor was
worthwhile if I am now—in order to support the moral
contradictions and the spiritual aridity of my life—
expected to become dependent on the American psy-
chiatrist. It is a bargain I refuse. The only thing white
people have that black people need, or should want,
is power—and no one holds power forever. White
people cannot, in the generality, be taken as models
of how to live. Rather, the white man is himself in
sore need of new standards, which will release him
from his confusion and place him once again in fruitful
communion with the depths of his own being. . . .
The price of the liberation of the white people is the
liberation of the blacks—the total liberation, in the
cities, in the towns, before the law, and in the mind.*

Baldwin is appealing to two dimensions that
stand out in the imagery of the Bible. The first
is the dimension of depth which stands over
against what man is as what he ought to be. The
second is the communal dimension of our human-
ity. In the first place our religious faith affirms
an “other” determination by virtue of which a
man’s self-determination is molded and reshaped.
We speak of an interdependence which is symbol-
ized by the Old Testament image of covenant
between God and a “people” and by the New
Testament image of the Church as a body. In
each case, one’s own initiative does not alone
determine or bring about the good. It is God who
chooses Israel and sets the terms of the covenant.
It is Christ who is the foundation and head of
the Church. In addition, both images point to
a communal aspect of existence. God’s covenant
is with a people. In the Church there is one
body with many members who care for each
other, who share each other’s rejoicing and who
suffer together. What happens to me, happens
to everyone.

The substance of human existence, then, is
community or a relatedness in that in feeling and
in deed means mutual support and enhancement.
We sometimes refer to this relatedness as love.
As feeling, love designates concern or intention.
As deed, love designates movement toward the
other. As an interrelatedness it means something
more—perhaps subjectively a recognition of the
objective fact of the interdependence of being, of
participation. (There are other participations as
well, pointed to by truth and beauty which must
also be related to community.)

What is required of us in America at this par-
ticular time in the area of race is given by the
conditions affecting the community of white and
black in the context of the community of all men.
Community or interrelatedness, of course, is de-
pendent upon individuals with capacities to relate.
But what is required for this is freedom from the
many forms of idolatry that plague us from ca-
rees, families, friends, and theories. In the Pro-
testant tradition this is given ultimately through
faith, because it is through faith that a man ac-
cepts himself as accepted and as fulfilled by the
action of one other than himself. Free from the
necessity to prove his adequacy, he is released to
accept what life and his friends who share in
the covenant ask. But this capacity to relate is
also given by various experiences and situations
that help us to express our humanity. That is
why those who in spite of fear or weakness accept
the challenge to be counted frequently find new
resources for the struggle. Once having spoken
up for his convictions in spite of influential friends
who differ, a man may find new courage to be.
Once having marched in a demonstration, a man
may find it easier to be present in the struggle a
second time. Thus we see that self-initiation on
the basis of one’s own being, rather than con-
formity to one’s environment, accompanies move-
ment toward the goal of community.

If we view the civil rights movement from the
religious perspective that I have been developing
we come to the same practical conclusions which
we reached previously by viewing it from the per-
spective of our political tradition. In each case
we have, of course, begun in a different place: in
our political analysis with self-initiation and a
shifting historical situation that requires an em-
phasis upon community as a means to maximize
self-initiation; in our religious analysis with com-
unity and what is required for its actualization.

The conclusion is this: while in the political
community we begin with self-initiation and end
with participation and community as a means, in
the religious community we begin with love, or
community, or participation and find that self-
initiation must be strengthened as the means to
its fulfillment. In both cases, integration is the
law of our personal and communal existence for
our time. Integration is what self-initiation and
community demand today. Integration is an im-
perative rooted in both our political and our reli-
gious traditions.

* James Baldwin, The Fire Next Time, Dell Publishing
And there is hardly a situation in which the dignity of the person is more deeply violated than in the struggles for the establishment of conditions under which this dignity shall be guaranteed. This is true of person-to-person relationships as well as of the relation of individuals to groups and of groups to groups. There are situations in which resistance without armed violence is possible but even then destructive consequences are hardly avoidable, be it through psychological, through economic or through sociological forms of compulsion. And there are situations in which nothing short of war can defend or establish the dignity of the person. Nothing is more indicative of the tragic aspect of life than the unavoidable injustice in the struggle for justice.

A third problem which must be considered to create a transition from the encyclical to the political thought of the conference is the role of power in relation to force and the principles of justice. Power can be identified neither with force nor with authority. In several statements of the encyclical, this has been done, and a direct discussion of the ambiguities of power is lacking. But without it, a realistic approach to the peace problem is impossible.

There is no effective authority without a structure of power behind it; and under the conditions of existence, no power can become effective without coercion applied against those who try to undercut it. For power is something positive; it is a basic quality of being. It is the power to resist what tries to distort and to annihilate the structures of being. I remind the theologians of the fact that they open the majority of their prayers with words like “almighty or all-powerful God” thus consecrating power in itself. And I remind the philosophers that potentiality means “power of being.” In every individual and in every group is some power of being and the affirmation of this power and the drive to defend and to increase it. In the encounters of power with power, union as well as conflict arises and the conflicts lead to the use of force for the sake of coercion. Then the great question arises: When is coercion a just expression of power, when an unjust one? We acknowledge just coercion in the enforcement of the law. Is there a just enforcement in the relation of power groups? This question has been answered for many centuries by the concept of the just war. But this concept has lost its validity through the fact that in a serious atomic conflagration there is no victor and no vanquished; in other words, neither a coercer nor a coerced will be left.

The old concept has meaning only in minor conflicts. It may lead to a kind of world police, but a conflict between those who give power and authority to such a police force cannot be solved in this way. The problem is neither power nor coercion, but the use of coercion with or without justice in the necessary exercise of power.

In this connection, a fourth problem arises: the question as to what degree a political group, for instance a social group with a center of power, able to act politically, can be judged in the way in which one judges human individuals. Such an analogy, if taken seriously, has dangerous consequences. It considers a contingent government as the deciding and responsible center of the group. This makes it possible for the government to be asked to follow moral laws like the Ten Commandments, or the Sermon on the Mount or the Natural Moral Law for individuals — as is often demanded by a legalistic pacifism. But no government can make a total sacrifice of its nation, such as an individual can and sometimes ought to make of himself. However, this does not and should not prevent a government from inducing its nation to bring about the sacrifice of self-restriction for the common good of a group of nations, including itself, even if some loss of the questionable and pernicious possession called prestige is involved. There is another consequence which the personification of a group can have. If the government is considered as the deciding center of the social body, no individual has the right to resist it. And this is the surest and most frequently used road to despotism. The group lies in another dimension of being than the individual; and the moral laws, valid for the latter, can be applied to the former only indirectly and with essential qualifications. A direct application of the rights and duties of the individual to the rights and duties of a group is impossible. This fact, in unity with the three other problems we have mentioned, shows the limits of any realistic hope for “peace on earth.”

This statement forces me to lead you into a more universal and more basic consideration of the question of peace on earth. We must ask: Which are the predispositions for the fulfillment of this aim in human nature and in the character of history? Most differences about the problems of peace are rooted ultimately in different interpretations of human nature and consequently of the meaning of history. At this point I must speak both as a Protestant theologian and as an existentialist philosopher. I see human nature determined by the conflict between the goodness of man’s essential being and the ambiguity of his actual being, his life under the conditions of existence. The goodness of his essential nature gives
the future of mankind, as e.g. the problems of food, medicine, overpopulation, conservation of nature.

A fourth basis of genuine hope is the existence and effectiveness, however limited, of a legal roof for all these types of limited groups. Man can extend the realm of peace where nature cannot. He can establish a legal structure which guarantees peace among those who are subject to it, not absolutely but to a certain degree. Not absolutely, for everyone subjected to the legal structure can break through it for his own interest or conviction.

Therefore, something more than the legal structure for peace is needed. One has called it “consensus.” But it is not something as intellectual as this word indicates. It is communal eros, that kind of love which is not directed to an individual but to a group. It is said that one cannot love another nation. This may be true in relation to a national state; but it is not true with respect to the people of the other nation. One can have eros towards them in their uniqueness, their virtues, their contributions, in spite of their shortcomings and vices. It seems that no world community is possible without this eros which trespasses interest as well as law. Every expression of such eros is a basis of hope for peace, every rejection of such eros reduces the chances of peace.

And now a last word about what we as a peace conference can hope for. First of all: we can only hope. We cannot calculate, we cannot know. The uncertainty remains. All the seeds of hope mentioned can be destroyed before they come to fulfillment. And further: there is no hope for a final stage of history in which peace and justice rule. History is not fulfilled at its empirical end; but history is fulfilled in the great moments in which something new is created, or, as one could express it religiously, in which the Kingdom of God breaks into history conquering destructive structures of existence, one of the greatest of which is war. This means that we cannot hope for a final stage of justice and peace within history; but we can hope for partial victories over the forces of evil in a particular moment of time.

With this hope, without utopian expectations, this conference should begin its work.

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**THE HOUND OF HEAVEN**

Snoopy we would hesitate to call “Christ.” He comes closer, rather, to being “a little Christ” — that is, a Christian. For as Schulz himself has pointed out, Snoopy is capable of being “one of the meanest” members of the entire Peanuts cast. Furthermore, Snoopy has other faults (or “character traits,” as Linus likes to refer to “faults”): he is lazy, he is a “chow hound” without parallel, he is bitingly sarcastic, he is frequently a coward, and he often becomes quite weary of being what he is basically — a dog. He is, in other words, a fairly drawn caricature for what is probably the typical Christian. And if anyone should have any illusions about how “good” all Christians are, he would only need to read one of Paul’s letters to “the Saints” in Rome or Corinth to realize that “Saints” often have a few readjustments to make before they become complete angels. Also, it is good to remember Luther’s teaching here that “Ecclesia est abscondita,” the Church is hidden, for it lives by faith and not by sight or works. “He who would look at an act as such sees no difference between a Christian and a non-Christian,” Luther reminds us. Then how is one to distinguish between the Christian and the non-Christian? Finally, this is a judgment only God can make; but there are certain guideposts available for intelligent guesses. For instance, “By this all men will know that you are my disciples, if you have love for one another” (John 13:35). And in spite of his many rather questionable “character traits,” by this test Snoopy does rather well.

The Divinity School is happy to welcome two new faculty members. They are Dr. Peter Homans, Assistant Professor of Theology and Psychology, and Dr. Brian A. Gerrish, Associate Professor of Historical Theology.

Dr. Homans, who this past year was Assistant Professor of Theology and Psychology at Hartford Seminary Foundation, Hartford, Connecticut, received his B.D. degree from Virginia Theological Seminary, and his M.A. and Ph.D. (1964) degrees from the University of Chicago. In 1960-61 he was Chaplain and in 1961-62 Psychologist at William Healy School, Institute for Juvenile Research, Chicago, and in 1962-64 he was Lecturer in the Department of Religion and in the Theological Faculty of Trinity College, University of Toronto.


Dr. Gerrish read Classics at Queen's College, University of Cambridge (B.A. and M.A.), and was a Scholar at Westminster College, Cambridge. In 1955-56 he was Mills Fellow and Fulbright Scholar at Union Theological Seminary, New York (S.T.M.). In 1956-58 he was a Graduate Fellow and Fulbright Scholar at Columbia University, where he studied philosophy of religion (Ph.D.). Further research was done at the Universities of Heidelberg and Göttingen.

Ordained in the Presbyterian Church, Dr. Gerrish has served in the parish ministry in New York. From Union Theological Seminary, where he was Tutor in Philosophy of Religion, he went to the faculty of McCormick Theological Seminary where he currently is Associate Professor of Church History.
We regret that Bernard M. Loomer is going west.

Professor Loomer has resigned his position at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago; he will hold a professorship at the Graduate Theological Union and the Berkeley Baptist Divinity School, Berkeley, California.

He has served the Divinity School for many years—in many capacities. He was first appointed Instructor in Ethics in 1941. In 1942 he became the Divinity School’s first Dean of Students. He was Dean of the Divinity School and Dean of the Federated Theological Faculty from 1945-55. For the past 11 years he has been Professor of the Philosophy of Religion. Since 1963 he has also been Chairman of the Theological Field.

He is an alumnus of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, having received the Ph.D. degree in 1942.

Professor Loomer was celebrated by students and faculty on June 3, 1965. He delivered a public lecture in Joseph Bond Chapel entitled “Some Reflections on Theological Education”; the lecture was followed by a farewell party in his honor.

His next address is: Berkeley Baptist Divinity School, 2606 Dwight Way, Berkeley, California 94607.
keynote speech on Judaism and Christianity, and at the Chicago Society of Biblical Research on "The Song of Songs and Biblical Faith." In April he was at St. Xavier College for the ADL Conference on "The Ecumenical Council—Its Implications for the American Experience—A Protestant View," and at the Bernard Horwich Center where he lectured on "The Jewish-Christian Dialogue."

NATHAN A. SCOTT, Jr., Professor of Theology and Literature, delivered three lectures at Washington Cathedral's College of Preachers on February 1-2. During the month of February he also appeared as guest preacher in the Chapel of Howard University, delivered the annual Candelmas Lecture at Boston College, and lectured at St. Lawrence University in Canton, New York. In March he delivered the William Lyon Phelps Lectures at Yale University and also lectured at Knox College, Galesburg, Ill. In April he lectured at the Church Divinity School of the Pacific, Berkeley, and at Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pa., and delivered three lectures before the Danforth Foundation's regional conference of its Graduate Fellows on the West Coast, in Carmel, Calif.

Professor Scott also attended a meeting of the editorial board of The Christian Scholar in New York City in February; in March, he attended a two-day meeting in St. Louis of the Danforth Foundation's Advisory Council on its Graduate Fellowship Program. On June 4 he was awarded a Litt.D. by Ripon College, and on June 7 he was awarded an honorary Doctorate of Humane Letters by Wittenberg University.

JOSEPH SITTLER, Professor of Theology, lectured at Cornell College in the General Studies in Humanities course on March 18, and delivered the Zimmerman Lectures at Luther Seminary, Gettysburg, Pa., on May 5-6. From May 7 to 13 he attended a conference in Jerusalem on Educational Proceedings among New Nations in Africa and the Near East. Professor Sittler also delivered commencement addresses at San Francisco Theological Seminary, San Anselmo, Calif., and at Valparaiso University. From June 21 to 26 he attended a conference at Fordham University on Teilhard de Chardin.


RICHARD E. VIKSTROM, Associate Professor of Music, conducted the final concert in the 1964-65 Oratorio Series, Handel's Israel in Egypt, with the Rockefeller Chapel Choir and 30 members of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, in Rockefeller Chapel of the University of Chicago. On April 26-28 he participated in the Northwestern University Church Music Conference at Alice Millar Chapel, Evanston, Ill., demonstrating and lecturing on "The Relationship of Organ Playing to Choral, Vocal, and Instrumental Media," and conducting a workshop on choral, vocal, and organ relationships. In June Mr. Vikstrom conducted workshops and demonstrations covering short choral pieces suitable for parish performance, and conducted a concert performance of Holst's Hymn of Jesus and Schubert's Mass in E-Flat, at the American Guild of Organists Regional Convention, St. Louis.


GIBSON WINTON, Professor of Ethics and Society, delivered the Porter Lectures at Beloit College, Beloit, Wis., and in April he attended a Public Affairs Symposium at Dickinson College. In June Professor Winton delivered the baccalaureate address for Northfield School for Girls, and was Alumni Preacher at Episcopal Theological School in Cambridge.

ALUMNI NEWS

LEILA W. ANDERSON (B.D., M.A. '40) known as the "Pilgrim Circuit Rider" in the United Church of Christ, was honored at a special service on January 24, 1965, at the First Congregational Church in Oak Park, Illinois. Miss Anderson, as a staff member of the Division of Christian Education of the United Church Board for Home Ministries, traveled thousands of miles annually during the past 18 years in a specially equipped "parsonage on wheels" to help churches in rural areas strengthen their Christian education program. She left in February for a Christian Education ministry with the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, the major Protestant denomination in the country. Miss Anderson is the author of the autobiographical book Pilgrim Circuit Rider (Harper Brothers).

WADE C. BARCLAY (B.D. '06) for 70 years a minister, author and educator in the Methodist Church, died on January 15, 1965, at the age of 90. Among his 20 books, A Book of Worship for families was widely used. History of Methodist Missions, a three volume work written while Dr. Barclay was Director of Historical Research of the Methodist Board of Missions and Church Extension, is considered an authoritative description of the period from Colonial times through
The Sacred and the Modern Artist

by Mircea Eliade

The quest for the unrecognizable sacred

Ever since 1880, when Nietzsche first proclaimed it, people have been talking a great deal about the “death of God.” Martin Buber asked recently whether this is a question of a genuine “death,” or simply of the eclipse of God—the fact that God is no longer in evidence, that he is no longer responding to the prayers and invocations of man. Nevertheless, it does not seem that his rather optimistic interpretation of Nietzsche’s verdict is able to assuage all doubts. Certain contemporary theologians have recognized that it is necessary to accept (and even to assume) the “death of God,” and are trying to think and to build on the basis of this fact.

A theology based on the “death of God” can give rise to exciting debates, but for our purposes it is only of subsidiary interest. We have made allusion to it to recall the fact that the modern artist encounters a similar problem. There is a certain symmetry between the perspective of the philosopher and theologian, and that of the modern artist; for the one as for the other the “death of God” signifies above all the impossibility of expressing a religious experience in traditional religious language: in medieval language for example, or in that of the Counter-Reformation. From a certain point of view, the “death of God” would rather seem to be the destruction of an idol. To acknowledge the death of God would thus be equivalent to admitting that one had been taken in, that he had been worshiping just a god and not the living God of Judaeo-Christianity.

Be that as it may, it is evident that, for more than a century, the West has not been creating a “religious art” in the traditional sense of the term, that is to say, an art reflecting “classic” religious conceptions. In other words, artists are no longer willing to worship “idols”; they are no longer interested in traditional religious imagery and symbolism.

This is not to say that the “sacred” has completely disappeared in modern art. But it has become unrecognizable; it is camouflaged in forms, purposes and meanings which are apparently “profane.” The sacred is not obvious, as it was for example in the art of the Middle Ages. One does not recognize it immediately and easily, because it is no longer expressed in a conventional religious language.

To be sure, this is not a conscious and voluntary camouflage. Contemporary artists are by no means believers who, embarrassed by the archaism or the inadequacies of their faith, do not have the courage to avow it and who thus try to disguise their religious beliefs in creations which appear to be profane at first glance. When an artist recognizes that he is a Christian, he does not dissimulate his faith; he proclaims it according to his own means in his work as, for example, Rouault has. Nor is it difficult to identify the biblical religiosity and the messianic nostalgia of Chagall even in his first period, when he peopled

Mircea Eliade is Sewell L. Avery Distinguished Service Professor and Professor of History of Religions at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. He has held positions on the faculties of the University of Bucharest and the Sorbonne. Among his major works translated into English are Yoga, Immortality, and Freedom; Shamanism; and Patterns in Comparative Religion. The above article was originally published as “Sur la permanence du sacré dans l’art contemporain,” XX Siècle, Nr. 24 (Paris, décembre 1964).
the past three generations we have been witnessing a series of "destructions" of the world (that is to say, of the traditional artistic universe) undertaken courageously and at times savagely for the purpose of recreating or recovering another, new, and "pure" universe, uncorrupted by time and history. We have analyzed elsewhere the secret significance of this will to demolish formal worlds made empty and banal by the usage of time and to reduce them to their elemental modes, and ultimately to their original materia prima (Cf. Myth and Reality, Harper and Row, 1969). This fascination for the elemental modes of matter betrays a desire to deliver oneself from the weight of mortal form, the nostalgia to immerse oneself in an auroral world. It is evident that we have been particularly struck by the iconoclastic and anarchistic furor of contemporary artists. But in these vast demolitions one can always read like a watermark the hope of creating a new universe, more viable because it is more true, that is, more adequate to the actual situation of man.

However, one of the characteristics of "cosmic religion" both among the primitives and among the peoples of the Ancient Near East is precisely this need for periodically annihilating the world, through the medium of ritual, in order to be able to recreate it. The annual reiteration of the cosmogony implies a 'provisory reactualization of chaos, a symbolic regression of the world to a state of virtuality. Simply because it has been going on, the world has wilted, it has lost its freshness, its purity and its original creative power. One cannot "repair" the world; one must annihilate it in order to recreate it.

There is no question of homologizing this primitive mythico-ritual scenario to modern artistic experiences. But it is not without interest for us to note a certain convergence existing between, on the one hand, repeated efforts at destroying traditional artistic language and attraction towards the elemental modes of life and matter and, on the other hand, the archaic conceptions which we have tried to evoke. From a structural point of view, the attitude of the artist in regard to the cosmos and to life recalls to a certain extent the ideology implicit in "cosmic religion."

It may be, furthermore, that the fascination for matter may be only a precursor sign of a new philosophical and religious orientation. Teilhard de Chardin, for example, proposes to "carry Christ... to the heart of the realities reputed to be the most dangerous, the most naturalistic, the most pagan." For the Father wanted to be "the evangelist of Christ in the universe."

THE HOUND OF HEAVEN (Continued)

Although Snoopy is certainly familiar with the humiliations that come with being a dog, he also seems to know the joy inherent in these humiliations: "Blessed are you when men hate you, and when they exclude you and revile you, and cast out your name as evil, on account of the Son of man! Rejoice in that day, and leap for joy, for behold, your reward is great in heaven" (Luke 6:22). Snoopy is constantly "leaping for joy." Not even the no-nonsense Lucy can discourage his joyful dancing. "Happiness isn't everything, you know!" she shouts at the happily bounding Snoopy. "It'll never bring you peace of mind!" she continues, as he peacefully dances on by her. It also may be that Snoopy has been reading Havelock Ellis. (It is known that Snoopy reads a great deal; although we are "disillusioned," as Lucy is, to learn "he moves his lips when he reads!") Dancing is "the supreme symbol of spiritual life," says Ellis. "For dancing is the loftiest, the most moving, the most beautiful of the arts, because it is no mere translation or abstraction from life; it is life itself." To those of us with real understanding, agrees Snoopy, "dancing is the only pure art form."

(3) The recognition of the fact that the gospels are not and cannot be sources for a life of Jesus. They do not contain the necessary material, e.g. they have no account of his personal development, and attempts to supply this material by analogy are inappropriate to the subject and catastrophic in their consequences. The gospels are products of early Christian preaching, the purpose of which is to proclaim the historic biblical Christ, or as Kähler liked to put it, the risen Christ in his fulfillment.

The subsequent discussion in Germany was in large part determined by the catastrophe of the First World War and its aftermath, which changed everything on the German theological scene. It completely destroyed liberalism with its interest in the historical Jesus and left the ground clear for the renaissance of Reformation theology spearheaded by Karl Barth. When, therefore, Bultmann took up the question in the 1920's he was writing in a different world, a world in which the effective death of liberalism and its Leben-Jesu-Forschung was recognized, in which a concept of faith quite different from the assumptions of liberal theology was accepted, and a world in which form criticism and existentialism were new and growing influences.

Bultmann's position can be summarized by beginning with the three points he takes over from Kähler and develops further himself.¹

(1) There is a distinction between historical Jesus and historic Christ; it is the distinction between the one who proclaimed the kingdom of God as the imminently to be expected eschatological act of God and the one who is himself proclaimed as the eschatological act of God. This is Bultmann's famous distinction between the Proclaimer and the Proclaimed. It should be noted that it includes three elements, all of which are very important to Bultmann.

(a) The distinction between historical Jesus and historic Christ, derived from Martin Kähler.

(b) The introduction of a reference to the eschatological act of God, proclaimed by Jesus in terms of the kingdom of God and by the early church in terms of the cross and resurrection of Christ. So far as the message of Jesus is concerned this comes from the "konsequent Eschatologie" of Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer which Bultmann has taken up and demythologized; so far as the message of the early Church is concerned it is Bultmann's own interpretation, largely derived from an exegesis of Paul and John.

(c) The emphasis upon the fact that in the message of Jesus this eschatological act of God is still future, albeit imminent and even now beginning to break in, whereas in the kerygma of the early church it is already past, although available ever anew as God manifests himself as eschatological event in the kerygma. So Bultmann always maintains that salvation is only a promise in the message of Jesus but a present reality through the kerygma of the church. This again, so far as the message of Jesus is concerned, is derived from "konsequente Eschatologie" and it has been furiously debated for the last half century, as I have shown elsewhere.²

(2) The object of Christian faith is the historic Christ, the Christ of the kerygma and not the historical Jesus. This insight, derived from Kähler and developed by Bultmann, owes much to the revival of Reformation theology in Germany after the First World War to which I have already referred. It is also a point at which it becomes clear that Bultmann is both a Lutheran and an existentialist. As a Lutheran he sees the ultimate context of faith as the Word of God, i.e. for him the kerygma of the early church; and he sees faith as necessarily independent of any factors external to this context. As an existentialist he sees the ultimate moment as a moment of decision in the context of confrontation. Put these things together and we have faith arising by decision as the individual is confronted by the Christ present in the kerygma. Everything else finds its place in reference to this central aspect of Bultmann's theology. This moment of faith is the consummation to which all else is subsidiary and upon which all else is dependent. Appropriately enough the finest discussion of Bultmann's theology to be found in any language, by the German speaking Roman Catholic Gotthold Hasenhüttl, is entitled simply Der Glaubensvollzug — "Faith: the consummation."

Faith arises by decision out of confrontation with the Christ of the kerygma, the Christ present in the kerygma.

The presence of Christ in the kerygma is for


³Gotthold Hasenhüttl, Der Glaubensvollzug, Essen, Ludgerus-Verlag Hubert Wingen KG, 1963.
properly urged that we use the English "understanding of existence" to express it. The problem is to grasp that we mean understanding of the self's own existence (what else is possible for an existentialist?), but at the same time we do not mean the subjective self-understanding where the emphasis is upon the self rather than the self's existence. The distinction might be expressed as a distinction between the self's understanding of its existence and the conscious decisions, deeds, and words to which this understanding leads and in which it may be expressed.

Bultmann espouses an existentialist understanding of historiography whereby the individual enters into dialogue with the past and is challenged by an understanding of existence (self-understanding) from the past which becomes significant to him in the historicity of his own existence. So, in the case of the historical Jesus, an understanding of existence (self-understanding, not self-consciousness) is revealed in his teaching which challenges us in terms of our understanding of our own existence. Hence Bultmann writes a Jesus book, Jesus and the Word, from this perspective.

Three things must, however, be said at this point.

(a) As the subject of this existentialist historiography Jesus is not unique. A similar study, with similar consequences in terms of a possible challenge to our understanding of existence, could be carried out in connection with any figure from the past for whom we have sources: Socrates the philosopher, or even Attila the Hun, as well as Jesus the Christ.

(b) This historiographical challenge to our self-understanding is not for Bultmann the challenge of faith, not even though the challenge of faith could be, and is, expressed by him in similar existentialistic terminology. He himself stresses that the Jesus of history is not kerygmatic and that his book Jesus and the Word is not kerygma, because the essential aspect of the kerygma is that Christ is present in it as eschatological event, and Christ is not so present in existentialist historiographical studies of the historical Jesus. If he were then they would cease to be existentialist historiographical studies and become kerygma.

(c) This type of study of Jesus is to be sharply distinguished from the liberal Quest. In the liberal Quest attempts were made to reach and to understand the psychology and personality of Jesus (i.e. his self-consciousness) — an endeavor that was both impossible (no sources) and illegitimate (use of analogy) — whereas in the Bultmann study the concern is with the understanding of existence (self-understanding) revealed in the teaching of Jesus.

This position of Bultmann's on the question of the historical Jesus and his significance for faith has been attacked from three standpoints. One might say: from right, left and center.

The attack from the right has turned on the conviction that the historical nature of the Christian faith, or the meaning of the Incarnation, necessitates more emphasis upon the actual historical events circa 30 A.D. than Bultmann will allow. In this camp we find all kinds of strange comrades in arms united in their conviction that the historical events of the ministry of Jesus, in addition to the cross, are necessary to the Christian faith. We can find the whole gamut of possibilities ranging from the extreme conservative, who insists on the factual historicity of everything from the Virgin Birth to the Resurrection, to the old-fashioned liberal for whom only the Jesus reconstructed by historical study can be of significance to faith. Of all the possible names here I will mention only that of my own teacher, the moderately conservative Joachim Jeremias, who deserves to be heard on this point because he has done more than any other single scholar to add to our knowledge of the historical Jesus. He has published a booklet on the question which I have translated and which the Fortress Press has published. In this he argues that the proclamation is not itself revelation, but it leads to revelation. Thus the historical Jesus is the necessary and only presupposition of the kerygma (a play on Bultmann's famous opening sentence of his Theology of the New Testament), since only the Son of Man and his word, by which Jeremias means the historical Jesus and his teaching, can give authority to the proclamation. This is a major issue in the contemporary debate: Does Bultmann's view do less than justice to the historical nature of the Christian faith? Does it do violence to the Incarnation? Is the historical Jesus as such the necessary ultimate concern to whom the kerygma points?

The attack from the left has taken the opposite position, namely that Bultmann is inconsistent in his views in that he properly sees Christian faith

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to do justice to both the "now" and the "then." Thirdly, Käsemann investigated our actual knowledge of the historical Jesus and showed convincingly that we know enough about his teaching to be able to say that the messiaship explicit in the kerygma is already implicit in the teaching of Jesus. Thus we stumble across a real element of continuity; for all the discontinuity between the historical Jesus and the kerygmatic Christ there is real continuity between the preaching of Jesus and the preaching about him. This seemed to Käsemann to offer real hope as a line of approach to the problem bequeathed to us by the New Testament and not satisfactorily solved by Bultmann.

At this point Käsemann's article ends it and is easy to see why it created the furor that it did; it raises questions and suggests lines of approach without really offering any solution of its own. Certainly it marked the beginning of all kinds of intensive work and interesting developments. The question of the historical Jesus had been raised in its modern form.

Every suggestion that Käsemann made has been intensively followed up. The theology of the synoptic tradition, and of the differing strata in that tradition, has become a major field for investigation. Some of the work done here can only be called brilliant. The question of the parallels between the message of Jesus and the message about him has been explored from every conceivable angle, even from the perspective of Qumran—the Dead Sea Scrolls had to be brought into the act somehow!

It is in this exploration of the parallels between the message of Jesus and the message about him that the most characteristic work of the "post-Bultmannians" has been done. They have attempted, and are attempting, to explore the relevance of the historical Jesus for the Christian faith from this point of departure. Probably the best known examples here are the work of James M. Robinson on the one hand and Ernst Fuchs and Gerhard Ebeling on the other. Robinson accepted the parallels pointed out by Käsemann, Günther Bornkamm and others and added to them some of his own derived from a study of the kingdom of God sayings of Jesus. Then, in addition, he took the existentialist modern historiography which seeks to mediate an encounter with the past at the level of self-understanding and approached the historical Jesus and his message in this way. Now, you see, we have two sets of parallels: between the historical Jesus and the kerygmatic Christ at the level of meaning of the message of and about the one and the other, and the encounters mediated by modern historiography with the one and kerygmatic proclamation with the other. The encounter with the historical Jesus then becomes significant for faith, not because it replaces or makes unnecessary the encounter with the kerygmatic Christ, but because it serves to correct, supplement and give content to the faith which arises here and only here.

May I say in passing that although I would want to express the matter in a somewhat different, and perhaps less ambitious, manner this seems to me to be a most valid and promising approach to the question.

Fuchs and Ebeling are the post-Bultmannians who have travelled farthest along the road of the "new quest." Indeed they have gone so far that they are no longer to be contained in these categories and must now be reckoned as having achieved a new and distinctive theological position, a position which is generally designated the "New Hermeneutic." We will consider them together since the differences between them are insignificant in the immediate context of our discussion.

They begin by exploring the concept of "faith" as the parallel between the historical Jesus and the kerygmatic Christ. They argue that Jesus himself reached a decision in the context of a confrontation with God in which he decides for the love and forgiveness of God and accepts the

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of a modern existentialist understanding of man. He argued that man is indeed fallen in that as man he has a possibility of authentic existence which in fact he does not achieve. What for him is a possibility in principle is not a possibility in fact. The one thing that can transform the possibility in principle to a possibility in fact is the act of God. True existence, the full realization of man's possibilities as man, is only available in faith; existence in faith is the only authentic existence.

The act of God which makes faith a possibility is the eschatological act of God in the kerygma of the church. This is for Bultmann a combination of the historical cross of Jesus and the mythical resurrection; but as proclaimed by the church it becomes truly historic as God addresses man through it with the offer and challenge of authentic existence.

Three things about Bultmann's theology need to be stressed at this point.38

(1) For Bultmann the believer and the object of belief belong inextricably together. Revelation and faith, word and hearing, encounter and understanding belong together and must be held together because they live only in their relationship to one another. There can be no meaning for one without the other. Consequently we can never speak of God without at the same time speaking of man. Revelation of God has to be consummated in encounter with man; without this it is not truly revelation. So whenever we speak of revelation or salvation event we must at the same time be speaking of man who is called to hear and to believe.

(2) There is in Bultmann's proposal for demythologizing a deliberate existentializing and personalizing of eschatology. The eschaton is God's freeing word addressed to man in the proclamation of the church. This proclamation is the proclamation of the cross and resurrection as the eschatological act of God, and this eschatological act is realized for me as I find myself addressed by God through the proclamation of the church. It is, so to speak, personalized for me as it becomes God's eschatological act for me in my eschatological moment.

(3) The key to understanding Bultmann's position is perhaps the idea of paradoxical identity. There is a paradoxical identity of proclamation and saving event as the saving event becomes the saving event for me in the proclamation. There is the paradoxical identity, above all, of eschatology and history in the cross which is at one and the same time eschatological and historical event. This is the absolutely necessary paradox, the one essential historical aspect of the eschatological event being the "thatness" of Christ and his cross.

As with the question of the historical Jesus there is a right, left and center reaction to Bultmann's demythologizing proposal, and the same people tend to be arrayed on the same sides in the discussion of the two questions. On the right there are the many theologians who claim that Bultmann has done less than justice to the objective element in the salvation process, that in his anxiety to speak meaningfully to man he has ceased to speak meaningfully of God. The best known name here is that of Karl Barth,39 who argues that Bultmann has not done justice to the Christ event as significant in itself apart altogether from man's appropriation of that significance. He has failed to do justice to the fact that Christ was crucified and resurrected in the past and that faith is the appropriation of the benefits of that past historical event. For Bultmann it is as though the crucifixion and resurrection first take place in the attitude and experience of the believer. In his attempt to avoid a one-sided objectivism Bultmann has fallen into an equally one-sided subjectivism.

Of the critics from the left the best known names are probably Karl Jaspers in Europe40 and Schubert Ogden in America.41 These claim that Bultmann is wrong in seeing in the Christ event the only possibility for authentic existence. Here he is inconsistent, they claim, in that, having properly rid himself of mythology and having properly interpreted reality existentially, he has illogically retained one element of myth: the cross and resurrection of Jesus as eschatological act of God and as essential to authentic existence. If the possibility of authentic existence is a possibility offered to man by God, and Jaspers and Ogden would both agree that it is, then it must be seen as offered in many ways and not only through the one event. As we have already seen, Jaspers would view Jesus as an example to be imitated. Ogden, on the other hand, claims that the unconditioned gift and demand of God's love is the ground of man's possibility of authentic existence and that this is decisively manifested in Jesus. It is decisively manifested in Jesus but

expression in the discussion. Lastly we have the group of questions which may be summed up under the heading “The Word of God.” We have seen how New Testament theology has been exploring the manifold issues raised here: the word of God as medium of revelation or the context of the salvation event; the kerygma of the church as the word of God; the word of Jesus and the word about Jesus; and, most recently, faith as word or language event and the hermeneutical task as the central theological task. It is, I think, clear that one thing urgently needed is further discussion of these issues, perhaps particularly those raised by the “new hermeneutic,” on the basis of an ontology and an epistemology other than the existentialist. An assault on the “new hermeneutic” from the standpoint of a linguistic analytical philosophy would be a real contribution to our discussion. Another thing urgently needed at this point is a discussion of New Testament hermeneutics in general from the standpoint of the findings of general literary criticism. It is, after all, not only in the field of New Testament studies that we face the problem of myth and the question of a present understanding of a text from the distant past; general literary critics have been wrestling with these problems every bit as intensively as have Bultmann and his followers and it is high time that their findings came to word in our discussion. This is perhaps particularly a task for the English language discussion for the simple reason that literary criticism flourishes much more strongly today in Britain and America than it does in Germany. Here in Chicago we might feel a particular responsibility for this aspect of the discussion since we have an emphasis upon theology and literature in our Divinity School and a number of most eminent literary critics working and teaching in the Humanities division of the University.

Several alumni and others have responded to the appeal in the last Criterion for contributions to help us partially underwrite the expenses of publication. We are deeply grateful for this expression of appreciation and confidence. These gifts will enable us to maintain the high quality of work set by Criterion and to undertake additional activities for our alumni and friends. If you have not yet given, we hope you will do so now. Checks should be made payable to the University of Chicago and sent to: The Divinity School, Room 100, The University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60637.

Concluding Unscientific Postscript . . .

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