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Barth. Those Americans who heard him will now read him in a different spirit. For many who never heard Barth, he was a totally consistent, unbending, relentless dogmatician. All who heard him will now read the massive *Dogmatics* with a radically new picture of the author. As they read, they will see a quizzical, smiling, old gentleman peering over his spectacles, finger raised, sharp blue eyes questioning. Whether Americans agree more fully with Barth in the future or disagree more heartily, they will certainly take their stance with less suspicion and with greater affection. This, in itself, made the occasion worthwhile.

It is not for us to say what kind of impact America made on Barth. Certainly, we did not want him to carry away a falsely optimistic picture of America; however, many have long felt that Barth really did not know or appreciate either the genuine strengths or the very real weaknesses of this nation. Granted his perceptive powers and his deep curiosity, we were convinced he would arrive at an accurate picture in the brief time available to him. Judging by his comments made at the conclusion of the panel discussions, Barth emerged with as different a picture of America as Americans emerged with a different picture of Barth.

All those present on the Thursday evening that concluded the panel discussions witnessed an almost prophetic moment. In his concluding comments, Barth called for America to move ahead without a sense of inferiority towards Europe or a sense of superiority towards Asia or Africa; he called upon American theologians to develop a theology of freedom which reflects the American experience. At the conclusion of his remarks, there was a spontaneous outburst of applause and an outpouring of empathy that clearly indicated that the audience felt Barth had caught a genuine feeling for the American situation.

Nobody knows what the final impact of Barth will be on the American scene. This is not the place to attempt such an assessment, and it is dubious if such an assessment is yet possible. There are still those who think the *Church Dogmatics* is the last word and the greatest exposition of the gospel; there are those who think Barth is useless for the modern world because he is so radically orthodox; yet others think he is not consistently evangelical or orthodox; and still others think his historical analyses and insights will prove of greater constructive significance for America than will the systematic dogmatic formulations themselves. Only time will tell who is right.

The Divinity School felt justifiably proud that it could be the first to present Professor Karl Barth to the American public. One of the primary functions of a university divinity faculty is to make certain that all of the major theological positions are given a full, sympathetic, and adequate hearing. Our only regret is that we could not have Professor Barth for a longer period of time. In the next issue of *Criterion*, we intend to publish excerpts from the panel discussions between Barth and six of the leading younger theologians in America. This should prove to be one of the outstanding issues of *Criterion*, because these materials will not be available elsewhere.
but for all teachers his conception of his task has been the norm.

The really serious charge was that Socrates corrupted the youth. The other charge, that he did not believe in the gods of the state, was simply one instance of such corruption. He defended himself against the charge of heresy, by the way, by declaring his allegiance to a mysterious voice within, a “divine voice,” no less, which spoke to him when he was not on the right track. Modern Socrateses cannot afford the luxury of such an appeal to revelation. Simple heresy is no longer a serious charge. But the basic charge, that Socrates, and any good teacher, is a corruptor of the youth must be taken seriously. For when all was said and done, Socrates’ accusers made that charge stick. The fact was, Socrates was guilty. And the fact remains, all teachers accept their goals as their own.

Let me put it bluntly: the proper task of a teacher is to corrupt the youth. A teacher is one hired to make students dissatisfied with what they know, with the knowledge, the attitudes, the interpretations of experience they have brought to the classroom with them. To this extent, the student who comes to college in order to learn how to defend his prejudices is the most incorruptible student among you, not because his integrity is unimpeachable, but because his corruption is already so far advanced that it cannot be a resource for the emergence of good.

The greatest failures of a teacher are students who learn in college only the techniques by which they can “attain their goals” in life and who do not seriously entertain the possibility that those goals are themselves never adequate to the full potential of life’s richness. That is to say, we fail in our task as teachers when you fail in your obligation as students. When you are bored in class, when you do minimal work to get by in a course, when you do not find your greatest excitement, your most valued experiences to be enhanced by, to be incapable of separation from, your participation in a community of learning, then we have failed you and you have failed us.

Corruption — the way I am using the word this morning — is, of course, a relative term, but it is a useful one to point up the revolutionary, the dangerous, the painful, the negative side of a teacher’s task. A teacher must corrupt the youth insofar as he is the instrument whereby the youth are made dissatisfied with their present state of ignorance. That he does corrupt the youth is, obviously, the judgment of society and not of the teacher. The teacher’s job is to teach, to let the facts fall where they may. If the facts threaten society’s most cherished ideas, its own self-image, if they cause men to reassess themselves and reject older assessments, that is the tyranny of the search for truth and not the responsibility of the teacher. The teacher has no obligation as teacher to heal, no obligation as teacher to compromise.

My whole address may be just a pitch for your sympathy. Perhaps, when all I say is reduced to a phrase, it adds up to this: I want you to forgive me and to forgive all teachers for what they must do if they do their job well. This is a college level version of “it hurts me worse than it does you.” I am asking that you reverse the decision of the Athenian court, that you rise to greater heights of understanding and compassion than the five hundred citizens of Athens. Socrates, you know, after he had been convicted of his crime, proposed what he thought a fair penalty for his having corrupted the youth. He proposed that the state put him on the public payroll for his work as a midwife in bringing ideas to birth from its citizens, that it pension him off in gratitude for his being a gadfly in its midst.

This is similar to what I am asking of you. Indeed, this is the effrontery your parents are paying for: they are paying dearly for the gadfly to sting you. Those of you who have had me in class know that I am no Socrates. And this means you know the extent of my failure. But to the degree that I or any teacher can emulate the role of Socrates, I am asking that you count yourself as one who gets his money’s worth.

But my pitch for sympathy is not yet over, for until I can communicate to you something of the agony involved in teaching (the joys are clichés), I cannot expect your compassion. The agony arises from the simple, but probably to you the dubious, truth that teachers are human too. One morning last spring I met one of my colleagues on the way to school. As we walked along, I remarked that he looked particularly harried and hollow-eyed. He told me what had happened. His own discipline is one in which a good deal of factual knowledge is necessary, an “objective science,” if I may use the term, where a premium is placed on competence in matters of fact. He had been grading papers late into the night. But these papers were of an unusual kind, for he had asked his students to evaluate some aspect of themselves on the basis of their knowledge in his field. That was the source of his trouble. “Why,” he blurted out finally, “I was grading their souls!” This, of course, thrilled me no end, especially since his discipline begins with the denial that there is such a thing as a soul.

It struck me then, and continues to impress me, that until we are grading a man’s soul we are
resolution which only knowledge can bring. Christianity's analysis of the human condition is such that it requires not resolution but a rescue. Gnosis, knowledge, will not save us.

Yet here I am, teaching in an institution which is founded upon a modern version of the Gnostic heresy (even the Gnostics knew better than to think man can save himself). Intellectually, this is justifiable. After all, why should I care? My task is to achieve excellence in what I can do best, and I have dedicated myself to the intellectual task of searching for knowledge. Intellectually, this is justifiable; humanly speaking, it leaves something out. For, intellectually I am aware that the search for knowledge explicitly claims autonomy and implicitly presents itself as a work of salvation. Yet theologically I am aware that, as Alexander Miller puts it, “learning is best conducted by those who know that there is no salvation in it.” And, finally, humanly I am aware that the theological and the intellectual claims are unreconciled. This brings me to my second burden.

My second burden can best be pointed up by a remark the Director of Student Counseling once made in a faculty seminar: “This is,” he declared, “an educational and not a therapeutic institution.” Translated into my terms, this means that our duty as teachers is to corrupt and not to heal. Healing is another's job, not ours. We, in a way, keep the healers in business.

Regarding that task of healing which is medical, I have no comment. But regarding the priestly task, the healing of souls, I, qua human, not qua teacher, am involved. You, dear snakes in academic paradise, you are the corrupters in this case. You have brought the sweat to my brow as I earn my bread and have even made giving birth to ideas, the Socratic midwifery, a sorrow and a tribulation. Let me quote you to yourselves to make my point. Here are a few excerpts from some papers you have written for me this semester. Remember, in good faith I assigned you the task of intellectual analysis of some theological ideas. Listen to some of your responses.

Exhibit A: “How and for what purpose other than abstractly does one live for God? The means of living for and according to God are missing. ... I need from Kierkegaard but one more thing - the utensil, the meaning for living, and this he himself says he cannot give me. The individual lives his own life, alone, receiving no assistance from others. I must assume, then, the burden of the paradox, and walk alone with the dreadful responsibility.”

Exhibit B: “If only there were some way by which man could be assured of the reality of God and of his love and acceptance. If he could have this assurance he might be able to reach a position of accepting himself. But he cannot have this assurance and he is left in complete separation from God, from man, and from himself, sometimes getting a glimpse of acceptance through love of and from his fellow beings. But man in the existential position is never capable of giving enough love and of accepting the meager bit that is offered him to give him the faith to make the jump possible. He may want to accept desperately, but he cannot unless he reaches out to his fellow men and receives an answering touch.”

Exhibit C: “One cannot open a book, or glance at a newspaper, or even speak for more than five minutes without in some way or other making broad ultimate statements about man, his place, me, my place, anxieties, concern about ourselves, neighbors, God.

Societies are tied by a language and the thought patterns of endless years of construction, destruction, reconstruction. There is meaning or meaninglessness; there are all the anxieties of man's inherited way of life - his characteristic thought and language patterns. Man is not just tied in slavery; he is bound by a Gordian knot and the riddle of the Sphinx. And all the blows and answers only increase the impossibility of the knot, the confusion of the gyroscopic answers — always a misdirected blow or a circumventive answer.

Through the eons of man's development, the knot has grown; it has had its last bare puzzle revealed, and then the thought twists and turns and becomes incomprehensible.

I revolt, but in terms that everyone else uses, and I only add my knot to the mess.

It is not fate or death, guilt or condemnation that frighten me ultimately; it is the entirety of man's thought, the complete destructive, self-destructive nature of the thought and its implications - man is these thoughts - man is only because of these thoughts. The physical self is not less subject to these thoughts than the mind self. Man is total, summed-up, even in the very naming of man - body and mind. Nothing is untouched; all is discussed and ... disgusting.

These passages of despair are evidence that the intellectual task, like it or not, is not carried out with discretion. And passion rouses passion. What, for heaven's sake, is one to do with such outbursts as these? Give them a grade, send the grade along to the registrar and let posterity learn from the record that "this is an A soul, the other is a B- soul, and this last, well his is, roughly, an F+ soul"?

My point is simply that students inconsiderately
History of Religions and a New Humanism

By Mircea Eliade

The history of religious meanings must always be regarded as forming part of the history of the human spirit.

Despite the manuals, periodicals, and bibliographies today available to scholars, it is progressively more difficult to keep up with the advances being made in all departments of the History of Religions. Hence it is progressively more difficult to become a historian of religions. A scholar regretfully finds himself becoming a specialist in one religion or even in a particular period or a single aspect of that religion.

This situation has induced us to bring out a new periodical. Our purpose is not simply to make one more review available to scholars (though the lack of a periodical of this nature in the United States would be reason enough for our venture) but more especially to provide an aid to orientation in a field that is constantly widening and to stimulate exchanges of views among specialists who, as a rule, do not follow the progress made in other disciplines. Such an orientation and exchange of views will, we hope, be made possible by summaries of the most recent advances achieved concerning certain key problems in the History of Religions, by methodological discussions, and by attempts to improve the hermeneutics of religious data.

Hermeneutics is of preponderant interest to us because, inevitably, it is the least-developed aspect of our discipline. Preoccupied, and indeed often completely taken up, by their admittedly urgent and indispensable work of collecting, publishing, and analyzing religious data, scholars have sometimes neglected to study their meaning. Now, these data represent the expression of various religious experiences; in the last analysis they represent positions and situations assumed by men in the course of history. Like it or not, the scholar has not finished his work when he has reconstructed the history of a religious form or brought out its sociological, economic, or political contexts. In addition, he must understand its meaning—that is, identify and elucidate the situations and positions that have induced or made possible its appearance or its triumph at a particular historical moment.

It is solely insofar as it will perform this task—particularly by making the meanings of religious documents intelligible to the mind of modern man—that the science of religions will fulfill its true cultural function. For whatever its role has been in the past, the comparative study of religions...
after all, erudition by itself cannot accomplish the whole task of the historian of religions; just as a knowledge of thirteenth-century Italian and of the Florentine culture of the period, the study of medieval theology and philosophy, and familiarity with Dante's life do not suffice to reveal the artistic value of the Divina Commedia. We almost hesitate to repeat such truisms. Yet it can never be said often enough that the task of the historian of religions is not completed when he has succeeded in reconstructing the chronological sequence of a religion or has brought out its social, economic, and political contexts. Like every human phenomenon, the religious phenomenon is extremely complex. To grasp all its valences and all its meanings, it must be approached from several points of view.

It is regrettable that historians of religions have not yet sufficiently profited from the experience of their colleagues who are historians of literature or literary critics. The progress made in these disciplines would have enabled them to avoid unfortunate misunderstandings. It is agreed today that there is continuity and solidarity between the work of the literary historian, the literary sociologist, the critic, and the aesthetician. To give but one example: If the work of Balzac can hardly be understood without a knowledge of French nineteenth-century society and history (in the broadest meaning of the term—political, economic, social, cultural, and religious history), it is nonetheless true that the comédie humaine cannot be reduced to a historical document pure and simple. It is the work of an exceptional individual, and it is for this reason that the life and psychology of Balzac must be known. But the working-out of this gigantic ouvre requires to be studied in itself, as the artist's struggle with his raw material, as the creative spirit's victory over the immediate data of experience. A whole labor of exegesis remains to be performed after the historian of literature has finished his task, and here lies the role of the literary critic. It is he who deals with the work as an autonomous universe, with its own laws and structure. And at least in the case of poets, even the literary critic's work does not exhaust the subject, for it is the task of the specialist in stylics and the aesthetician to discover and explain the values of poetic universes. But can a literary work be said to be finally "explicated" when the aesthetcian has said his last word? There is always a secret message in the work of great writers, and it is on the plane of philosophy that it is most likely to be grasped.

We hope we may be forgiven for these few remarks on the hermeneutics of literary works. They are certainly incomplete; but they will, we believe, suffice to show that those who study literary works are thoroughly aware of their complexity and, with few exceptions, do not attempt to "explicate" them by reducing them to one or another origin — infantile trauma, glandular accident, economic, social or political situations, etc. It serves a purpose to have cited the unique situation of artistic creations. For, from a certain point of view, the aesthetic universe can be compared with the universe of religion. In both cases, we have to do at once with individual experience (aesthetic experiences of the poet and his reader, on the one hand; religious experience, on the other) and with transpersonal realities (a work of art in a museum, a poem, a symphony; a Divine Figure, a rite, a myth). Certainly it is possible to go on forever discussing what meaning one may incline to attribute to these artistic and religious realities. But one thing at least seems obvious: Works of art, like "religious data," have a mode of being that is peculiar to themselves; they exist on their own plane of reference, in their particular universe. The fact that this universe is not the physical universe of immediate experience does not imply their nonreality. This problem has been sufficiently discussed to permit us to dispense with reopening it here. We will add but one observation: A work of art reveals its meaning only insofar as it is regarded as an autonomous creation; that is, insofar as we accept its mode of being—that of an artistic creation—and do not reduce it to one of its constituent elements (in the case of a poem: sound, vocabulary, linguistic structure) or to one of its subsequent uses (a poem carrying a political message, or serving as a document for sociology or ethnography).

In the same way, it seems to us that a religious datum reveals its deeper meaning when it is considered on its plane of reference, and not when it is reduced to one of its secondary aspects or its contexts. To give but one example: Few religious phenomena are more directly and more obviously connected with sociopolitical circumstances than the modern messianic and millenarian movements among colonial peoples (cargo-cults). Yet identifying and analyzing the conditions that prepared and made possible such messianic movements form only a part of the...
The Role and Function of Church History

By Robert M. Grant

Idea cannot be separated from action

All history," writes Collingwood in The Idea of History, "is the history of thought." This is a clear statement of the idealist view of history, but as A. M. Maclver pointed out in his critique (in Flew's Logic and Language, Second Series), Collingwood's actual dealing with historical investigation keeps cropping out in his book; it prevents him from remaining strictly in the realm of the history of ideas. "History," he elsewhere says, "is the science of res gestae, the attempt to answer questions about human actions done in the past." In other words, there is more to it than thought. Something has to happen; something has to be done. The idea is important, but it cannot be separated from the action.

Collingwood had some difficulties with action because of his idealist stance. "So far as man's conduct is determined by what may be called his animal nature, his impulses and appetites, it is nonhistorical: the process of those activities is a natural process." Such a division in the understanding of human activities is nonhistorical; it seems nonbiblical; one might almost call it Manichaean.

History is not simply the history of thought; it is the history of thought primarily as expressed in action, and for the historian the deed is often more important and meaningful than the word or the thought—to some measure, simply because the deed was done. If the deed was not done, an explanation of it in relation to a historical process is both meaningless and unnecessary, though the belief that it was done obviously can be related to the history of ideas—or even to history in general.

The dangers of Collingwood's method in relation to the history of ideas can be illustrated by an example he himself provides.

Suetonius tells me that Nero at one time intended to evacuate Britain. I reject his statement, not because any better authority contradicts it, for of course none does; but because my reconstruction of Nero's policy based on Tacitus will not allow me to think that Suetonius is right.

So much the worse for Collingwood's reconstruction. A more adequate understanding of human nature (that of dictators in particular?) might suggest that policies are not always logically or fully maintained.

Collingwood attacks J. B. Bury's dealings with "Cleopatra's nose" (had it been longer or shorter, the policies of Julius Caesar would have been quite different) on the ground that Bury found individuality ultimately unintelligible. This is a good ground for attack, but it is hard to see how Collingwood himself does much better, except at the points where he gets off his idealist horse.

What I am arguing for is a recognition of the primacy of the res gestae. It is perfectly obvious that the historian and his predecessors select the

Robert McQueen Grant received his B.D. from Union Theological Seminary and his M.S.T. and Th.D. from Harvard. Ordained to the priesthood of the Protestant Episcopal Church in 1942, he taught at the University of the South from 1944 to 1953. He came to the Divinity School faculty in 1953 and is now Professor of New Testament. He is also serving as Chairman of the Church History Field. Latest books include Gnosticism and Early Christianity (Columbia University Press, 1959) and The Earliest Lives of Jesus (London:SPCK, 1961). Dr. Grant is the editor of Gnosticism — A Source Book of Heretical Writings from the Early Christian Period (New York: Harpers, 1961). The above is an abbreviated version of an address given before the Church History Club in May, 1962.
social and environmental factors. This concern deserves to be widened and deepened, though not at the expense of concern for the Christian community itself. The study of social and environmental factors is important if we are to understand how the gospel has been propagated and what risks were run under various circumstances. This study is also important if we are to avoid “canonizing” some particular period of the church’s life as if every pronouncement made by a Christian were a Christian pronouncement. And I should hope that a study of the personal or “accidental” factors would play its part as well. Is the life and thought of John Chrysostom adequately understood if we neglect the fact that some contemporaries thought that he looked like a spider? To neglect this aspect means taking at face value the remark of Fitzgerald’s Gatsby about a crucial episode in his life: “In any case it was just personal.”

To emphasize social-environmental and personal factors in church history means that, while the church historian has something to contribute to other fields of study in the Divinity School, he also has much to learn from them. From Bible he learns about the central concerns of the earliest Christians and their representation of the event of Christ; from Theology he learns how these concerns and this representation is comprehensible today. But his debt does not end with the more traditional fields. Church history involves learning from Ethics and Society, from Religion and Personality, from Religion and Art, and from the History of Religions. Neither the methods nor the results of these disciplines can be excluded from his attempt to understand the history of the Christian community.

Finally, it may of course be asked what the church is. No doubt a simple answer can be given this question in a purely denominational school—if there are any purely denominational schools. The church is my denomination. In this case the function of church history becomes chiefly apologetic. The church historian proves that his denomination is the church either by tracing the title back to or toward the beginning or by indicating the point at which everyone else went wrong. In our setting the answer must be somewhat more complex. If we are to say that the truly Christian church is the church of the New Testament, we must recognize that such New Testament churches as were addressed by the apostle Paul do not seem to have been free from aberrations, and that it is difficult to identify any church in our own day precisely with that (or those) of which the New Testament writers speak. There is continuity and discontinuity; there is similarity and difference; and it might be best to recognize that “all have sinned and have fallen short of the glory of God.” The positive function of church history in this regard is to try to indicate how and why the falling short has taken place but at the same time to point toward the opportunities for creative action which have been taken. Indirectly the existence and the use of these opportunities give ground to suppose that in our own day they continue to exist. If church history does not continue, there is no special reason for studying it in the Divinity School.

CATHOLIC, ECUMENIC, IRENIC?

The word “catholic” is another weasel word of uncertain meaning. Many times people speak of the necessity of incorporating both Protestant and Catholic elements in a united church. Eugene Carson Blake has proposed reunion in a Reformed and Catholic church. What is meant by “catholic”? Certainly the Protestant reformers considered themselves to be “catholic” Christians and members of the “catholic” church. Catholic, of course, means “universal,” but those who use the term frequently mean liturgical or sacramental or episcopal. Sometimes it is used to describe a church with a threefold order of the ministry; sometimes it is used for a church which claims an apostolic episcopate. The Roman church identifies the term with the Roman primacy and obedience. Would it not be less confusing to restrict the term to its generic meaning?

“Ecumenical” is another ambiguous term in current ecclesiastical jargon. Technically, the Baptist World Alliance is an ecumenical body whereas the National Council of Churches is not. To make our meaning clear would it not be much better to speak of cooperative Christianity and unitive Christianity when we are not referring to world-wide movements and concerns? There is also much to be said for using the old theological category of “irenic” for much of what is now included under “ecumenics.” It is puzzling why a good word should be surrendered in favor of a much less satisfactory descriptive term.

from an editorial by Winthrop S. Hudson in Foundations, Volume IV, April, 1961, No. 2. Published by the American Baptist Historical Society.
Man of the Year

Professor John T. McNeill was selected as “Man of the Year” by the Board of Trustees of The Baptist Theological Union. He received this award on October 18, 1961 at the annual dinner given by the Board to Divinity School Faculty. The Citation read as follows:

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John T. McNeill

Internationally renowned scholar, mentor of several generations of scholars and clergy; himself a devoted churchman and clergyman who always upheld the highest academic standards in behalf of university and church;

Born on Prince Edward Island, Canada; he earned at McGill University the A.B. in 1909, and the M.A. in 1910; in 1912 he received the B.D. from Westminster Hall, Vancouver; and in 1913, he was ordained in the Presbyterian Church, Canada;

He pursued graduate work at New College, Edinburgh; and he studied the summer of 1913 at Halle University; it was at the Divinity School of The University of Chicago where he engaged in a full program of graduate study and through it received his Ph.D. in 1920;

John T. McNeill has had a most impressive teaching career; he started as lecturer in church history, Westminster Hall, 1914-20; served one year as instructor of church history, The University of Chicago, 1919; became assistant professor of history, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, 1920; and in 1922, he was appointed professor of church history, Knox College, Toronto; in 1927, he accepted the appointment that he was to hold longest in his distinguished career; he became professor of European Christianity in the Divinity School of The University of Chicago and held that post for seventeen years, until 1944 when he was appointed Auburn Professor of Church History, Union Theological Seminary, New York; he retired from that chair in 1953; since that time he has continued to teach each year as a visiting professor in various theological schools;

One of the truly great church historians of the past quarter century, he has published over one hundred articles, monographs, and books, and well over two hundred book reviews; it is not primarily the quantity of his scholarly output that will be remembered but the quality and breadth of his scholarship; among the ten major books he has written, he has handled problems from the early medieval period through the Reformation, English Puritanism, evangelicalism, and modern movements in the church;

Interested for many years in the ecumenical movement, he made pioneer contributions to the historical understanding of this movement;

Deeply interested in the pastoral ministry of the church, he was among the first of the modern historians to explore the “cure of souls” in Protestantism;

Many years of research culminated in the publication of The History and Character of Calvinism, 1954, and in his editing the new authoritative English edition of Calvin’s Institutes (2 volumes), 1960; he is considered by many to be the foremost historian of Calvinism in the English-speaking world;

Among his many editorial tasks, he will long be remembered as one of the three editors of the Christian Classics Series, in which twenty of the projected twenty-six volumes have already appeared; his works have been translated into German, French, Spanish and Chinese;

Gentleman and scholar are terms most appropriate to this churchman; always kindly and considerate, setting an example in genuine humility and disciplined perseverance, he gave freely of his time and vast store of knowledge and wisdom to students and colleagues; from his seminars have emerged many of the present younger church historians now holding posts in the major theological institutions in America; through his leadership and guidance in conjunction with a handful of colleagues, the American Society of Church History was reinvigorated;

His honors have been many; he shared the Adams prize for history, 1923; and among his various honorary doctorates is one from Edinburgh University, 1960;

It is fitting that John T. McNeill has been selected by the Trustees of The Baptist Theological Union to represent the alumni of the Divinity School of The University of Chicago at the Annual Dinner to the Faculty of the Divinity School, Wednesday, October 18, 1961.
age along lines pursued by men such as Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain. Mr. Ogden proposed that this is strictly impossible, and that a restatement of Christian faith in terms of the thought of Charles Hartshorne and Martin Heidegger is required.

Despite this categorical disagreement, the considerable area of agreement between Mr. Ogden and Mr. Fairweather should be noted because it provided the matrix of contact making possible an encounter. Both interpreted the theological task constructively; that is, they rejected the possibility of a purely biblical theology without any effort to specify the content or meaning of the term "God." More specifically, they agreed upon the methodological premise that it is possible in principle to correlate the categories of metaphysics with the biblical witness to the nature of God. One way of saying this is to say that the question of the meaning of the term "God" is prior to the question of his existence. Mr. Ogden pointed this out in response to William Crockett, who had suggested Mr. Ogden presupposed the fact of God's existence when he stated that theological statements are existential. This is not incorrect, but those theological statements which validly make truth-claims (i.e., which are both existential and necessary) require delicate and precise forms of expression, (as anyone familiar with the writings of Charles Hartshorne knows). Certainly one aspect of the problem of theology is the question whether the precision required can be achieved. For Mr. Ogden, undoubtedly more so than for Mr. Fairweather, this is the heart of the theological task. Both agreed also that the use of analogical reasoning is central in theology, and this received considerable attention during the conference.

In view of this large area of agreement, the issue dividing Mr. Fairweather and Mr. Ogden can be defined more precisely. Primarily, it was a matter of the adequacy of each metaphysical formulation in specifying the meaning of the biblical God and in interpreting the meaning of this God's action in history. Secondly, the issue was that of the choice of resources available to theology in its endeavor to specify the meaning of "God" adequately.

Taking the secondary issue first, it was here that the differences of personality, historical background, and of interests displayed an influence upon their views. Trained at the University of Chicago and avidly interested in the work of Heidegger and Bultmann, Mr. Ogden expressed his views with such vigor and pursued rational clarity with such zeal that Mr. Meland was constrained to suggest that his rigorous use of analogy ran the risk of importing mystery into the realm of the familiar, and to ask how the concern for the depth of mystery in existence can keep analogy under judgment. Mr. Ogden was preoccupied with finding a solution to the problem of faith as it is described by Bultmann, and he was careful to make exactly clear what Bultmann has attempted to do through his program of demythologization. (The reader is referred to Mr. Ogden's recent book, Christ Without Myth, Harpers, 1961.) Anglo-Catholic in sympathy and a student of Patristics, Mr. Fairweather, on the other hand, was less agitated by the Existentialist diagnosis of the malaise of the modern spirit; and he found the resources in the historic formulations of the Church a viable possibility for faith when appropriately reinterpreted. (The reader is referred to Mr. Fairweather's articles in The Canadian Journal of Theology.) This prompted Herman Cole (M.A. in Religion & Art) to suggest that the so-called crisis of belief today is not a problem for him, whereupon Mr. Fairweather suggested that some modern men need a "metaphysical conversion" by which he meant they need to get over believing what the Existentialists have been telling them about a universal metaphysical breakdown. Here was clearly an issue not only regarding the appropriate source of an adequate theological metaphysics, but also regarding the correct diagnosis of the "religious situation" in contemporary culture.

The primary issue between them was that between the "objective transcendence" of Mr. Fairweather's neo-Thomism and the existential immanence of Mr. Ogden's dipolar theism. The fundamental theistic category of Mr. Fairweather was that of invisible power, which he specified in terms of the "classical ontology" as it is embodied in Thomism. He averred that it is possible to conceive: (1) of God as a transcendent First Cause related in creation, preservation, and redemption to the world order of secondary causes, (2) of God as effecting his purpose within the world order, and (3) of God as accomplishing his redemptive purpose through the "fleshiness" of human
Left to right, Schubert Ogden, Jakob Petuchowski, Edward Carnell, Markus Barth, Karl Barth, Jaroslav Pelikan, William Stringfell
Left to right, Markus Barth, Karl Barth, Jaroslav Pelikan
Charles Roy Stinnette, former Professor of Pastoral Theology at Union Theological Seminary, New York City, has joined the faculty of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, effective July 1, 1962. The Rev. Dr. Stinnette is appointed as Professor of Pastoral Theology, the study of theology in relation to the psychological disciplines. At Union Theological Seminary he was Associate Director of the Program in Religion and Psychiatry. He has the first certificate in applied psychiatry for the ministry granted by the William Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry, New York City.

Dr. Stinnette received a B.S. from North Carolina State College of Agriculture and Engineering in 1937. Thereafter he entered Union Theological Seminary, which granted him a B.D. in 1940. He attended Hartford Theological Seminary where he received a S.T.M. in 1943, and Columbia University, where he received a Ph.D. in 1950. He was ordained a deacon in 1940 and a priest in 1941, in the Episcopal Church. As a chaplain in the U.S. Army from 1943-46, he attained the rank of major and won the Bronze Star.

Dr. Stinnette was Professor of Religion and Chaplain at the University of Rochester from 1948 to 1950; rector of the Episcopal Church of the Ascension, Rochester, from 1950 to 1952; and Associate Warden of the College of Preachers, Washington Cathedral, Washington, D.C., from 1952 to 1956. He also was installed as a Canon of the Washington Cathedral. He served as Associate Professor of Pastoral Theology at Union Theological Seminary from 1956-59 and became a full Professor in 1959. The Rev. Dr. Stinnette and his wife, Nancy, are the parents of a son and a daughter.

His publications include Anxiety and Faith (Seabury Press, 1955); Faith, Freedom, and Selfhood (Seabury, 1959); and Grace and the Searching of Our Heart (Association Press, 1962).
The Problem of Ambiguous Terms

One of the major problems of profitable conversation — ecumenical or otherwise — is an adequate definition of terms. Many resemble the confusion of tongues because ambiguous terms are used which have been given no precise meaning. Thus the speaker, even when his thought is crystal clear in his own mind, is apt to mean one thing by a word he employs while the word connotes something quite different to the hearer. A degree of such confusion and misunderstanding is inherent in all language, but it is heightened by a careless use of words to convey a wide variety of different meanings.

from an editorial by Winthrop S. Hudson in Foundations, Volume IV, April, 1961, No. 2. Published by the American Baptist Historical Society.
P. Bowne, following the lead of the German philosopher Hermann Lotze, had established Personalism at Boston University. These four centers constituted the vanguard of liberal theology in America at the turn of the century. To be sure, liberal tendencies were in evidence in many of the seminaries: Egbert Smyth at Andover, L. F. Stearns at Bangor, A. V. G. Allen at the Episcopal School in Cambridge, Fenn and Peabody at Harvard, Harper at Yale before coming to Chicago, and of course Rauschenbusch was to be heard from shortly at Rochester Theological Seminary. The Divinity School at Chicago represented a more radical experiment in pursuing and communicating the critical scholarship in Protestant theology than was reflected in these American forms of liberalism. There were Ritschilians on its faculty, notably George Burman Foster. In his earlier years, Gerald Birney Smith had also been Ritschlian in his sympathies. The Chicago faculty as a whole, however, preferred to be known as modernists, meaning by this, no doubt, that its empirical method appealed to a broader scope of contemporary experience than the religious experience centering in a response to the historical Jesus. Late in the nineteenth century an Hegelian renaissance in America had stimulated interest in Idealism and was having increasing influence in colleges and universities from New England and the Middle West to the Far West, notably at the University of California in Berkeley. This development, however, was to have little effect upon theologians at Chicago, except as a movement to resist and against which to define themselves. A new philosophy by the name of Pragmatism was on the make late in the nineteenth century. And with John Dewey and George Herbert Mead in philosophy at Chicago, it is not surprising that it was to become formative in the Chicago School of theology as well. New sciences were emerging. Biology had become more confident and aggressive in its use of scientific method following Darwin's *On the Origin of the Species* (1859), and by the end of the century had begun to exert considerable influence upon all areas of thought including theology. Psychology was well under way to becoming a recognized branch of study in the universities before 1890. And by the turn of the century the newest science of all, Sociology, was being talked about. Historical science had made rapid strides in German scholarship and was being conveyed to theological study through Harnack, and later Troeltsch. Following upon E. B. Tylor's innovating work, *The Origins of Culture*, in 1871, literature in anthropology developed rapidly, and became widely influential as a base for other disciplines. All of these sciences were to become basic sources of study in the theological curriculum that was being created at Chicago.

Biblical Criticism had reached American theological scholarship rather late in the nineteenth century. Bushnell, for example, appears to have had no acquaintance with it. And William Newton Clarke as late as the eighteen seventies, speaks only slightly of its influence upon him. By the eighteen nineties, however, it had attained considerable vigor as a discipline in several American schools, though much of the vigor at the time was in the nature of enthusiasm for biblical inquiry rather than solid achievement. From the outset at Chicago the new biblical study formed the spearhead of theological study, as the founding of *The Biblical World* in 1893 gives evidence. This field of study had its serious, scholarly side in the Divinity School, but under William Rainey Harper and Edwin DeWitt Burton, and later under J. M. P. Smith and Edgar Goodspeed, the study of the Bible took on the romance of a popular movement among people of the churches in the Midwest, not unlike the Great Books movement of the thirties. Thus the spirit of the Divinity School from its beginning was that of a frontier movement, not only in the sense of being a participant in creating the new sciences, but of bringing the results of the new scientific and religious learning on many fronts to a region which hitherto had remained relatively untouched by the new currents of thought. In this sense, the Divinity School, like the University of Chicago itself, has been conscious of itself as a center of learning on the frontier. And it is from this understanding of itself that it has drawn much of its zest and directive. The Divinity School has been short on a sense of tradition. Not that it has lacked historical mindedness; the historical consciousness, coming as it did on the wave of the new scientific studies, loomed large in the thinking of the Chicago School. But historical understanding in the context of scholarly inquiry does not always generate a sense of tradition. It may, in fact, be a means of dissipating it, or of holding it critically at bay.

One may say that the stimulus of scholarship at the University of Chicago has usually been simultaneously uprooting and creative. It was said, for example of the poet, William Vaughn Moody, who came to Chicago from Harvard to join the faculty of the Humanities in 1895, that "the result of Moody's emigration to Chicago is to be seen in his own poetry. Hitherto his inspiration had been literary and the result largely imitative. Now for the first time he drew on his own experience
their scholarly and educational task. Objectivity, as this has been commonly understood where a strict application of scientific method is adhered to, has in part given way to a sense of involvement in the issues under consideration. As the late Robert Redfield once put it, speaking of changes that have come about in the method of the social scientist, in contrast to that of the physical scientist, "my very closeness, my very involvement with my particular subject matter, puts me in a different position with regard to policy, action, and the pursuit of the good life than that occupied by the physicist" ("Social Scientist: Man Between," Chicago Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 Special Issue, 1954).

The complexity of theological inquiry arising out of a more holistic emphasis lays upon the theological scholar a dual commitment, requiring him to assume a more complex critical stance than was demanded by the earlier orientation. For in this context, while he is responsive to, and to a degree governed by the community of scholarship arising out of associated disciplines within the university, the theological scholar cannot simply conform to the sciences, or to philosophical notions, or accommodate theological study to them, as appeared to be possible under an earlier understanding of the theologian's vocation. As a critical theologian, responsive to the complexity of his vocation, he must confront the findings of other disciplines with a judiciousness appropriate to a theological judgment, even as he takes their contribution to knowledge seriously in dealing with his own problems.

Before going further into specific characteristics of theological inquiry and study in the Divinity School, it may be well to note the distinctive methodological emphases which have prevailed at various times during its history. For more than a quarter century following the year 1900, the sociohistorical method of the Chicago School, which had developed under Shailer Mathews and Shirley Jackson Case, dominated theological study at the Divinity School. This method presupposed that the realities of Christian faith could best be conveyed to one through the social experience of any people. We cannot penetrate the mystery of God's reality, even the religious experience in which His presence is made known to us, Mathews would claim. Nor can we settle the intricate metaphysical problems which man's encounter with this reality has raised through the ages. Yet, like people of all times, he would say, we can set up personal relations with this reality and receive the beneficence and disciplining of these relationships. Religion is a problem of social adjustment, Mathews argued. It occurs as a social phenomenon. And anyone who would understand its meaning must attend to it as a social movement within the historical period in which it occurred. Hence history, social psychology, and sociology were seen to be the indispensable intellectual tools for exploring the realities being pointed up in theological doctrine.

Mathews was skeptical about all ventures into philosophical inquiry that veered away from this empirical line of social adjustment. And he viewed with suspicion as well as with distaste all solitary vigils that turned the individual in upon himself; for this kind of trailing off into the inner wilderness of subjective feeling, he believed, could lead to the most baffling and fruitless experience of all. Hence he viewed mysticism as a pathology; and the mystic as a misled and muddleheaded man. Even worship, in his judgment, needed to be kept focused upon the historical and contemporary event of social adjustment to the prophetic demands and promises of God, if Christians were to escape being lured away from the social center of reality. All modernists within this sociohistorical school, in my experience, shared something of this distrust of introspection and reflection dissociated from social thinking and activity.

Christian doctrines in this context were to be understood sociologically as expressing the felt needs of a social group in a particular historical situation as they responded to the witness of faith which the historical Jesus had elicited. Anyone acquainted with the habits of thought of this era will see in this method the interweaving of several intellectual disciplines, as I have already indicated, including anthropology, social psychology, sociology, along with historical exegesis; and underlying them all was the functional method derived from the Darwinian theory of evolution. Here one sees the theologian forthrightly and unashamedly appropriating the method of the sciences, and thereby becoming a scientist of religion.

By 1927, with the coming of Henry Nelson Wieman to the Divinity School faculty, the winds of doctrine were changing, not only at Chicago, but in most of the major seminaries of the country. Reinhold Niebuhr was to go to Union Theological Seminary in 1928; H. Richard Niebuhr to Yale in 1931, and by 1933 Paul Tillich was to come to this country, settling at first temporarily, and then permanently at Union. Wieman's role on the theological scene was ambiguous from the outset. First of all, he was not a theologian in the usual sense of the term, nor even in the sociohistorical
history itself in its own poignant ways presented to us.

In retrospect, speaking now solely of our own theological work in this school, it is clear that this sharpening of the theological focus was long overdue if we were to justify our being considered a theological school rather than a school of religious studies. And it has been voiced by many that this one achievement attests to the stature of that period of our history and of the men who guided it.

The decision to move in this direction, however, had certain dubious consequences. For one thing, it drew a sharper line of demarcation between technical and constructive studies than had previously been the case in Divinity School practice; and possibly had the effect temporarily of dissociating theological interpretation from the guidance of such technical, historical disciplines. It is my impression that we have recovered from this imbalance somewhat, and, in the interim, have come to a better understanding of the relation between these two aspects of critical theological inquiry. It should be observed that the issue involved here is not one peculiar to our situation, but an issue that arose quite generally during the forties in many areas of higher education where technical inquiry was being reevaluated along with a searching inquiry into the ends of education and of scholarly effort. Concern with purposiveness, and a greater coordination of effort in relation to a unifying purpose came to mark many areas of scholarship and learning. We should view our efforts in this direction during the forties as being a participation in this wider act of reevaluation in higher education, and not as simply an esoteric crusade to make philosophical theologians of us all, as was often claimed.

It may be claimed, too, that in pressing so emphatically for a theological focus in all theological disciplines the procedure became inhospitable to particular gifts and capacities in the faculty, representative of other approaches to religious meaning and to the effort of faith seeking understanding. In so doing our work may have lost in depth and variety, in subtlety and nuance, what it gained in purposiveness. It was often argued, too, that as the constructive emphasis took precedence over everything else in our various fields of study, a loss in historical proportion followed to the detriment of constructive theological thinking itself.

Noting these imbalances, however, should not obscure the solid achievements in theological education which were attained during this period of our history. If it is claimed that these achievements were made at the expense of creative theological scholarship, one should recognize that, to the degree that this casualty was incurred, it must be ascribed, not to the theory of theological education being advanced, but to institutional problems and circumstances within the Federation that made the discussion and execution of such education all-absorbing to the point of crowding out every other significant activity. This was the tragedy of those years of Federation. Despite its harassments, however, this period yielded unexpected results of a positive nature for which we can only be grateful.

So much, then, for a general review of methodological distinctions in our theological history.

Despite this difference in orientation of stance between earlier and contemporary periods of divinity education in the University of Chicago, there are significant affinities in the way theological education itself is envisaged. The overall affinity is expressed in what is currently and what has been traditionally regarded at Chicago as dimensions of study essential to adequate theological learning. The organization of theological learning at Chicago has been triadic, though not in the traditional pattern of Bible, Church History, and Theology. The three dimensions that have been rather persistent through the years have been designated the Biblical Area, the Historical Area, and the Contemporary Area. A perusal of Divinity School catalogues over the past forty years or more will reveal a rather consistent adherence to this division of theological disciplines. The Biblical Area has covered an extensive body of scholarship ranging from pre-Israelic studies to interpretations of the first three centuries A.D. And it has included a variety of technical disciplines such as Languages, Archaeology, Textual Criticism, Exegesis and Biblical Theology. The Historical Area can roughly be described as a study of religious movements and institutional developments within Christendom from early Christian times to the present, including the history of missions. From the earliest years of the Divinity School the History of Christian Thought has had a working relationship with the Historical Area, but its main business has been transacted in the Theological Field. This has meant, too, that the Theological Field has been something of a hybrid in this arrangement, having one source of its stimulus in the Historical Area and another in the Contemporary Area. The Socio-historical method accentuated, if it did not originate, this situation; but the arrangement is hardly attributable to any one method. The History of Religions, which, one
where a sense of the Church's vocation within society as a witnessing community has become sharpened, there is arising, possibly for the first time among some Protestant groups, a specialized conception of the Christian task. The lay emphasis, I argued, wherever it occurs, in whatever area of life, represents an unspecialized concern, and may very well harbor resentment toward those who concern themselves with minute distinctions in ideas, issues, or policies, distinctions which only a specialized interest in problems would cause one to make. Conversely, problems of general interest which might seem of the utmost importance to a lay mind, undisturbed by more intricate questions remote from the general interest, might leave the restrictive, specialized mind unimpressed. This conversation led me to recall some remarks by Rudolf Otto in speaking of the Enlightenment period. A characteristic of the 'Aufklärung,' said Otto, is that religion must have its own sources and a separate life of its own, not dependent on ingenious scholasticism, on reasoning and logic, on speculation, on learned research, on academic controversy and apologetics, on theological schools, on the grace of philosophers, on toilsome proofs. It has its root in the general emergence of 'Lay-Christianity' at the close of the Middle Ages, which carried the Reformation along with it, was continued in the Independents' Movement in England, and thence progressed towards Deism and 'Aufklärung.'" (Philosophy of Religion, p. 15.) These remarks moved me to say that one way to understand Liberal and Modernist theology is to view them as being expressive of this lay Christianity. But this lay emphasis, as Otto also points out, precedes historical liberalism in the Separatist and free groups of Puritan Protestantism who were in direct conflict with a more specialized effort in Christian doctrine and liturgy. Jerald Brauer, reflecting upon these remarks, observed that the dominant movement in Protestantism, especially from the nineteenth century onward, would support such an interpretation. And this, in turn, led us to look at the interplay between what I would call the "specialized mind" in theology and ecclesiology and the lay concern, looking more insistently to larger, but more general issues of theology and culture.

Now lest we get involved needlessly in a hassle over the pejorative implications of "the specialized mind in theology" and the lay emphasis, let me hasten to say that these implications cut both ways. My intention is not to intrude them if they can possibly be avoided. I use the term "specialized" in this context to refer to what church historians have referred to as the "high" tradition in order to center on what is defining in their methodology. The specialized mind takes seriously within a highly restrictive context the distinctive concerns that arise in relation to especially designated functions and objects, which are thereby brought sharply into focus. Classical orthodoxy, following the era in which church institutions took form, developed a specialized way of thinking about doctrine and church practice which assumed more and more definitiveness as inquiry and experience in ecclesiology progressed. The Reformation was one instance of explosive reaction against this specialized mind in Christianity, though piet group and mystics had kept alive a restive ferment for many years preceding this explosion. Subsequent to the Reformation, Protestantism has embraced both tendencies, but more often has suffered a split in its community as a result of preferences and divergent efforts in one direction or the other.

To move swiftly to our own theological history, it is clear that the Divinity School stands squarely in the lay tradition of Protestant Christianity and has made a cause, both of extending this emphasis in the direction of a theology of culture, and of combating any tendency to recede toward a specialized ecclesiology.

What marks our recent history, especially the years of Federation history, is the bold adventure into coordinating these two historic emphases in theological education. This came about, I am inclined to believe, quite unwittingly, as a result of elevating the distinctly theological dimension of study and making it controlling in all areas of inquiry. So long as the more neutral term "religion" occupied the foreground in Divinity education, as it did throughout the twenties and thirties, the laity was bound to be accentuated. But in bringing to divinity education a more specific and self-conscious theological focus, we moved toward a more normative stance in our inquiry, and thus toward a more specialized mode of inquiry regarding our understanding of the Church, its doctrine, and its current task. The very nature of this change in focus in our thinking opened the way to a more appreciative understanding of the claims of the specialized mind in ecclesiology; in short to a curbing of the lay bias which had historically characterized the Divinity School.

It would be a mistake to interpret this development in our recent efforts as a relapse into orthodoxy, or a movement toward neoorthodoxy, though undoubtedly many of our alumni view it as such. It is rather a summoning of the lay mind in Christianity to take account of the dissipation of focus in theological education as well as in church
earlier decisions and labors put into our path. Yet I am aware that to jog us loose from these unhappy moorings and to move toward a more creative policy of common inquiry, something radically different from what is now occurring must happen. And I am aware, too, that the future of the Divinity School turns precariously upon decisions and dedications we now make, or refuse to make.

As one step in this direction I should like to urge that we seriously consider the opportunity to which I have pointed in this paper, coordinating the two strands of Protestant history which have now become explicit and self-conscious in our faculty. Conceivably we would be strengthened in our efforts to take hold of the opportunity which is offered to us in our present associations as a faculty if we were to address ourselves more consciously to the Protestant history out of which we have come, both by way of verifying the analysis which I have ventured to give in this paper, and, more significantly, by way of envisaging the Protestant era that is imminent, possibly immediately upon us. If the Protestant era in America dominated by the lay character of the Enlightenment and the Separatist Movements, and subsequent expressions of Liberalism, is at an end, possibly a new Protestant era is ready to be implemented in the vision of theological education which awaits our commitment. This I do not see as a harnessing of incompatible steeds, but as a serious interchange of critical opinion bearing upon these divergent emphases in Protestantism, by which our historic concern with the theology of culture might be both judged and justified, and by which our new awareness of the critical role of a church tradition can be seriously examined and assessed.

Letting the course of least resistance prevail has had the effect of aligning us on the side of biases ready at hand. More than being simply ourselves in this lethargic manner, we need to summon ourselves to encounter the commitments and witnesses of one another, insofar as we confront one another with the challenge of alternatives, in the hope that such an interchange and mutual response to one another’s vested interests may yield the creative occasion in our work which we so desperately need, and in our hearts yearn to attain.

To that end, I urge (1) that we look upon this coordination of historic opposites in our efforts, not as a betrayal of the Divinity School’s earlier lay heritage, but as a historic healing within this theological community of a cleavage we inherited by reason of being set in a Separatist and Liberal tradition.

(2) That we see this coordination, not in terms of right and left parties to the historic cleavage in Protestantism or in Christendom, but in terms of a community of inquiry transcending both aspects of the cleavage. In short, that we identify ourselves with the new emergent that is implicit in our efforts and bend every effort to make it more and more explicit as a controlling idea and directive in our theological study.

(3) That we take our several inherited stances both as a resource and as a limitation which each of us must bear and which we must ask others among us to bear with as we work toward a mutual understanding and acceptance of what each in his dedication and vocation can bring, and wishes to bring, to our common effort.

(4) That we work toward greater freedom in confronting one another in terms of our disparities, recognizing in them, as I have said, both a resource and a possible impairment to our effort, yet a constituent element of the new life and vocation to which our efforts in common are hopefully dedicated.

(5) That, as far as possible, we let the vision of our common effort direct and influence our discussions of critical issues in policy or program, even as we lay bare the genuine concerns that each one has; rather than assume that we have only partisan interests which each in his own way must safeguard and affirm. In short, I am pleading for an open acceptance of an organic procedure in which to seek out one another’s concern in the very process of bearing witness to one’s own.

Now I fear that my remarks may only elicit a defensive reaction. I would hope that this might not be the case. For I do not speak in the role of a scold, or in the mood of a holier than thou. I can only speak as a fellow confessor, troubled by circumstances into which earnest efforts have brought us, and determined, God helping us, that we shall not persist in them.

I speak also as one for whom time is of the essence. Yet the measure of my days in this place by no means gives the measure of my concern for the work of this school, or for each of you, and for all of us together as a theological community. For in ways I find difficult to explain, I find that, to myself, I am the Divinity School. Its history is the history of my own theological pilgrimage; hence the Divinity School is very much in me. This will probably continue to be so through the years.

Thus, insofar as one member can speak out of a community’s heart, I venture to speak these words from the inner core of our existence, praying that the judgment of God’s grace will reach us and help us to find a way through these complexities.
Tokyo is a bustling metropolis where even the Kamikaze taxis have to slow down on account of the impossible traffic. In front of our hotel, situated very close to the Diet building, we often were spectators of the miles and miles of miners, farmers, shopkeepers, teachers, students and what have you, singing, shouting, and snake dancing in their "Demo" (short for "demonstration").

It is all too easy to characterize Japan simply as a queer mixture of the old and new, the East and the West. Yet, it is exceedingly difficult to feel and grasp the inner spirit of Japan today. Who is instrumental in determining its destiny? Old time politicians sitting in the Diet? Successful businessmen entertained in the "Geisha quarters"? Pleasure-loving youths in the night clubs? The faithful old who frequent shrines and temples? Or, perhaps Zengakuren students who demonstrate in the street? One is almost tempted to imagine a sinister, faceless power in this drama, call it the revolutionary spirit if you will, dancing the puppets from behind the screen, seeking a new cohesion, a novel pattern of society and culture that is yet to come!

As we proceeded from Japan to Southeast Asia, our sense of confusion and uncertainty multiplied. Previously, we had spent time in this part of the world; then we were enchanted by Angkor Vat and the temples and canals in Bangkok, but we had also sensed an undercurrent of political and social unrest, especially in South Vietnam. This time, we spent a week in Phnom Penh, capital of Cambodia, attending the Sixth Conference of the World Fellowship of Buddhists (WFB) in November, followed by a brief trip to Thailand, Singapore, and the Federation of Malaya. The Conference of the WFB was marked by a new sense of self assurance among Buddhists in today's world. Speaker after speaker, venerable patriarchs, learned scholars, pious old ladies and chic maidens, representing every continent, all spoke with passion their conviction that only the path of the Buddha would bring the peace and order which the world so desperately needs. Prince Sihanouk who followed the unusual course of abdicating the throne in order to become the "Prince, Head of the State," harangued the conference for over an hour, denouncing the warmongers, and advocating Buddhistic socialistic principles and political neutralism. Yet, the conference of the WFB, like its Christian counterpart in New Delhi, inevitably reflected the tensions of the cold war, which incidentally is not so cold in Southeast Asia. Indeed, delegates from Thailand and Taiwan were not invited by the Cambodian government for political reasons, and the conference itself was sharply split over such issues as nuclear war and the membership of the Taiwan regional center in the WFB.

The conference of the WFB provided ample opportunity for us to meet delegates from various countries. (We also had an occasion to drive around the countryside and to enjoy an exquisite performance of the Cambodian opera.) Our talk with a high government official from Laos helped us to see some of the hidden factors operating in the later trouble of that small principality, although at that time the whole thing already sounded like a wild nightmare. By sheer coincidence, we were placed in the same hotel where Buddhist delegates from Mainland China, Inner Mongolia, and North Vietnam were staying. On the whole, the impressions gained while in Cambodia were not clearly drawn. Some of our feelings about Southeast Asia were confirmed, while others were corrected by our later visits to Bangkok, Singapore, and Kuala Lumpur. Broadly speaking, we sensed different kinds and degrees of forces and events in a movement of coalescence and counteraction. Some may be worth noting, even though it may be impossible to see an overall pattern.

Firstly, Southeast Asia is a convenient term referring to a geographical region, but it does not imply the existence of a regional culture or political unit. In fact, in Southeast Asia there are diverse ethnic and cultural groups with historic hostilities toward each other. Inevitably, they draw different meanings from the same events because of the differences of their histories. Buddhism, it is true, is a dominant religious and cultural force, shared by many Southeast Asians, but it does not seem to be sufficient to unite, say, Cambodians and Thais, or Laotians and South Vietnamese. All these nations, regardless of their size are understandably very proud, touchy, and ethnocentric. Many of them lack the essentials for nationhood, not so much in economic resources but in political experience and the symbols of a common loyalty, except perhaps in recent anticolonial struggles. Economically, many of these nations are dominated, to a greater or lesser degree, by Chinese immigrants who maintain their identity as Overseas Chinese.

Secondly, Southeast Asians are awed by, and also envious of, Communist China, although they know little about the USSR or communism as such. Actually, the Communist Party does not seem to be strong or successful, and communism as an ideology does not attract the intelligentsia as it did until a decade ago. Nevertheless, an amorphous
which alone is the Taiwan regime's raison d'être, has been supported by the U.S. which provides Taiwan with a considerable amount of economic and military aid and protects her by means of the Seventh Fleet. In America, a group of influential citizens, known as "The Committee of One Million," has been active since 1953 in supporting the claims of Taiwan against the admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

The reality, however, is far more complex than what it appears to be. Taiwan did not become Chinese territory until the seventeenth century when Koxinga defeated the Dutch who were then in power. Prior to the arrival of the Dutch, and also the Spaniards, Taiwan had been inhabited by native tribes of Indonesian origin. During the Manchu rule of China, from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, Chinese immigrants settled in Taiwan; however Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 and remained under Japanese administration until the end of World War II. Taiwan became a province of China in 1945, and soon the Nationalist government with about two million refugees moved there after the communist victory on the Mainland. Even today, we can observe three distinctive cultural layers in Taiwan—the old Taiwanese culture, the culture shaped by the fifty years administration of the island by Japan, and the postwar Nationalist Chinese culture. Understandably, the all powerful KMT (Kuomintang) dominates political life, even though minor non-KMT parties are allowed to exist. The elite of Taiwanese society are almost exclusively those who came from the Mainland after the war, and they are well-educated, socially gracious, and personable people. There is considerable resentment on the part of the Taiwanese against the newcomers, but most Taiwanese lack the political experience to maneuver themselves in the game of upward social mobility. Inevitably, most foreign visitors come in contact only with the mainlanders who, according to the Taiwanese, have not mentally "unpacked their baggage" as yet.

Visitors to Taiwan are impressed by the achievements of the Nationalist government. It looks as though some of the progressive measures of the KMT, such as the Land Reform program, which had not been put into effect on the Mainland, have been accomplished on this small island. Economic improvement was no doubt advanced greatly by American aid amounting to $650,000,000 between 1951-58 alone, plus military aid which was probably about the same amount, if not more. The regime is also serious about the political indoctrination of the citizens, and does not tolerate any deviation, however minor, from anticommunist policy. The Nationalist government is most sensitive to international news; any hint of the "Two China" policy on the part of any government in the world is subject to bitter criticism by the press. Unfortunately, this type of doctrinaire anticommunism tends to confuse, in the words of the late Dr. Hu Shih, "genuine patriotism with irrational nationalism." From their point of view, however, the government leaders have all the reasons they need. They tell you that the whole of Taiwan—and not only Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu—is an anti-communist fortress whose troops are ready to cross the Taiwan strait, only 100 miles wide. According to their view, the Peking regime is at the point of collapse, and a wholesale revolt of the masses may take place soon. "We are ready anytime," they say with utmost confidence.

When you go to Hong Kong, however, the picture looks quite different. (Hong Kong, incidentally, is no longer the shoppers' paradise it once was, due to the fact that prices have gone up although instant tailoring still attracts many tourists.) Those who have been influenced by the cloak and dagger TV version of "Hong Kong" will be somewhat disappointed to discover that the Hong Kong government is very efficient in preventing subversive activities. But one can buy books and other publications from Mainland China there, and in the colony there are communist sympathizers, Taiwanese sympathizers, and persons of all shades of undefined commitment in between. We were surprised to discover that not all the "communist shops" are operated by communists; some of them sell excellent Christmas cards, and a friend of our gets a "clergy discount" in one of them. At any rate, Hong Kong is a good place to "feel the pulse" of world events. One can drive to the border and look across the barbed wire to catch a glimpse of life in the forbidden land. Refugees, estimated to be about 250 per day, during our stay there, bring information and rumors of all kinds. One wonders how the residents of Hong Kong can remain so calm and go about their daily business without excessive anxiety or fear.

The picture of the Mainland that one gets, piecing together many persons' accounts, some reliable and others not so reliable, is a confused one. They tell you of the serious rift between Peking and Moscow, and they can document the blunders of the Peking regime in internal affairs. The shortage of food is common knowledge, and even the cadres have been known to escape to Macao and Hong Kong. Yet, very few are willing