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“Perspectives on the Good Society”

A Jewish-Protestant Colloquium

*Sponsored by The Divinity School of the University of
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by Leo Strauss

AT the request of Professor Rylaarsdam I attended the Colloquium as an observer with the understanding that I would write a report about it for *Criterion*. I am a Jew but I was not meant to write this report as a Jew but as an observer, an impartial and friendly observer, or as a social scientist, for the social scientist is supposed to be particularly concerned with every effort directed toward the good society. This concern was the common ground of the participants and the observer, for the Colloquium was based on the premise that in spite of their profound disagreements Jews and Protestants can be united in their concern for the good society and in their effort to bring it about or to secure it.

The Colloquium consisted of two parts, of three discussion sessions and two meal sessions. The discussion sessions dealt with 1) “Common Ground and Difference,” 2) “Faith and Action,” 3) “Needs and Justice”; they descended from the question regarding the highest principles to the question regarding the most important social action here and now; at each of these sessions a Protestant and a Jew spoke. The speaker at the luncheon

session was a Protestant and the speaker at the dinner session was a Jew; the meal sessions may be said to have been devoted to the situation which has rendered possible a Jewish-Protestant Colloquium about the perspectives on the good society. Since not indeed the highest principles by themselves but the manner in which they are approached or come to light depends decisively on the given situation, it will be best to speak first of the meal sessions.

At the luncheon session Professor Nathan A. Scott, Jr., (Professor of Theology in Literature, Divinity School, University of Chicago) spoke of “Society and the Self in Recent American Literature.” He concentrated on the American novel of the time following the Second World War since the novel enjoys a particularly high prestige in present day America. Above all, the contemporary American novel — especially if contrasted with the contemporary British novel — shows how much Judaism and Christianity are embattled in present day America. According to Mr. Scott, this kind of literature preaches up the radical divorce of the self from contemporary society or the existence

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a society in which everyone can be what he is or can develop his unique potentialities, is truly free and truly great or excellent. What is true of the individual is true also of the groups of which society consists and in particular of the religious groups; the freedom and excellence of this country requires above all that its citizenry belong to a variety of faiths. Why this is so, appears from a consideration of the ills from which American society suffers. Those ills can be reduced to one head: the tendency toward homogeneity or conformism, i.e., towards the suppression by nonpolitical means of individuality and diversity; all Americans are to be remolded in the likeness of "the typical American." American society is in danger of becoming ever more a mass society which is "informed" in the common and in the metaphysical meaning of the term by mass communication, by the mass communication industry, the most visible and audible part of which is the advertising industry. Everyone can see that the youngest girl and the oldest great-grandmother tend ever more to look alike; the natural differences of age and beauty are overlaid by the conventional identity of the ideal, formed not without the support of the cosmetics industry. It is not merely amusing to observe that whereas there is a single model of womanhood — say, the attractive young woman of twenty-one — there is a dual model of manhood which one may describe as that of the good-looking and successful junior executive on the one hand and that of the good-looking and successful senior executive on the other; in this sphere cosmetics cannot help respecting the most important natural difference: "the body is at its peak from thirty to thirty-five years of age, the soul at about forty-nine" (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* II 14). On the whole however mass society succeeds amazingly well in rendering irrelevant all natural differences and therefore in particular also the racial differences: one can easily visualize a society consisting of racially different men and women each of whom dresses, has "fun," mourns, talks, feels, thinks, and is buried exactly like everyone else. It is for this reason, I suppose, that Mr. Schary found religious diversity most annoying to the lovers of homogeneity. The difference in religious faith — in dedication to what simply transcends humanity — is the obstacle par excellence to conformism.

One may well find it paradoxical that a society dedicated to the free development of each individual in his individuality should be threatened by a particularly petty kind of conformism, but the paradox disappears on reflection. It is merely a shallow hope to expect that the uninhibited "growth" of each individual to its greatest height will not

lead to serious and bloody conflict. The growth must be kept within certain limits: everyone may grow to any height and in any direction provided his growth does not prevent the growth of anybody else to any height and in any direction. The limits, the right limits, are to be set by the law. But in order to fulfill this function, the lawmakers and ultimately the sovereign must possess both knowledge and good will. The sovereign must be enlightened, free from prejudice; such freedom can be expected to come from exposure to science (both natural and social) and its consequences (technology, facility of traveling, etc.). "People and ideas all over the world are increasingly accessible, and the sense of what is 'alien' grows dimmer"; the "more remarkable differences (among the races of men) tend to dissipate." Mr. Schary was, to say the least, not quite certain whether this is a pure gain. One must be grateful to science and its concomitants for the liberation from prejudice which it achieves; but, as was indicated, the same power also endangers diversity or fosters homogeneity. As for good will, democracy was originally said to be the form of government the principle of which is virtue. But it is obviously impossible to restrict the suffrage to virtuous men, men of good will, conscientious men, responsible men or whichever expression one prefers. While in a democracy the government is made responsible to the governed in the highest degree possible — ideally the government will not have any secrets from the governed — the governed cannot be held responsible in a comparable manner: the place par excellence of sacred secrecy or privacy is not the home which may be entered with a search warrant but the voting booth. In the voting booth the prejudices can assert themselves without any hindrance whatever. Voting is meant to determine the character of the legal majority. The legal majority is not simply the majority but it is not irrelevant to the legal majority how the simple majority feels. There may be a stable or permanent majority; in the United States the stable majority is "white Protestant." As a consequence there is a social hierarchy at the bottom of which are the Negroes (or colored people in general) and barely above them are the Jews. There is then a prejudice which is both constitutional and unconstitutional against Negroes and Jews. If I understood Mr. Schary correctly, the conformism against which he directed his attack, has the unavowed intention either to transform all Americans into white Protestants or else to deny those Americans who are not white Protestants full equality of opportunity. Yet would not one have to say that this pressure toward conformism is not the same

ages: while the Synagogue was presented as lowering its head in shame, its features were presented as noble. However far the mutual recognition may go in our age, it cannot but be accompanied by the certainty on the part of each of the two antagonists that in the end the other will lower its head. Recognition of the other must remain subordinate to recognition of the truth. Even the pagan philosophers Plato and Aristotle remained friends although each held the truth to be his greatest friend, or rather because each held the truth his greatest friend. The Jew may recognize that the Christian error is a blessing, a divine blessing, and the Christian may recognize that the Jewish error is a blessing, a divine blessing. Beyond this they cannot go without ceasing to be Jew or Christian.

To say the least, it was always easier for Christians to recognize the divine origin of Judaism than for Jews to recognize the divine origin of Christianity. On the other hand, it was easier for Jews to recognize that Christians may have a "share in the world to come" than it was for Christians to recognize that Jews may be "saved." This is due to the Jewish union of the "carnal" and the "spiritual," of the "secular" and the "eternal," of the "tribal" and the "universal": the Torah which contains the promise of the eventual redemption of all children of Adam (cf. Maimonides, *Mishneh Torah* H. Melakhim XI-XII) was given to, or accepted by, Israel alone. As a consequence, it was easier for Jews to admit the divine mission of Christianity (cf. Yehuda Halevi, *Cuzari* IV 23) than it was for Christians to admit the abiding divine mission of Judaism. It is therefore not surprising that, as Mr. Rylaarsdam pointed out, the first genuine meeting of Jews and Christians should have been initiated by a Jew, Franz Rosenzweig, and that a comparable Christian response to this Jewish call should not yet have been forthcoming. Such a response, including above all the recognition of the abiding mission of Judaism, is urgently demanded in the opinion of Mr. Rylaarsdam because of what happened to the Jewish people in our life time: the butchery of six million Jews by Hitler-led Germany and the establishment of the state of Israel; Jewish agony and Jewish rebirth are not adequately understandable on the basis of the traditional Christian view of Judaism. In addition, the traditional Christian judgment on the Jew is at least partly responsible for the persecution of the Jews in the Christian world and therefore, if indirectly, for Hitler-Germany's action. The Christian must begin to ask himself whether he can "acknowledge that the mission of Israel did not end when his own mission began." One cannot leave matters at asserting the undeniable

fact that the Jew denies and the Christian maintains that the Messiah, that Redemption has come. Judaism says that "there is no redemption yet God has redeemed his people"; Christianity says that there is no redemption yet God has redeemed mankind in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Judaism, in contradistinction to Christianity, "is concerned with the redemption of history," with redemption on this side of death, with redemption on earth: according to Judaism, the Elect One is Israel which never dies; according to Christianity, the Elect One is Jesus the Christ who died on the cross. Yet "the Christian must agree with the Jew that the world [*this* world] is unredeemed" and that "this world matters to God". The agony of the Jew and the agony of the Cross belong together; "they are aspects of the same agony." Judaism and Christianity need one another.

One may say that Mr. Rylaarsdam stated what Christianity has to learn from Judaism; he did not presume to tell the Jews what they have to learn from Christianity; he left the performance of that task to his Jewish partner. But Mr. Cohen did not perform this task. I do not think that he can be blamed for this. He did not of course mistake learning from Christianity for assimilation to Christianity. For instance, to move the day of rest from the seventh day of the week to the first day is an act of assimilation to Christianity which does not involve learning from Christianity. Nor did he deny, he even asserted, that Judaism and Christianity need one another; in fact, in this respect he agreed entirely with Mr. Rylaarsdam. But in the main he limited himself to reasserting vigorously the traditional Jewish position toward Christianity: there is an irreconcilable disagreement between Judaism and Christianity; Christianity depends on Judaism and not vice versa; Christianity has to learn from Judaism; there is no Judaeo-Christian tradition; at least from Paul on Christianity has never understood Judaism. And yet he stressed the fact that the contemporary Jew and Christian are not, and can never become again, the Jew and the Christian of old: they confront one another "no longer as dogmatic enemies, but as common seekers of the truth." He admitted in other words that the misunderstanding has been mutual. But he did not explain what the Jewish misunderstanding of Christianity was. He did not go beyond alluding to certain defects of Jewish Messiahism at the time of Jesus and to the deplorable if excusable alliance of Judaism with secularist, anti-Christian movements. Why did he fail to make clear what Judaism may have to learn from Christianity? Are Jews still in greater

view of faith and action." He gave a comprehensive survey of Jewish thought on this subject from the days of the Bible down to the present. According to what one may call the classic Jewish view, "knowledge of God," study, faith, learning or wisdom both presupposes and issues in righteous action or active piety or "fear of heaven" but in such a way that what counts is action. The basis of this view appeared to be the Talmudic theologoumenon that by his right or pious action man becomes "a participant with God in the work of creation": whereas regarding revelation and redemption man is merely a recipient, regarding creation or rather regarding the continuity of creation "man is an active partner" of God. The Jewish view of faith and action was obscured in different ways and for different reasons in the middle ages on the one hand and in modern times on the other. Owing to their subjugation many medieval Jews came to believe that "the world matters little; the rectification of its ills and, finally, its redemption, would come in God's good time." As a consequence of the emancipation of the Jews in the 19th century, an important part of Jewish opinion came to identify social and other progress with the process of redemption; that which transcends progress and action, that with which faith is concerned, tended to be forgotten. Modern secularism believed that it would put an end to the Jewish-Christian antagonism by depriving Judaism and Christianity of their *raison d'être*; its manifest failure which affects equally Jews, Christians, and nonbelievers calls for a community of seeking and acting of both Jews and Christians — a community which has originally been rendered possible by secularism. The failure of secularism shows itself for instance in the ever-increasing cleavage between science and humanism. In Mr. Glatzer's view that gulf cannot be bridged by a "synthesis" of science and humanism because science is "neutralist" and humanism is "traditionalist": the required "redefinition of the image of man" is beyond the competence of either or both not in spite but because of the fact that it must be a redefinition of man as created in the image of God. "The *hybris* of scientism" cannot be overcome with the help of a humanism which is inspired by the belief in man as a creator. Over against scientism and humanism Judaism and Christianity are at one.

The greatest divisive power in the past was revealed religion. Even today, as we have been led to see by reflecting on one of the papers read at the Colloquium, religious diversity is the obstacle par excellence to conformism in this country. The differences at any rate between Judaism and Christianity do not preclude the availability of a

common ground. What divides the human race today in the most effective manner, is, however, the antagonism between the liberal West and the communist East. Even in this case there exists, as Mr. Gibson Winter (Divinity School, University of Chicago) pointed out in his paper on "National Identity and National Purpose," a "common ground": "their common ground is the limit set upon their opposition by (their) nuclear power." Thermonuclear war being manifestly an act of madness, the common ground must become the basis of a dialogue — a dialogue to be conducted not in ideological terms but with a view to the duties of this country faced by the worldwide "struggle against hunger and the aspiration for human dignity"; this country must cease to "endorse a status quo position in a hungry world." The dialogue required is then in the first place a dialogue not with Soviet Russia but with the "have-nots" within the USA and without. As for the dialogue with the USSR, it requires that the "purpose and interest" of "our enemies" be respected and, above all, that the "apocalyptic framework" for the dialogue be recognized: in the spirit of Deuteronomy 30:19, we must choose life — "a future in justice and community" — in the certainty that the alternative choice leads to thermonuclear annihilation as God's judgment. What will enable us to continue the dialogue with the USSR in spite of all its hazards is faith, not of course in the good will of the Soviet rulers, but in God. It goes without saying that no such faith can be expected from the Soviet rulers: unilateral disarmament is out of the question. Faith equally forbids preventive war. On the other hand one cannot simply assert that this country must not under any circumstances initiate the use of nuclear weapons. "The most difficult problem in the use of nuclear power" however concerns retaliation. "Retaliation after a destructive attack becomes simply vengeance" and seems therefore to be incompatible with Christian ethics: "to choose the life of others over our own — this is the message of the Cross." Yet "the possibility of retaliation is the power which restrains aggression." Two comments on this proposal seem to be appropriate. The possibility of retaliation would lose much of its restraining power if the enemy knew that a second strike force which survived his successful attack, would never be used against him; hence a decision allegedly demanded by faith must remain the most closely guarded secret; in other words, the tongue must pronounce the opposite of what the heart thinks. Secondly, by saving the lives of the Soviet people in the contingency under consideration, one would surrender all the have-

Faith and Action:

A Christian Point of View

by Paul Ricoeur

A Christian must rely on his Jewish memory

HOW, in Christian history, has the relationship between faith and action been understood?

Undoubtedly, before considering its own characteristics, it is proper to emphasize the Jewish foundation of Christianity. For even if Christianity introduces tensions and at times new contradictions, it is in the first place a prolongation of the religious ethic of Judaism. One should strongly affirm this characteristic against all the deviations grafted onto Christianity under the pressure of Hellenism. The principal one of the temptations comes from the opposition between the contemplative life and the active life, between "theory" and "practice," which was inherited from Greek wisdom. This opposition is mainly Platonic, but it is common to nearly all the Greek philosophies; the Aristotelian ethic distinguishes the dianoetic virtues from the practical virtues, the latter being properly the ethical virtues. The Epicurean philosophy stressed this opposition as much as the Platonic philosophy. Only Stoicism was able to avoid this general opposition between meditation or contemplation and practice; in any case, it cannot be denied that this kind of division is present in various degrees in all the varieties of Neo-Platonism, to the time of the Renaissance, and that its role in the opposition between the monastic life and life in the world is not negligible. This

Greek dualism is wholly foreign to Judaism, for which — as Professor Glatzer insists — "knowledge of God" is inseparable from "justice and goodness" and which has never separated meditation from work and action in the community. Inasmuch as it resists the separation of contemplation from action, Christianity is the heir of Judaism. "To do the will of God is to know God"; it is certainly not at this point that Christianity brings something new. Thus, according to the great eschatological discourse in the Gospel According to Matthew each man will be judged according to what he has done, even unknowingly, to the least of his brothers. Moreover, Jesus reflects Deuteronomy when he says that the second commandment — to love one's neighbor — is like unto the first — to love God with all one's strength and mind.

Thus my task will be to investigate the specific traits of Christianity and to ask if they do not give rise to a new dichotomy of faith and action which would explain the Platonizing infiltrations which mark its history. This approach is legitimate to the extent that Christianity introduces some new tensions between faith and action which seem at first glance to justify a kind of opposition similar to that of Platonism. We shall approach these new tensions by means of the misunderstandings that they have provoked; this indirect approach

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belonging to an economy of mercy and grace.

This second point, although it already has in view something specifically new, does not seem to me foreign to Jewish thought, for the law has never been separated from mercy, as Deuteronomy reminds us.

But a third remark leads us to the heart of the Pauline conception of this economy of grace. Paul, as one knows, did not consider the law a source of life but a pedagogical means leading to grace by way of condemnation. This is assuredly not Jewish. But my thesis is that this new interpretation of the sequence — law, condemnation, faith — does not destroy the bond between faith and action established by the Jewish prophets, but reinforces and deepens it. According to Paul, in recognizing grace we discover an economy of salvation that we may call “progressist,” since it is determined by a law of superabundance: I think here of the famous text of the Letter to the Romans, “but where sin increased, grace abounded all the more” (Romans 5:20). This *pollo mallon*, this “how much more” of Romans 5:17 is the ultimate expression of what I call the law of superabundance; and it is this superabundance which grounds action, in spite of, by means of, the confession of the abundance of sin.

Such is the first Christian paradox that I wanted to underline; it is the paradoxical bond which holds together, in the same consciousness, the admission of radical evil and the *élan* for action.

II. *Justification by Faith and the Problem of Action*

Another tension between faith and action arises from the Christian doctrine of justification by faith, recovered by Luther and common, in our time, to Barth and Bultmann.

It seems that here we have the possibility of a new “argument for laziness,” for, according to this doctrine, “all is accomplished” without me; a victim has been substituted for my sins and justification comes to man “without the works of the law.” The question is all the more serious because on this point was consummated the rupture with the admirable Pharisaic tradition which preserved and developed the will of an Esdras or a Nehemiah, to apply concretely the “commandment of God” in all its details and to the very end. Our task here is not to construct a new scholasticism with the opposing formulas — “justification by faith,” “justification by works” — but to recover as from a coded language, the new depth of the paradoxes of faith and action.

We are going to proceed step by step toward the central paradox.

Our first remark will be negative. Whatever the opposition between faith and works, it cannot

be a repetition of the opposition between *theoria* and *praxis*, between contemplation and action according to the Platonic model. Why? Because the two terms of the Greek alternative (contemplation — action) belong to the same side of the Christian alternative (faith — works). Contemplation is also a kind of work. “Work” is not at all action, as opposed to contemplation; it covers the entire field of human activities; practical, intellectual, spiritual. All this is the “work” of man. We may already suspect that “work” can signify contemplation and that faith can signify practice, but in a new sense which does not restore what Paul excluded under the title of justification by works.

Let us approach this paradox by means of a second remark which is more positive. What is “work,” in this context, if it does not designate action purely and simply? And what is faith, if it is not equivalent to action? Here we arrive at the great question of justification: this question lies on a more profound plane than the apparent alternative — to do or not to do. It concerns the pretension of man to make himself righteous in his own heart by virtue not only of his actions but also of his meditation; in a word: justification by faith is not an alternative to action but to merit. Whatever the source of merit — action or thought — it is merit which is called in question. I do not intend to elaborate this theological concept more carefully but to apply these preparatory remarks to our problem, that of the sources of action in the Jewish faith and in the Christian faith.

It is by advancing to this depth that we may rediscover in justification by faith new sources of action. Our task is no longer to repeat the old expressions, but to recapture their fundamental intention.

This intention was to discover the profound sources of freedom, of that freedom born from the certitude of being in no way justified by works. It is this freedom which gives action its power. Thus, rather than suppressing or drying up the motivation for action, the famous doctrine of justification by faith changed and deepened it.

If we go beyond the words to recapture the intention of this hoary doctrine, it is a dialectic inherent in life that is disclosed to us. Was it not present from the beginning in the Bible? Did not Abraham, ready to sacrifice his son, give witness to this boundless confidence in merciful action? Haven't the confidence of the believer in the creative action of God and the certitude of man's responsibility in all things always dwelt together within the same consciousness? It was Augustine who said: “Let us pray as if God did all; let us act as if man did all”; such is the paradox

IV. *Individual Salvation and Historical Redemption*

Christianity has always been tempted by an ideology of individual salvation which implies that history is impotent and condemned. This tendency finds an initial justification, it seems, in the accent that Christianity places on personal faith. Moreover, it is reinforced by the preference Christianity seems to give to interpersonal relations, at the expense of anonymous and collective history. One may think of the stress on the theme of the neighbor in Christian preaching. Pessimism concerning history seems to be a correlate of the concern for individual salvation. This individualism is certainly one of the inclinations of historical Christianity. It is reinforced by all the other perversions that we have looked at; pessimism about sin which makes humanity a *massa perditionis*, opposition of faith and works, cultivation of purity of intention at the expense of concern for efficacy.

But this individualism turns into a kind of pathology of the religious life from the moment it is separated from other compensating and balancing factors. In the first rank of these must be placed the sense of the *increasing collectivity* of humanity. This is the theme that the Greek and Latin Fathers developed in opposition to Neo-Platonism. They propose a vision of history brought forward by a temporal creation, within which man is indivisibly individual and collective. According to this historical and cosmic vision, all the forms of evil are individual *and* collective, but also all the forms of the superabundance of grace are indivisibly individual *and* collective. All of them are transmitted by the "heart" of each person *and* by the great forces and institutions (economic, political, and cultural) of history. Let us consider some examples of the individual depth and collective amplitude of evil. Let us take as guide line the classical distinction that moral theology makes between sin as covetousness, sin as pride, and sin as vanity. There has always been a tendency to limit these three aspects of evil to the personal life and to blind oneself to their collective and historical dimensions.

Avarice is certainly a personal "vice": "Woe to the rich," says the Gospel. But our relation to possession is inseparable from institutions such as property. The collective "fetish" of money is thus another face of the curse of possession. It is not only the individual who is fascinated by possession, but society inasmuch as it is devoted to money and even its organization is based on covetousness. It is here that Marxism gives a useful warning to the religious man; he is a hypocrite if he denounces covetousness among individuals but worships mon-

ey on the level of society taken as a whole. To separate a criticism of a private "vice" from a criticism of the collective "alienations" is a new way of separating faith from action.

Pride is also a personal "vice": "The first shall be last and the last shall be first," the Gospel tells us. But we rob pride of its seriousness when we reduce it to the vain pretension of an individual; pride is an aspect of our personal relation to power, which regains its seriousness when we relate it to the history of power in the world. This is why the question of Caesar, which was at the center of the trial of Jesus, is a dominant question in the Gospel. It was not individuals who put Jesus to death, but the collective power, the power of Caesar, of the same Caesar who was nevertheless the basis and safeguard of peace and order. The trial of Jesus has something to do with the *pax romana*. This is a large question; but the problem of power is not purely a problem of political power. Power is a universal problem: the relations between father and son, master and disciple, and all the unequal relations between men involve power. There is an intellectual power and also a spiritual power which are no less dangerous than political power. Further, the relation to power is also a fundamental question for the church; it is not only situated in face of "political" power, for, as power, it is itself involved in the adventure of power: wars of religion, inquisition, domination of souls, etc. attest that this is not a simple possibility but a tragic process which operates throughout history.

Vanity was regarded by moral theology as a third form of evil. But this vanity is not sheltered only in the "nothingness" of the individual who trusts in all kinds of idols; it concerns also the meaning of the culture in which we participate; it resides in the arts, literature, philosophy. We discover vanity in its fullness only when it takes the enormous dimensions which can only be given to it by the cultural expressions of art and literature; these are the cultural forms which attest to the historical dimension of human distress.

Thus a Christian anthropology necessarily encompasses reflection on property, on power — that of the State and that of the Church — and reflection on the spiritual meaning of our culture. It cannot be reduced to the horizon of the individual.

But the "superabundance" of grace, of which we have spoken above, also has its signs in the individual *and* in the *collectivity*. It is necessary to examine here the limited sense in which Christianity has understood the "remission of sins," considered as a strictly personal event. I do not deny

Divinity School News

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1962-63

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CRAFTON, PAUL F.
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FONG, DAVID H.
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GOWAN, RICHARD D.
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S.B., University of Chicago
TYKSINSKI, RALPH A.
A.B., Knox College
WADSWORTH, JAMES L.
A.B., Eastern Michigan College
WARKENTIN, WELTON
A.B., Knox College
WARNER, EDWARD A.
A.B., Graceland College

WOLF, ROBERT E.
A.B., Northeastern University

MASTER OF ARTS


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B.Th., Luther Theological Seminary
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S.T.B., Trinity College, Canada
BEBARDELEBEN, CALVIN N.
A.B., University of Michigan
DRAKE, GEORGE A.
A.B., Grinnell College
A.B., Oxford University, England
D.B., University of Chicago
EDWARDS, OTIS C.
A.B., Centenary College
S.T.B., General Theological Seminary
ELHARD, LELAND E.
A.B., Capital University
GODBAY, JOHN C.
A.B., Nebraska Wesleyan University
D.B., University of Chicago
GOLDBERG, SUSAN M.
A.B., Syracuse University
HALL, LEWIS D.
A.B., Northern Illinois University
HOMANS, PETER P.
A.B., Princeton University
D.B., Protestant Episcopal Theological Seminary
IDINOPULOS, THOMAS A.
A.B., Reed College
A.M., Duke University
JANES, FRANCES L.
A.B., University of Kansas
A.M., University of Kansas
JOHN, MATTHEW P.
D.B., Serampore College
M.Th., Serampore College
A.M., University of Calcutta, India
KEELING, LYTLE B.
A.B., Capital University
KERNEY, LEROY G.
A.B., Westmar College
D.B., Evangelical Theological Seminary

FAMILIAR SCENES

. . . around campus



*Shirley Jackson Case Room —
Rare Bible Collection*



Joseph Bond Chapel

*Shirley Jackson Case Room —
Mosaic Collection*





*Swift Hall
Library*



*Swift Hall
Coffee Shop*



*Reception —
Swift
Common Room*



Swift Hall



*Swift
Common Room*

Memoirs of an Ecclesiastical Moonlighter

by Martin E. Marty

*Vocational decision is as lonely, is twice
as lonely, as marital decision*

Sir Steven Runciman speaks of the historian's work as being carried on under "the watchful scrutiny of his colleagues." A historian who teaches also works under the watchful scrutiny of his students. By the time this article appears I shall be working in such circumstances. From past familiarity with the community of church historians; from partial familiarity with the Divinity School faculty; from remembrances of the School's student body, I shall be highly conscious of this "watchful scrutiny." This means that the next time I write for CRITERION it will be necessary to document every impression; to explore the background of my texts; to footnote the footnotes. Such a prospect permits now the luxury of the casual, personal statement which follows.

Since great numbers of alumni are and a large percentage of the student body will be in the parish ministry, I hope that this reflection will "speak to their situation" as it speaks out of mine. It was originally prepared for my colleagues in the pastoral ministry and appears here with the permission of THE AMERICAN LUTHERAN. — Author's note.

ONE who follows an occupation or pastime by moonlight is, according to the dictionary, a moonlighter. In secular Ireland, it goes on, he was "one of a band that engaged in agrarian outrages by night." In ecclesiastical America he is, as I have been for seven years, one who follows an occupation or pastime or engages in urban outrages

by night in addition to a full time parish ministry. After tending the daily pastoral needs of a suburban congregation I have tried to edit, teach, write books and lecture.

On July 1, 1963, this ambivalent career ended. On that day about 100 of the more than 250,000 Americans with pastoral charges moved on. They do so every day, having lived out their average seven years of tenure. Thus the fact that I left the parish ministry that day along with ninety-nine others lacks cosmic significance or human uniqueness. Had I been born six months sooner perhaps I could have contributed to the brilliant series of articles on "Why I Quit" or did not quit the ministry or the parish ministry. On the other hand, perhaps I could not. For those articles in the *Saturday Evening Post* or *The Christian Century* or a thousand church bulletins were written by single-minded men. They were right and the world was wrong or *vice versa*; they were right and the laity was wrong or *vice versa*. Alas, I have been a divided man, full of ambivalences and ambiguities. That is why I was a moonlighter. On the assumption that the church is full of double-minded men who were not represented in the "Why I Quit/Why I Didn't Quit" antithesis, I am emboldened to speak an autobiographical word.

MARTIN E. MARTY was recently appointed Associate Professor of Church History at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. Before his appointment, he was pastor of the Lutheran Church of the Holy Spirit, Elk Grove Village, Illinois. He remains the Associate Editor of *The Christian Century*, and a member of the editorial staffs of numerous religious journals. The most recent of his many books are *The Displaced Christian* and *The Varieties of Unbelief*.

tional historian!" From the Christian viewpoint is there such a thing as "mere" or "conventional" history?)

Item: A student at a large seminary not long ago reported that its internes returned to it totally "disenchanted and disillusioned" with the parish ministry. I was the only one they knew who was identified with a romantic conception of the ministry and who, they thought, might come to justify the residential parish in theological terms. (I had never been enchanted — how could I be disenchanted? Parish ministry is hard, dirty work with occasional surprising rewards. It has an element of humdrum as most vocations do. If this meant a romantic conception, they were welcome to it. Their invitation was not amplified.)

Whoever straddles the cultures seems to have to effect an inner or personal synthesis. When the synthesis takes concrete vocational form, moonlighting results. What is needed more than moonlighters with their proneness to mediocrity is practitioners of one art who can empathise with the other. Then, we can see more wholeness return to Christian endeavor.

Take history. In the eyes of many a parish minister, to teach history or to write editorials is to abstract one's self from the life of the church. What is "history" or the "instant history" we call journalism? Really critical historical work could be one of the most important tasks of the church in a bewildering hour. More positively, as Jules Monnerat says, history is something more than a process of ripping open dolls and turning them over to shake out the sawdust. It is also the midwife of values. One step further: it was the greatest of our time's church historians, Adolf Harnack, who said, "Man is in the world in order to act in it, not in order to contemplate upon it."

From the other side we hear historians, social critics, social scientists writing off *en masse* the parish and most other concretions which are the stuff they study. Is this premature disavowal tactically necessary and theologically justifiable merely because it is methodologically neat?

A divided man speaks. I have tried both. Purity of heart is to will one thing and, for me, means to give up the full time pastorate. Since I was a four-year-old awed by the dark theocratic gloom and inspired by the paradoxical grace that emanated from a Nebraska pulpit under which I sat, I never envisioned being anything but a pastor. At the same time, culture being so rich and tantalizing, I never envisioned being *only* a pastor. First art and architecture and later history and journalism beckoned to nocturnal outrages. Brunner's sentence, "I did not want to become a pro-

fessor, but a preacher of the Gospel" was my under-the-desk-glass motto of inspiration at seminary. In a final burst of out-snobbing snobbery I rented but did not buy a doctoral hood the day before I marched off to the pastorate.

The Divinity School catalog of my pre-doctoral years loftily advertised the Ph.D. as a good or adequate preparation for parish ministry, though many of its associates expressed surprise whenever a "doctor" pursued congregational ministry. I must admit to a secret delight in surprising others. Conversely and perversely I admit to secret delight on the frequent occasions when a Letter to the Editor at the *Century* would twit: "If only that man Marty would come down from the ivory tower to the grass roots, he would know whereof he speaks." I was choked in grass roots, as is any man who founds and virtually *is* the staff of a growing suburban parish, rich in its diffusion. Alas, I surrender the perversities in the future.

A Last Look

Now it is time to take a parting glance at the parish ministry for which I prepared twelve years and in which I served twelve years (allowing for a bit of overlapping). As I see it, most of the problems of the parish are endemic to church life everywhere. They result from the inward secularization of all Christian people and the outward secularization of Christian forms — and the failure on our part to develop a language or style of faith and life for the two phenomena. The parish is the vulnerable, visible place to test the problem. To isolate the problem is not to solve it. It seems to me unfair to locate the whole problem of the crisis of belief and action with the laity in the congregations.

Second, it has seemed important to me to marvel at the first frail evidences of faith and faithfulness that become open in the hidden Christian life of any parish. My sticking-point is Bonhoeffer's dictum: A pastor should not complain about his congregation to other people nor to God.

Of course such a saying does not relieve the preacher of the Law from analyzing and diagnosing, nor does it exempt the parish from criticism. If anything, the parish — in the years of sociological scrutiny — has not received searching enough theological criticism. But in the concrete relation of pastor to people, a different mission is involved. (This also explains why I never used "my" parish as a datum in public expression. If a congregation is a pastor's test tube for sociological expression and resource for publicity handouts it is difficult to picture how one can sustain the confidences

The Human Condition

by Paul Tillich

*He who is not aware of the ambiguity of his
perfection . . . is not yet mature*

May I express first my feeling of thanks for the honor to be a speaker at this great occasion, a feeling which is increased by my awareness that only the astonishing lack of prejudice in the American tradition made it possible to choose someone who is not a born American and who shows this fact irrefutably by his accent.

When accepting the invitation, I was asked to speak about "The Human Condition in Relation to the Anniversary Celebration of *Time* Magazine." While "the human condition" is a subject of general philosophical significance, our interest tonight is focused on the late past and the near future. Nevertheless, one cannot say anything about the present human situation without having an image of the universal condition of man. It is my conviction that the character of the human condition, like the character of all life, is "ambiguity": the inseparable mixture of good and evil, of true and false, of creative and destructive forces — both individual and social. Of course, there are degrees to which the one or the other side prevails, but there is nothing unambiguously creative and nothing unambiguously destructive. They accompany each other inseparably.

Sometimes I have the feeling that the American irony, including the style of *Time* Magazine, shows some awareness of the ambiguity of life — as long as it does not degenerate into mere cynicism.

The awareness of the ambiguity of one's own highest achievements (as well as one's own deepest failures) is a definite symptom of maturity. Therefore, in an assembly in which so great achievements in the many realms of life are represented, it may be justified to speak of something I suggest to call "The Ambiguity of Perfection." He who is not aware of the ambiguity of his perfection as a person and in his work is not yet mature; and a nation which is not aware of the ambiguity of its greatness also lacks maturity. Are we mature as a nation, are we aware of the ambiguity even of the best in us?

There are signs of such awareness in many places. The very fact that I was asked to speak about the "human condition" points to a lack of certainty about the excellence of this condition. An awareness of the ambiguity of our achievements is alive in those who know that the American form of democracy, though preferable to most other present political methods, is not the end of the ways of historical providence. It is alive in those who realize that our methods of education-in-breadth, though desirable, are full of dangers for the future of our culture. It is alive in those who realize that the immense success of our economic system, though justified by this success, is not an unambiguous criterion for all other systems. It is alive in churches insofar as they

The talk printed here was originally delivered by Dr. Paul Tillich at a dinner celebrating the fortieth anniversary of *Time* magazine on May 6, 1963. Professor Tillich needs little introduction to American theologians. He has been a Professor on the German theological faculties of Marburg, Dresden, Leipzig, and Frankfurt. In 1933 he came to America and has since been Professor of Philosophical Theology at Union Theological Seminary and Columbia University and University Professor at Harvard. In 1962, he was appointed John Nuveen Professor of Theology at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. He has published many books; the most recent is *Christianity and the Encounter of the World's Religions*. "The Human Condition" is reprinted with the permission of *Time, Inc.*

good, namely religion. He does not! Even if one calls the experience in the vertical dimension religious it is not what this word usually connotes. It is not what I sometimes have called the magazine-concept of religion, namely religion as one of the cultural functions of man's spirit, reported for instance between economy and sports, considered as the job of the "religionist" — the most antireligious word in the English language. Religion as the experience of the vertical line is effective in every creative work, in artistic as well as scientific, in ethical as well as in political, in technical as well as in economic creations, and even in the power of playing, this great symbol of human freedom. Religion in this sense is the state in which we are grasped by the infinite seriousness of the question of the meaning of our life and our readiness to receive answers and to

act according to them. These questions and answers are ordinarily expressed in systems of religious thought and life. But they are not exclusively bound to such expression. The vertical dimension of depth is present in the secular as well as in the religious realm. It is present too in our own one-dimensional culture though obscured and suppressed by the forces of the horizontal and their restless drives.

It is my hope for the future that they will be uncovered and liberated far more and for far more people than they are under the human condition in the present period. And I believe that it is the duty of all those who speak for our time — including *Time Magazine* — to help with passion and wisdom so that the ultimate question becomes powerful again in our Western culture and in our nation.

A MORE PROFOUND and COMPREHENSIVE ORDER OF REASON

. no culture can comprehend all the values and possibilities of human existence. Hence the need of Western culture at the peak of its power to recognize its limitations, lest arrogance be its destruction. Merely to attack existentialism without learning whatever truth and right it may have is mistaken procedure because it will leave this truth and right in the hands of our foes as a weapon with which to destroy us. The way to conquer the enemy is to learn from him the sources of his strength. In the previous sentence the word "enemy" is not intended to suggest hostility but only the dialectic of discussion between opposites.

This mystery beyond the reach of reason, always entering conscious experience on the fringes of reason and sometimes disrupting the order of reason, we must keep exposed, because our existence is tied into it. We can never understand ourselves, and we can never find what to live for that is fitted to our existence, so long as we think that reason can be the master of our lives. Something else other than reason opens up the frontier and into that unexplored region we must go whether we like it or not. The function of reason is not to control and direct this basic drive but to search out the conditions under which it can open the way for a more profound and comprehensive order of reason.

From "The Religious Significance of Existentialism" by HENRY NELSON WIEMAN in "The Journal of the Liberal Ministry" Spring, 1961.

form a theological system and yet there is a basic unity in their perspective and affirmation. The same is true of Wright's own writings. One can find many apparently fundamental statements in Wright's writings which, if developed to their logical conclusions, would be repudiated by him. For example, Wright formulated a definition of biblical theology which was one of the main points in his book *God Who Acts*: "Biblical theology is the confessional recital of the redemptive acts of God in a particular history . . ." Now a "confessional recital" is an act of worship, in Wright's own understanding. Therefore, biblical theology is an act of worship. However, it is unlikely that Wright meant to simply include biblical theology among acts of worship, and sometimes his wording avoids this implication as when he speaks of biblical theology as "a reflection on" or as "pointing to" the confessional recital of traditional and historical events.² Just what he intends the relationship between the two to be, however, remains unclear.

In the same book there are also a number of important ambiguities in key terminology, such as "history," "faith," "event." The ambiguity of the word "history," for example, adds a good deal to the apologetic effectiveness of a statement like: "Biblical theology is the confessional recital of the redemptive acts of God in a particular history, because history is the chief medium of revelation."³ "History" in the causal clause may mean Israel's past, Israel's story of the past, the temporal aspect of man's life, or simply reality. As least the word "history" has all these meanings in *God Who Acts*. Wright's own explanation of what "history" means here is not very clear: "The term 'history' in this connection is used in a broad sense to include not only events of seeming impersonal significance, but also the lives of the individuals who compose it." Another example of ambiguity in terminology is: "The realism of the Bible consists in its close attention to the facts of history and of tradition because these facts are the facts of God."⁴ What can "facts" mean in that statement?

There is another kind of ambiguity one encounters in the writings of Wright which is more subtle but more important. It can be illustrated from the statement quoted above: ". . . history is the chief medium of revelation." Is this a descriptive or a normative statement? Is Wright the historian of Israel describing what some or most Israelites believed, or is Wright the theologian stating a theological truth claiming general validity? In this case my impression is that Wright meant the statement in the first instance as descriptive; it is clear, however, from the rest of

his writings that he thinks the Israelites were right and therefore he would also make the statement normatively. One may still ask, however, whether Wright believes history is the medium of revelation *because* that's what the Israelites believed. I think one of the things which has most piqued Wright's critics, among whom on this point I include myself, is this frequent ambiguity as to whether highsounding statements are meant descriptively (what Israel believed) or normatively (what we should believe).

I mention these various ambiguities in order to illustrate the point that Wright's style of thought and writing often lacks precision of statement. Critics who read him to disagree with him rather than understand him can therefore have a field day with such details. *God Who Acts* read as a systematic statement is a weak book. But if it is read as the public advocacy of a point of view, in which rhetorical statement and exaggeration are not out of place, then it is a powerful and effective book, and it is in this role that it has become an influential and widely-cited work. There is no mistaking that Wright has a point of view which he has advocated in a variety of ways in a variety of contexts. It is a point of view, however, which has come to expression charismatically, as it were, rather than systematically. It has been evoked bit by bit as Wright addressed himself over a period of time to a series of problems and tasks which confronted him. In what follows it is my intention to describe four themes or motifs which are central in G. E. Wright's point of view. These four themes emerge in the course of Wright's work and my description will have some features of a chronicle. I call these four themes the mutation argument, the history-nature argument, the Heilsgeschichte argument, and the prophetic analogy argument. Wright has stated these themes as arguments in his different writings, but I am less interested in them as arguments than as illustrations of the way in which Wright conceptualizes or makes sense of his subject matter.

The mutation theme is an argument about the history of Israelite religion. The basic issue is whether the high religion of the Old Testament is only the outcome of the later phases of the history of Israelite religion or whether the essential features of this high religion were present from the beginning (i.e. from Moses, or at least the time of the conquest of Palestine). Wright argues that these essential features were present from the beginning and that what development took place was the result of this original Israelite religious structure encountering and responding

civilization whose writing significantly influenced Wright in the 1940's held an even more emphatic view of the importance of the culture unit. This was Henri Frankfort of the Oriental Institute who employed the formulations of Ruth Benedict's *Patterns of Culture* in dealing with the concept of civilization. In this connection he wrote: "... cultural behavior is integrated and the whole determines the significance of the parts."¹² Albright was not willing to put the matter so drastically, preferring to call a culture an empirico-adaptive system,¹³ but the notion of the cultural unit as some kind of dynamic integral system in which the parts have meaning in light of the whole is the basis of the mutation argument.¹⁴ In all contexts in which Wright argues for the uniqueness and continuity of Israelite religion this conceptualization is in the background. Even when his particular formulations vary or are ambiguous or inconsistent among themselves, this conceptual framework remains constant.¹⁵

The mutation theme or argument provided a way of conceiving of Israel as a culture unit in which the diverse data of the history of Israelite religion could be seen as reflecting a basic religious structure which underwent change and development only within the limits of that structure's organic unity. The history-nature theme provided an argument as to the way in which the Israelite religious structure differed from other ancient Near Eastern religion. The main point in Albright's argument had been that Israelite religion was the first monotheistic religious structure which succeeded as the basis for a culture unit. There had been sporadic tendencies toward monotheism during the "first Internationalism" in the centuries just prior to Israel's conquest of Canaan,¹⁶ but only in Israel did a whole cultural complex develop around monotheism as its basic and controlling religious insight.

In his early years of teaching Wright was particularly interested in elaborating the way in which Israel differed from the religious forms of its environment.¹⁷ In this period he stressed that in Israelite religion Yahweh was without divine companions, that there was no mythology of Yahweh, nor images of him, and that he was conceived exclusively in anthropomorphic terms — the significance of which is that it excludes animal forms. The notion that only man is made in God's image was a basic element of early Israelite religion. Wright's first book in the area of biblical theology, *The Challenge of Israel's Faith*, was based on this way of putting the difference between the Israelite and non-Israelite notions of God. Anthropomorphism and the jealousy of God

as the bulwark against paganism were advanced as assets rather than defects in contrast to modern intellectualism. Israel's God

was no abstract idea or principle. He was a living, active, powerful God. Hence, anthropomorphism in Old Testament religion was the *very reason* for its dynamic and virile character . . . we may ask . . . whether Israelite anthropomorphism is not the true answer to the modern tendency toward deism in practical Christian living.¹⁸

In 1946 there was published a work which opened up for Wright a new way of formulating the difference between Israelite and non-Israelite religion. The book was *The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man*.¹⁹ It was a cooperative work produced by faculty of the Oriental Institute. The most general interpretive essays were contributed by H. and H. A. Frankfort. These described the nature of mythopoeic thought in the ancient Near Eastern civilizations, and the dissolution of mythopoeic thought in two directions, that of Hebrew thought and that of Greek philosophy. The few brief pages in which Frankfort described the Israelite mutation — he did not use the word — from the mythopoeic thought of Mesopotamia and Egypt were crammed with far-reaching implications for the thing in which Wright was more interested. Perhaps the most important were those of the following quotations:

The differences between the Egyptian and Mesopotamian manners of viewing the world are very far-reaching. Yet the two peoples agreed in the fundamental assumptions that the individual is part of society, that society is embedded in nature, and that nature is but the manifestation of the divine. This doctrine was, in fact, universally accepted by the peoples of the ancient world with the single exception of the Hebrews. . . . The dominant tenet of Hebrew thought is the absolute transcendence of God. Yahweh is not in nature. Neither earth nor sun nor heaven is divine; even the most potent natural phenomena are but reflections of God's greatness. . . . Not cosmic phenomena, but history itself, had here become pregnant with meaning; history had become a revelation of the dynamic will of God . . . Man, according to Hebrew thought, was the interpreter and the servant of God; he was even honoured with the task of bringing about the realization of God's will. Thus man was condemned to unending efforts which were doomed to fail because of his inadequacy. In the Old Testament we find man possessed of a new freedom and of a new burden of responsibility. We find there a new and utter lack of *eudaimonia*, of harmony — whether with the world of reason or with the world of perception . . . The doctrine of a single, unconditioned transcendent God rejected time-honoured values, proclaimed new ones, and postulated a metaphysical significance for history and for man's actions. With infinite *moral* courage the Hebrews worshipped an absolute God and accepted as the correlate of their faith the sacrifice of an harmonious existence. In transcending the Near Eastern myths

the attempt to explain the events which led to the establishment of the nation."²⁴ This narrative structure goes back to the earliest days of Israel and thus this method of doing theology is itself part of that mutation which constitutes the uniqueness of Israelite religion.

This understanding of the role of the Heilsgeschichte narrative in the religion of Israel stands behind Wright's various statements in *God Who Acts* to the effect that history is the chief medium of revelation or the arena of God's activity. These statements are descriptive; they mean that the Israelites thought of God as having done and still doing things in time, the same kind of time in which they lived. It is just at this point, however, where the ambiguity of the word "history" and of Wright's way of formulating his statements becomes most apparent. For example in the following statement: "The knowledge of God was an inference from what actually had happened in human history."²⁵ Now does that mean an inference from what the Israelites *thought* had actually happened in human history as distinguished from what the Israelites knew to be myth or legend, or does it mean what actually happened in human history in *our* terms as distinguished from what the Israelites may have thought? As a matter of fact the statement is worded so that it can be understood either way. The Israelites based their faith on real historical (in our sense) events, the exodus, for example, as distinguished from the creation myths of the Babylonians. But at the same time they told the story of the exodus in the Heilsgeschichte in a way that would not fit our sense of real history, even though they undoubtedly believed it to be entirely true. In the case of the covenant of Sinai Wright recognizes that the story is to us "a projection of faith," while to the Israelites it was a "real event of history."²⁶

It is not difficult to see that Wright resists drawing a sharp line between Heilsgeschichte and history. He doesn't want to separate very far the history that Israel recited from the history the biblical archeologist can work with. Thus he argues that there is a direct causal connection between the exodus as a real historical event and the origin of the Heilsgeschichte: no other explanation was possible for what had happened to Israel than that they had been chosen at the exodus as God's elect people. The rest of the Heilsgeschichte was developed out of this first "inference" from the exodus.²⁷ This argument, which he had already devised in 1946,²⁸ is a poor one insofar as it purports to be a historical reconstruction. But both Wright's interest in this argument and the persistent ambiguity in the

word "history" is to be explained, I believe, from the fourth of the themes I am enumerating: prophetic analogy.

The prophetic analogy theme is Wright's basic hermeneutical principle. This principle is implicit in a great many statements throughout Wright's writings, but was already stated quite explicitly as well in *The Challenge of Israel's Faith* in 1943:

There are two conditions which must be met before we can really understand the prophets in the sense that they meant their own messages to be understood. The first is that we be willing to stand with them at their point of vantage, look at their particular history with them, and experience the challenge and immediacy of the will of God for that moment. The second is that we endeavor to stand in our own history, struggle with the same tragic and compelling events which concern us, and strive . . . to find the immediate Word of the Lord for *us*, now, at this moment.²⁹

And in 1951, after the writing of *God Who Acts*:

The Church cannot afford the luxury of such a seemingly "objective" approach. Its primary aim must be to view Biblical history through the eyes of its interpreters, grappling with those vital questions of faith and meaning with which the Biblical authors themselves were concerned. This means that the Christian interpreter must take his stand with prophet and apostle in their struggle to hear God's Word of judgment and mercy in the midst of the human crisis. He cannot separate himself from them, from their history, or from their all-absorbing attention to the objective being of God, else he will not hear with them that Gospel which is nothing other than God's proclamation.³⁰

The argument is that we should expose ourselves as fully as we can to the actual historical situations of biblical men and to their message and response in these actual situations. We should then address ourselves to our own historical situations with equal seriousness. We do not simply do or repeat *what* the biblical men did or said; rather we do and speak *as* they did. We should strive to see our own situation as analogous to theirs and adopt an attitude toward it analogous to theirs. In this way the Bible, precisely as historical record, becomes a factor in the contemporary lives of Christians, but at the same time, since the relationship is one of analogy, the Bible cannot be set up as a legalistic norm or as a system of theology. Wright is insisting on the concrete reality and prime importance of the historical situation for both biblical men and ourselves, but the two are not simply divorced. The experience and utterances of biblical men should be a continual and incalculable element in the lives of contemporary men. The God who continually met and dealt with Israel is the same God who meets and deals with us, though

EXPECTATION FULFILLED IN ENTHUSIASM

One does not rationalize God's existence, but simply awaits his action in grasping man. Then he is touched by the holy God and this place becomes holy ground. Our national theological history has been derelict at this point as well as that of *expectation*. We have had our fill of "God-possessing" days — we have enlisted Him on our side in the fight against godless communism, some are calling upon Him this very day in the race to the moon; we have purchased by the thousands the advices of Paine, Emerson, Marden, Trine, Emmet Fox and Bruce Barton; we have lured him into our churches by coolness of acolytes and cleverness of preacher. No, *enthusiasm* is not this — it is expectation fulfilled — it is humility waiting, having Him take hold of us in our rejections, our failures, in all our fumbling — it is the awesome presence of God with us, *Immanuel*. Albert Camus is in error when he states that the wager of our generation in the wake of the rebirth of French culture and Western society — that this wager is to be up and creating a stability of peace ahead of the manufacture of intercontinental ballistics. No, the wager of our generation is to have our expectation fulfilled in *enthusiasm* by waiting upon the Father.

From a sermon preached in Rockefeller Memorial Chapel of the University of Chicago by the REVEREND WILLIAM J. McCUTCHEON, Dean of the Chapel at Beloit College.