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Editor: Nancy E. Auer
Assistant Editor: Alan Miller

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The Divinity School

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ethics—toward an implementation and integration of the subject of theology in the life of the congregation. While such a radical distinction between the responsive and the reflexive functions of theology may not be fully justified, the discussion does focus attention upon the role of theology in relation to the pastoral ministry: it is an activity in which the church's own self-understanding is a function of its mission, its work. The pastoral ministry, then, becomes a particular manifestation of that theological work.

Our emphasis here is upon the integrity of the relation between theology and the pastoral ministry. Kierkegaard, it will be recalled, insisted that "the thinking person is an existing individual." Man is a rational animal—but his thinking is never unaffected by the existential facts of his living. Consequently we are reminding ourselves that theological reflection is an integral act of the pastoral ministry. It is precisely in those broken situations of life, particularly in illness and in stress, that the pastoral ministry is called upon both to be and to articulate a vision of life's wholeness beyond its tragic, fragmentary character. Such a task requires self-understanding on the part of the pastor—a self-understanding rooted in the critical self-understanding of the church and in a matured capacity for accepting one's own limits while offering one's gift of ministry.

The pastoral ministry is a responsible expression of the ethics—the praxis—of faith. Reflecting about its own activity, pastoral theology becomes, then, not an appendage to other theological disciplines (e.g., a technical branch) but an integral part of the total theological enterprise. Its method and its activity are shaped by God's saving action which cares for and cures the person in his depths. As an integral part of the theological work of the church, pastoral theology reflects its own methodological focus in its concern to bring healing to the concrete and personal experiences of the human predicament.

If the word "theology" is to be reserved for the larger task of providing a unified, coherent and relevant understanding of man's knowledge of God no one of its disciplines may imperialize over the others. Each brings its own methodological tools to this workbench. If a unitary view is our goal who shall decide which is primary? The necessity for system and order must be balanced by an openness to the unexpected and the unpredictable in history. The traditional objective stance of theological doctrine must, today, leave room for some evaluation of the psychological factors which influence the person who embraces belief. Theology is learning, as David Roberts has put it, that "...a belief cannot be understood apart from what it means dynamically to the person who holds it."

**Dichotomy or Creative Polarity?**

Insofar as it strives to bring order and coherence to knowledge of God, theological method is dependent upon the structure of logic. Insofar as the pastoral ministry is directed toward the act of care in which mutual response involves both conscious and unconscious forces there is an elusiveness and inappropriateness about every precise logical formulation. Methodologically this condition is represented within pastoral theology in the tension between its systematic efforts and its functional character. Some theologians believe that this tension represents a dichotomy between technology and religious knowledge. Technical knowledge tends to become here the tool by which theological truths are applied. However we must reject this view not alone on the grounds that every technology is also the bearer of a wider, implicit model of reality, but also on theological grounds. Among others Brunner has reminded us that the content of revelation is mysteriously inseparable from its mode. The tension within pastoral theology is the tension involved in the revelational mode itself. Surely it is true here that theological method cannot be developed apart from the actual appropriation of revelatory knowledge in and through finite and therefore limited minds.

Perhaps the crucial question in theological method is the issue of essential continuity versus discontinuity between God, the phenomenal world and man's perceptive powers. Tillich maintains that the conflict represents two ways of approaching God: "The way of overcoming estrangement and the way of meeting a stranger. In the first way man discovers himself when he discovers God; he discovers something that is identical with himself although it transcends him infinitely, something from which he is estranged, but from which he never has been and never could be separated. In the second way man meets a stranger when he meets God. The meeting is accidental. Essentially they do not belong to each other."

While there is always a risk of delivering theology into "a Babylonian captivity of psychology" in the effort to correlate the two, it is even more risky to assume that God always speaks as a theologian. If we assume that man's existence is bound up with God and His World—that, indeed, man is estranged but not a stranger—then

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of thought itself. Thought is an act of response as well as of reflection. The thinker is a participant in all that he knows. This is the "Copernican Revolution" in knowledge which John Dewey celebrated. "Mind is no longer a spectator beholding the world from without," Dewey wrote. "The mind is within the world as a part of the latter's on-going process."

The self-world relationship is the prior condition of all self-consciousness and, therefore, of all thought. In Tillich's terms knowledge is a form of union — but cognitive distance is the presupposition of union — and of reflection. Man is the creature who can "take thought"; but in his thinking his own self (as Hooking has said) is half the world he perceives. This way of portraying the process of knowing has produced a revolution in all the interpersonal disciplines concerned with teaching and caring. Indeed psychotherapy is based upon the self-world dialogue as providing the point of entry through which progress toward recovered health is initiated.

Psychotherapy has illuminated several aspects of the subject-object relationship in knowing: as an invitation to dialogue it proceeds on the assumption that the abstractions or interpretations yielded by analysis — whatever they may be — are first of all functions of this particular and immediate relationship. Again, the very progress of therapy itself requires the achievement of a kind of rapport which signals a participatory-knowing relationship where analytic and syncretic knowing are together. With such rapport the therapist is able to lend his own strength to his client as a way of enlisting the latter's active participation in his own therapy. At another level analysis here becomes a kind of understanding (Verstehen) by means of Nacherleben, i.e., a living into the patient's past in such a way that the casual and amnesic chain is broken and new patterns of behavior are tried out. Such mutuality of knowing is certainly far from a passive reception of knowledge. Indeed, the implications of this understanding of knowledge as dynamic rather than passive emphasizes again the inseparable relation of knowing and doing, of Kant's primacy of practical reason and of the orientation of all knowledge toward moral action.

* Gordon D. Kaufman (Relativism, Knowledge and Faith, University of Chicago Press, 1960, p. 18), explains the term: "It was during the development of nineteenth century historical studies that it became increasingly clear how impossible it is to gain understanding (Verstehen) of positions other than our own, unless we are able imaginatively to re-enact or relive or re-experience (nacherleben) the experiences out of which they grew."

(3) The total effect of the new climate in ways of knowing amounts to a rediscovery of the power of symbol. It also heightens our recognition of the ineffectualness and decay of traditional symbols. The present crisis in man's self-knowledge calls for new and relevant symbols where the old have lost their power. That the intrinsic function of symbol has become even more vital and necessary is evidenced in the anguished art and literature of our day. But it is largely an expression of guilt without absolution, of isolation which does not remember somewhere a covenant people "keeping holy day," and of doubt which seldom finds its true function in the depths of faith. Indeed, as Nathan Scott has suggested, our need today is for adequate symbols which have thoroughly incorporated knowledge of the tragic vision within the Christian faith. The pastoral ministry must live with the reality of tragic knowledge even as it employs some of these broken symbols. We have not yet achieved that "first post-critical philosophy since St. Augustine" which Michael Polanyi is striving for. Yet in our discovery of the power of symbol we should be more mindful of the syncretic function of symbols of meaning — a restorative function which should not bypass the necessity of analysis but serve to weave the analytic strands back into a whole fabric. The full dimension of knowledge includes identity-wholes as well as descriptive reductive analysis. "The problem of meaning," Reinhold Niebuhr writes, "is not solved without the introduction of a principle of meaning which transcends the world of meaning to be interpreted . . ." Broken though it is, the symbol of meaning employed in pastoral care is the faith and trust of one who takes upon himself the forsakeness of this world in order that the unforsakeness of grace may heal and restore.

**PASTORAL CARE: THE CONTEXT OF THEOLOGICAL THINKING ABOUT MINISTRY**

The new climate of theological work and its emphasis upon the context of knowledge leads us directly to an exploration of the stages of thinking about ministry. All ministry is rooted in the Word of God and in the Body of Christ, the Church. The prophetic and redemptive work of the Word moves toward its fulfillment in the mission, communion and ministry of the church. But all of these directions find common expression in the work of ministry which by the profound imitation of Christ is

care. For the pastor who seeks to order his ministry in theological terms this process represents a necessary continuing evaluation.

Theological thinking within the context of pastoral care arises in the experienced disparity between belief and action. It is pragmatic to the extent that it is oriented toward action. However, the source and meaning of that action is grounded in the transcendent act of God and Jesus Christ. Intellectual ordering involves the continual selection and evaluation of the means for achieving a desired end. Honesty with ourselves requires facing the fact that the ends we achieve are strangely like the means we employ.

**The Pastoral Ministry as Work**

"This is the work that God requires," Jesus said to his followers, "believe in the one whom he has sent" (John 6:29, N.E.B.). The task of theological ordering in the ministry is shaped by the conviction that in Christ the means and the end are one. In Christ the Word became flesh—belief and action are united in work, as they are in the disciple. The early church proclaimed as its credo that “Jesus is Christ.” This proclamation became the transcendent center for the ordering of all ministry. From the human side it becomes an unending search for identity with Christ and for the means of expressing that identity. Daniel Day Williams writes that the love of God which finds its way into human care conforms itself to the need to be met. He adds,

> Our human need is involved with our guilt, so God’s love is expressed as forgiveness. Our need is for hope in the midst of estrangement, so God has to bear with us in our suffering.∗

The ultimate goal of theological ordering in the ministry is that all work shall be shaped by the mode of Christ. Whatever else it may be called, the pastoral ministry is work. But the problem of work in our time involves the technological removal of work from worship—indeed, from every expression of the meaning and value of man’s partnership with God in the order of creation. How shall the pastoral ministry fulfill its task of restoring a secularized world to its sacred center?

In order to answer that question the pastoral ministry must first explore the theological meaning of secularization. What is its message? Perhaps it is to be understood as the occasion of God’s call for another exodus of his people— an exodus out of a “Christendom” which has been largely shaped by the desire to hide the disenchanted


of modern man. The secularization of the church itself is hid to those who use it as a chapel of ease in the midst of the world’s disquietude. But such escapism becomes increasingly difficult. Secularism is openly revealed when it is no longer masked by comfortable religion. Then its challenge becomes inescapable. A recent commentator on the effect of radical secularism in East Germany writes,

> The public facade has been removed and secularization is seen for what it is, the social process that inevitably accompanies the development of industrial society.∗

Secularization is a moment of truth for Christianity. In its radical challenge to every claim for a transcendent center of man’s life and work, secularism exposes the facades behind such claims. As technology, it puts man in a position to manipulate and control nature, indeed his whole environment—but hardly to understand or to love. It approaches the world—even man himself—not with wonder but with something like contempt. Its moment of truth for Christians is its revelation of the extent to which we embody this secular attitude toward God’s world. Rather than husbands of the earth we have become absentee lords who manipulate by abstraction and remote control. We have lost contact with what Henry David Thoreau and Joseph Wood Krutch meant when they referred to “the wilderness as a tonic”—a “brace” for mankind. The crucial question in a technical society is whether we shall be able to recover the relevance of the doctrine of Creation for contemporary man. Marxism is surely right in its contention that a combination of technology and the bourgeois mind tends to fashion instruments from nature which become enemies rather than allies to man. The pastoral ministry finds its meaning in the recovery of that primal relationship in creation in which to know is to love, and to fashion instruments is to find new occasions of glorifying God. This means that the pastoral ministry finds its work in the world—specifically in the emerging urban world. It must be clear, however, that we enter that world not as caretakers but as caring—not with a program or an ideology but with a mystery of fellowship rooted in God’s grace.

**Summary**

We have held that the pastoral ministry springs from a moral response to the claims of the Gospel. Its primary identity is expressed in moral action. Its constant temptation, however, is to extract

What Is the Ought in Race?

J. Coert Rylaarsdam

The role of the Church: a post-mortem

During the weekend of February 7-8, 1964, the Divinity School Student Association sponsored a winter conference entitled “What Is the Ought in Race?” The following paper was presented in the context of that conference.

(Editor’s Note)

I permitted my name to go on the list for this Conference against my better judgement. Paraphrasing Jeremiah, Mikelson persuaded me and I was persuaded. He prevailed because he majors in Old Testament; that gave him a trump card. I do not assert that he played it. The fact that he held it was enough.

I shall cite only three reasons why I came reluctantly and feel out of place. In the first place, I am “out of residence” and am getting ready to go to Israel. So I am busy with other things. That is a good reason; but it does not touch any of your concerns here. So we won’t discuss it.

The second reason hurts you almost as much as it does me. I do not possess the technical competence to measure and assess the variety of propelling forces involved in the movement for racial equality in America today. But I do feel that an assessment of those forces is indispensable if we are to understand where the movement may go, or, for that matter, where it ought to go. Frankly, for me there is no “ought in race” of a general and abstract sort as your title seems to imply, an “ought” that could conceivably be superimposed upon the very specific and concrete movement alive in our midst today. For me the “ought” in this movement, and in all social movements, is inherent in it and unfolds with it, even though for all sorts of reasons not all observers may discern it.

As some of you know I have been busy for a long time, in a more or less disciplined way, trying to analyze the dynamics of the relationship between Jew and Christian. Unfortunately, that does not help to make me competent to speak with authority about the struggle for equality by the American Negro today. The two cases are not at all commensurate. Between Jew and Christian the forces at work are basically ideological, weighted down with a psychological freight that is the burden of centuries. The forces that lead to tension and conflict between Negro and white in our society today also have their psychological overtones; but they are, I believe, fundamentally sociological, cultural, and economic (especially “economic”). I have heard no great ideological debates; have you? The die-hard Southerners lack a Rosenberg and to compare them to the Nazis is to treat them more seriously than they deserve. No, the questions are really all about “How” and “When.” This makes all the delaying more exasperating; especially since it deprives us at home and embarrasses us abroad. But this is
the body is not separable from the Spirit; the artistic and intellectual interweave with the raw and the economic.

What would we do — white, northern, Protestants — if the views of “Malcolm X” shaped this movement? That would probably be a matter of great relief to white Southerners, including most southern white Christians, as far as I can make out. They really believe this is a racial movement; they very much want it to be just that. They probably understand “Malcolm X” a lot better than we do and, if it ever came to a showdown, they could conceivably work out a deal with him. They share the scorn of cultural and racial unity he proclaims. But what would we do? Where would we be? We would be immobilized by the mythology in which we glory. Israel Zangwill wrote a play in 1908 which he called *The Melting Pot*. That phrase became a tag for the myth by which we identify ourselves. “America is God’s Crucible,” said Zangwill, “where all the races are reforming. . . . A fig for your feuds and vendettas — German and Frenchman, Irishman and Englishman, Jews and Russians — into the Crucible with you all! God is making the American.” We have added another pair to the series: black and white. We may only have whispered it, but we can’t un-say it. We neither can nor want to! There you have “the ought in race” in its most decisive form; for generations it has been built into the living fabric of this society; it is not something either to be taken out of it or superimposed upon it. We are in no doubt as to what it asks of us today. What it may ask of us tomorrow, only tomorrow can tell us. “It shall be given to you in that day.” We are conditioned for an American movement such as this movement led by King, Randolph, *et al.* The views about how the melting pot should work or what results it may produce are always changing — pluralism has displaced the flat, monolithic models — but the vision of cultural and racial unity remains. It is precisely because this movement is not a racial movement that we want to think of it as our movement too. Yet as churches we stand on the fringes. Why?

There is a second specific factor in the total complex that deepens the embarrassment of the white northern churchman about his ineffectiveness in this movement. That is the fact that the Negro church, especially the Negro church in the south, is effective in a way that makes it the pivot on which the whole movement turns.

For years we had heard that the Negro church was fading out. It was too primitive; the educated were no longer at home in it. There was no theological sophistication. The leadership was, for the most part, uneducated. The organization was chaotic, highly individualistic, and undisciplined. What we heard was true, in a way. But now we are amazed; for this outmoded church is vibrant with life. It is supremely relevant. It has made this movement an explicitly Christian thing. It is a rallying place and recruitment center. It offers a refuge from the mobs. It has been remarkably effective in training the masses in both the principles and tactics of the movement. What is probably most stupefying to the rest of us is the element of spontaneity in all this: to be sure, it is by no means as easy as it seems to those who stand at a distance. But it does seem to be the case that the Negro church is dynamically in league with the stuff of life itself. It stands in the midst of life, where the determining processes of nature and history confront men with a choice; and it hallows the decisions that are the response to that challenge. The line between what God asks for and what his people need and want is mysteriously erased. The Church is no longer something abstract, an idea or a law apart from life, but something concrete, here and now. The Church is flesh and blood, not notions and theories.

Now it seems to me that the Church whose feebleness we deplore does not stand in the midst of life in that way. It passes resolutions and adopts programs; but it is not present where the decisions that sum up man’s self-affirmation in response to the determining processes of nature and history occur. Therefore it can not hallow those decisions. Quite apart from its difficulty in getting involved in this movement for cultural and racial unity, the northern, white, Protestant church has found the whole problem of its relevance to the dynamics of life and culture to be ever more difficult. One suspects this is because it does not really think of the processes of nature and history as the arena and means of the revelation of God but only as something to be manipulated, whether by command of God or of man. The Church carries such a small slice of life because its God is not really in the midst of life. God is only a principle by which you judge it or a formula by which you try to change it.

Back in the thirties when the whole world suffered from physical hunger there were endless debates about whether missions and churches should run soup kitchens or preach the Gospel. I was reminded of this recently when I read a book by the Cardinal Archbishop of Brussels with the title *The Gospel to Every Creature*. He reacts against a movement in France and Belgium called *Jeunesse d’Église* that has adopted the slogan of its leader (Montuclard), “You must humanize first
ultimately rests on that confession.

This dimension of religious realism which the movement exhibits is the very facet of biblical faith which is so sadly in eclipse in living Christian experience today. It has always had hard sledding, so that even such a responsible Jewish apologist as Martin Buber has concluded that Christian faith has forfeited it. But nowhere is this eclipse more complete than in contemporary American Protestant experience. Protestantism in America is largely what Pietism, rationalism, and moralism have made it. It locates the revealing work and Word of God not in the objective world of time and place, mediated by the largely impersonal processes of nature and society but in the personal consciousness of the individual, so that the believer's conversion and his utterance of a confession displaces regeneration and sacrament as the sign and substance of the work of God. The rationalization of experience stands in as substitute for the prevenient of grace. The will of God is defined almost solely in ethical terms, and obedience to it seems to consist mostly of laboriously wrought strategies by means of which the faithful will carry God into a world from which they mistakenly believe him to be absent. They call this a secular world; and they think it was made secure by rapid transport, or by two world wars, or by urbanized industrialism, or by the Jews, or by modern communications, or even by this movement for cultural and racial unity, or by whatever it was that hit the little white cottage and the village church. What these devout and entirely sincere but inadvertently self-centered Christians overlook is that they produce secularism.

In this paper I have spoken repeatedly of the wistfulness of northern, white, Protestant churches. They would like to stand at the center of this movement for cultural and racial unity. What they really want is a spontaneous involvement in which, individually and together, they discover their identity as Christians and as the Church. But they don't have it. There are probably many reasons for this. But the one that matters to me is that the churches we represent are not conditioned to locate the action of God in this movement, or in any other economic, social, or cultural movement. They can't think of it as a religious movement, for it goes on out there in that secular world. Measured by some accepted ethical abstraction it may be deemed worthy of the support of Christians. This support may be dramatized by exemplary acts such as we have cited. But the gap is never erased and the spontaneity does not emerge. I know it is popular to say that too many Christians are "security-minded" and worried about their jobs and their equities; or that not enough of us are deeply enough convinced of the justice of the Negro's claims to be fully aroused to action. I say so myself sometimes. But I wonder if the eclipse of the biblical understanding of creation isn't, in the last analysis, even more determinative? For theologians to blame the Church's dilemma on the suburbanite, blameworthy though he be, is just passing the buck.

Biblical faith is a this-worldly faith. It is a faith that hallows and transforms the elemental drives expressed by food, sex, and tribe. Witness the role of sacrifice, circumcision and covenant in ancient Israel. But it hallows and transforms them precisely because it confesses that they are the means and scene of the Work of God. In the Shema, - "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one," - Israel does not simply assert there is but one God but that everything and every process finds its center and meaning in this One. This is included in what the Bible means by God as Creator. God has created man in his own image; through man the hallowing of life is to be accomplished. "Let him have dominion" is the word of his Creator. For biblical faith the "ought" in race is not the achievement of some specific hypothetical social structure or some one and universally specifiable definition of the good. In this and in all other human issues in which man is called to decision as he is confronted by the irreversible processes of nature and history, the ought is fulfilled in the hallowing of the creation for the sake of the Creator. It is not so much the realization of a goal that is at stake as the constant recording of relationships to conform to the implications of the confession of God as Creator.

So, by way of summary and conclusion, for me the "ought" in race is the "must" of God. But this must of God does not lie ready to hand somewhere, as a formula to be used; not in the Bible or anywhere else. Nor is it anything you or I could formulate as a fixed and universal principle. This must of God is located where God is revealed as being at work, in the determining complex of the processes of nature and history. But the irony of the matter is that this "ought in race," this "must of God" presents itself to us not as a law to be met, but as the gift of greater freedom, broader horizons, and fuller life. The must of God is the signal for hope, joy, and Shalom.
Death: a Theological Reappraisal
A Report on the Fall Conference

William Dean

The Divinity School Association fall conference, entitled “The Problem of Death: Christian Responses,” was an experiment. The topic, the form and the results of the conference were experimental. The topic was experimental because it attempted to isolate a relatively unexamined and concrete phenomenon; the form was experimental because it attempted to treat the phenomenon in a new way; and the results were experimental because they were data for significant generalizations. And perhaps, for an afternoon, evening and morning the aura of the laboratory covered us all: there was a shirt-sleeved edginess and an attentive expectancy of some great uncooking. The cork was never pulled; but the experiment succeeded.

The topic was designed to raise a concrete problem that would elicit a more existential response and foster more direct confrontations between participants in the conference. The usual abstract, academic topics of hermeneutics, history, etc. were experimentally replaced by a topic which affords little modern theological footnoting and much definite concern.

The form followed almost necessarily from the topic — or the content, if you will. The problem of death delivers the shock it does largely because theology since Schleiermacher has failed to give an answer that evokes the patience of most students. Why then call in an established theologian to lead the conference? The fall conference was entirely student led.

Like the results of a good experiment the results of this conference swelled with implications. Inferences were drawn in discussions before the conference was half over. They can be classified into two types: those about the nature of the answer itself to the problem of death and those about the authorities for these answers. First, in each paper the answer to the problem of death was more to the “left” than would be expected. The first paper introduced the problem and the remaining four papers treated the four main slices of the theological pie: conservative or orthodox, liberal, neo-orthodox, and “post-Christian.” The introductory paper came closer to tripping the conference than setting it up; the conservative paper ended by agreeing with Tillich; the liberal paper was uncomfortable; the neo-orthodox paper was stocial; and the “post-Christian” paper flatly rejected Christology. It would be difficult to demonstrate that immortality in any ordinary sense of the word was involved in these Christian responses to the problem of death. Second, inferences were drawn about the authorities for these answers. The Bible, tradition, and metaphysics were not predominantly used as authoritative sources. Sometimes the modern mind or the modern mood was cited as an authority to criticize the irrelevancy of some positions other than those of the speaker; seldom was this authority used as a basis for an affirmation. When each speaker was pressed into uncovering why he chose his way of answering the problem rather than

William D. Dean received his B.A. degree from Carleton College (1959) and holds an M.A. degree from the Divinity School (1964). He is now a Ph.D. student at the University of Chicago and is President of the Divinity School Association for the academic year 1964-65.
The Meaning of Death
In the autumn quarter, the Divinity School welcomed Dr. William Hulme as Visiting Professor of Religion and Personality. Dr. Hulme is Professor of Pastoral Theology and Pastoral Counseling at Wartburg Theological Seminary in Dubuque, Iowa. He holds the B.S. degree from Capital University, Columbus, Ohio, the B.D. from Evangelical Lutheran Seminary, Columbus, and the Ph.D. in psychology and religion from Boston University (1948).

After three years as the pastor of Clinton Heights Lutheran Church in Columbus, Dr. Hulme became Professor of Philosophy and Religion at Wartburg College at Waverly, Iowa, where he also served as college chaplain. He was Lutheran tutor at Mansfield College, Oxford in the years 1958-59.

His major publications include *Face Your Life With Confidence* (1953); *God, Sex and Youth* (1959); *Living With Myself: Guide for Young Adults* (1964); *How to Start Counseling* (1960); *Counseling and Theology* (1956); *Pastoral Care of Families* (1961).
Mr. Cooper suffered, from the sharp and limber tongue of his pre-designated conservative critic, the fate of the apostate.

The exponent of theological liberalism, Clark Williamson, served his cause by describing the notion of immortality in Schleiermacher and in the thought of three living philosopher-theologians that he considered to be within the “liberal perspective”: Tillich, Hartshorne, and Bernard Meland. Schleiermacher maintains that the resurrection of the body is the answer to the problem of death—though he gives this, as every postulate of eschatology, only a secondary importance. “The notion of the resurrection of the body is necessary to the concept of the survival of personality, for Schleiermacher, because human identity and continuity of consciousness are matters involving memory; and memory is completely inseparable from the organic nature of the body.” This conclusion creates problems for Schleiermacher. The conclusion was inevitable because Schleiermacher lays all, in this case, on the individual human memory; this dependence on human memory is necessary because Schleiermacher’s God is impassable, absolute and unrelated. On the other hand, Tillich and Hartshorne avoid Schleiermacher’s problems because for them eternal endurance does not depend on human memory, but on divine memory; endurance can depend on divine memory because their God is related and in some way passable. Their God can receive the effects of men’s lives and preserve them eternally—and this answers the problem of death. Mr. Williamson went on to describe the supplementation of the immortality afforded by the memory of God with the immortality afforded by the memory of men. Bernard Meland’s coloration of the latter notion was cited. At this point in the conference it appeared that we did have a man who stood comfortably in his stipulated tradition and on his given authorities. However, Mr. Williamson went on to make it clear that, first, he was attracted to Meland’s notion of endurance through human memory because it is “more down-to-earth”; second, he recognized that this form of “immortality” is abruptly and disturbingly terminated with the death of the last human; third, he found his entire view of objective immortality somewhat unsettling when he applied it—not to himself—but to other people.

Walter Buschmann defended the neo-orthodox response to death. Keeping first things first, Mr. Buschmann began by throwing neo-orthodoxy’s propaedeutical bomb: Blast the liberals! The liberals dodge death because they absolutize life! Neo-orthodoxy affirms, however, that “It is not life that is the opposite of death, but rather the love of God manifested in Jesus of Nazareth.” Mr. Buschmann documented this alternative by means of a Bultmannian exegesis of both Testaments. And he went on to suggest three responses to the problem of death: 1) the affirmation of finitude, including death, as good; 2) the identification with the Christian congregation and the community of culture; 3) an openness to the future. The third response takes the form of a hope, but a hope that for our time is indefinable. Mr. Buschmann recognized that his third response is most relevant to the terror of death; and he recognized that it might be less than satisfying. He said, “And so this fact of death can only be met with a courage that seems to me to have more affinity with Stoic virtues than with Christian hope.” He received no argument on this last point.

Richard Pierce represented what could be called the post-Christian theological position. In the course of what was, perhaps, the least academic paper, the cat finally tore out of the bag, stretched and snarled. Here death was depicted as personal and tragic. Mr. Pierce attempted to demonstrate that for Paul death is only overcome through Christ, and that for Paul without Christ “we are of all men most miserable.” But Mr. Pierce, following some of the leads of men like William Hamilton, is unable to affirm conventional Christology—e.g. the divine and human natures. And, in a sense, Mr. Pierce is ready to accept Paul’s alternative—misery. He noted that this misery is proportional to one’s valuation of life. After examining Whitehead and Unamuno, Mr. Pierce remarked: “An apparently insoluble issue remains: the more we enjoy and participate in life, the more we want life to continue and become fuller, richer, more abundant, and, the more we hate, dread and resent death.” He went on, however, to advocate just such enjoyment and participation in life, not, in order to intensify the dread of death, but in order to defy death and to celebrate what we have. The sting of death is
Professor Scott was recently elected a Fellow of the School of Letters of Indiana University and will be conducting a seminar there in the summer of 1965.


JOSEPH SITTLER, Professor of Theology, lectured at the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York on the topic “Religion and the Arts,” at the University of Virginia on “Faith and Culture,” and at Columbia University on “Thought in Nature and in History”; he was guest preacher at Rockefeller Chapel, Rutgers University, and Elmhurst College.

Professor Sittler’s book, The Care of the Earth — and Other University Sermons was published in September by Fortress Press. The Festschrift in his honor, The Scope of Grace, was edited by Philip Hefner and was also published by Fortress Press.

CHARLES R. STINNETTE, Professor of Pastoral Psychology, lectured at the College of Preachers, Washington Cathedral, Washington, D.C. during October 26-27, 1964; he presented the opening convocation address at Culver Academy, Culver, Indiana, and he addressed the pastors’ conference sponsored by the Chicago Federation of Churches during September. From January 26-February 5 he served as consultant for the Regional Adult Laboratory School conducted by the American Baptist Convention.

Three articles by Professor Stinnette on “Human Development in Theological Perspective” appeared in Crossroads (January 1965).

PAUL TILLICH, John Nuveen Professor of Theology, spoke at the University of Michigan, at the University of Notre Dame, at Mundelein College in Chicago, and at Sarah Lawrence College in New York.

JAY A. WILCOXEN, Instructor in Bible, read a paper entitled “The Wilderness Narrative: Its Structure and Theology” at the Midwestern Section of the Society for Religion in Higher Education at Lake Forest College.

ALUMNI NEWS

CHARLES J. ADAMS (Ph.D. ’55) was recently promoted to the rank of full Professor in the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University, Montreal, Canada. For the past two years Professor Adams has also served as administrative director of the Institute.

OREN HULING BAKER (Ph.D. ’37) is acting as Visiting Professor of Parish Ministry at Central Baptist Theological Seminary, Kansas City, Kansas.

ADAM DANIEL BEITTEL (B.D. ’25, Ph.D. ’29) retired from the presidency of Tougaloo College, Tougaloo, Mississippi on September 1, 1964. He is presently serving as Director of the Mississippi program of the American Friends Service Committee.

GERALD I. GINERICH (M.A. ’27, Ph.D. ’32) became Secretary of the Division of Institutional Ministries of the American Baptist Home Mission Societies as of July 1, 1964.

G. WAYNE GLICK (M.A. ’49, Ph.D. ’57), who is Dean and Associate Professor of Religion at Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, Pa., is presently acting as Coordinator of Consultants for the Know Seminars in Educational Management. This program, sponsored by the Ford Foundation and involving 25 predominantly Negro and 25 predominantly white colleges, was founded to provide information and consultation for the more effective administration of liberal arts institutions.

FRANCIS P. JONES (M.A. ’15) has come out of retirement to teach a course on the history and culture of Eastern Asia at Drew University. In recent years Professor Jones has published The Church in Communist China (Friendship Press, 1962) and has edited Documents of the Three Self Movement, a collection of documents emanating from the Protestant churches of China during the past 14 years. For many years he has also been involved in the preparation of a collection of Christian classics in Chinese; 27 volumes have been published thus far.

RICHARD LAWRENCE (B.D. ’62) is Director of the Campus Christian Association at Chicago Teachers College and Wilson Junior College. Mr. Lawrence was recently invited to deliver one of the Liberal Arts Lectures at Oregon State University.

JOHN M. NOBLES (Ph.D. ’42) retired from foreign missionary service with the Methodist board after 36 years of service. For the past 21 years, he had been
Religious Innocence and the State University

John Opie, Jr.

What happens to theological inquiry when there is no program of religious studies?

Most state universities still cast a baleful look upon the intrusion of religion into their proudly secular bailiwicks. Faculties take vast pride in the objective and scientific manner in which education is carried on. Gracefully wrapped in the mantle of rational and independent inquiry, they argue that the study of religion is intrinsically excluded from the regular academic curriculum. They say that religion is an inflammatory and highly subjective matter which belongs to the churches, the theological seminaries and those private institutions which are willing to take it on. It is dismissed as obscurantism and superstition. The result is not the banishment of one of education’s devils, but that many a mighty faculty is painfully prehistoric when it inevitably approaches religion as an academic or public question.

When religion is dismissed as an academic field, it does not leave the campus. It makes its way as a stepchild in the departments of philosophy, history, sociology, classics, anthropology and psychology. It also reappears in the personal opinions of individual faculty members, based on “the right of private judgment.” Religious studies emerge in a chaotic manner. Deprived of scholarly penetration and simultaneously freed of academic control, they emerge as an apparently irresponsible threat to the goals of modern education. Faced with such a patently unscientific and irrational threat to its goals, no wonder the state university refuses to allow theological inquiry into the curriculum. But the state university has given birth to its own nemesis. It has refused religion the very talents that the university claims are necessary for acceptance into the curriculum. It has refused religion the right to overcome the obscurantism and superstition for which it is condemned.

When the subject of the possible development of an academic program of religious studies is broached, this innocence makes itself all too evident. We cannot give it prestige by labeling it ignorance or intolerance; it is merely innocence. A mathematician, for instance, finds religion repulsive, representing all the poor, nasty, dull and brutish passions that must be conquered by all men who claim the right to use the powers of rational inquiry. It is bad enough, he suggests, that the churches still draw herds of followers, but were this cancer to be allowed into the university, the entire academic enterprise would become suspect, a mass of recrimination, intolerance and suspicion. Another professor “was once a Lutheran,” so he considers himself fully qualified to “understand” the concern of the religionist for “student values.” As institutions that encourage a sound program of personal ethics he insists that the campus churches are to be commended. Sometimes I despair over the confusion between the

John Opie, Jr. is the director of the United Protestant Education Board at the University of Illinois, where he teaches credit courses in religion. He received his undergraduate degree from DePauw University and his B.D. from Union Theological Seminary; he holds the M.A. and Ph.D. (1963) degrees from the University of Chicago. The present article is the result of the extensive revision of a “working paper” for a faculty committee and for campus clergy at the University of Illinois in the fall of 1963. Among Dr. Opie’s other works are book reviews in Church History, Journal of Religion and Journal of Presbyterian History; extensive contributions to the forthcoming Westminster Dictionary of Church History; and “The Modernity of Fundamentalism” in the Christian Century.
research in religion, the lifeline of adequate teaching, are disappointingly small. To quote a recent study by Robert Michaelsen,

The situation in the college and university today is one in which a scholarly treatment of religion may be neglected entirely; or it may be a helter-skelter affair carried on more or less “on the side” by an interested professor in some related discipline; or it may become the task of one or two teachers of religion who are expected to cover everything from the Vedas to the Book of Mormon and everyone from Hammurabi to Barth.1

The elementary study is necessary, but it must be based on specialized study. This is a foregone conclusion in higher education, but it is astonishingly ignored in religious curricula. The scholar of religion is continually brought up short by the simple fact that his colleague’s innocence in the field of religion continues to breed further innocence.

A state university without an academically sound program of theological inquiry remains religiously unfocused. It cannot escape fuzzy thinking and fuzzer policies about religion. When the subject matter is scattered, it lacks a center of focus. The university will remain without a defined image of a subject in which it is inevitably deeply involved. Without this defined image of religion, and convinced by self-styled “experts,” the university becomes intellectually clumsy in theological inquiry and astonishingly outdated when faced with religious controversy. It does not create an image of academic stature based on objective analysis. The spectacle of a mighty faculty blundering into the thistles of modern religious debates could be amusing, but it remains tragic because the tools with which it could identify the thistles are so readily available. This is not to claim that the presence of a “theologian in residence,” or a curriculum in theology, or a department of religion would eradicate all possible controversy in the subject that might exist on a university campus. Nor is this a claim that the appearance of the highly touted “queen of the sciences” would solve all the problems of a university. While the university might seek a beautifully harmonious universe of learning in place of its present anarchy, the intent here is not to claim that academic lions and lambs live in peace under the benign government of theology. This beautifully constructed panacea never existed, even in the medieval university.

The innocence of a university makes religion a favorite whipping boy. Scholars in religion wish to join the universities in condemning those ele-

Worship

T. A. Burkill

Religion is neither an acute feeling of helplessness nor a buoyant feeling of well-being

The word “worship” is used in various connections. In colloquial speech the lover can address his beloved in such terms as “I worship you” or “I adore you.” In these instances, however, it would be commonly agreed that the words “worship” and “adore” are being employed loosely and that, construed in a strict sense, they should not be used in this way since the object of sexual devotion is not superhuman. There is a suspicion that the lover is being rather extravagant in his choice of language. But then, if poetic license is not granted to him, to whom may it be granted? Adverse criticism is more definitely implied when it is said that someone worships money. Here the suggestion is that a person is making an idol of money, his worship being addressed to something definitely not appropriate for such homage. The implication is that worship should be directed toward something superior to money, and this draws attention to the etymological connection of “worship” with an Anglo-Saxon word weorþ, or wourþ, which signifies “price,” “value,” “honor,” or, obviously, “worth.” Morally, only the worthwhile may be worshiped. Hence an adverse judgment is passed on a person who makes money an object of worship, the critic assuming that money is not worthy of devotional acts involving submission and reverence. A man ought not to prostitute himself before his equal, still less before an entity inferior to himself. Not only is idolatry based upon a misapprehension, but the idolater is actually degrading his status as a free and rational being. Such is the usual suggestion behind declarations like “He worships money” or “He makes a god of his lucre.” For, being a human creation, money is less than man and therefore disqualified for worship.

Accordingly, the notions of “greatest” and “best” have come to be more closely associated with the verb “to worship” than with verbs of allied significance like “to honor,” “to praise,” “to respect,” and even “to venerate.” It is commonly felt that a person can respect another member of the human species who possesses certain virtues, whereas with “worship” such is not the case; this term is to be reserved for homage paid to a mode of being of the greatest or highest kind. “Worship” is manifold in its denotation only because there are idolaters in the world, and properly the attitude and action that it represents are oriented toward what enjoys supremacy ontologically and axiologically — toward what is greatest and best. The word “greatest” conjures up ideas of power and effectiveness. The worshipful transcends man in causal potency, presiding over and, to some extent, determining his destiny. It is no mere instrument of something greater than itself. The word “best” has an ethical significance. What is worshipful somehow exceeds man in the depth and comprehension of its moral concern, and if
powers in their relation to that on which he has set his heart. This is his religion.” Grace always precedes works, for no man owes his origination to himself.

It is a great merit of Rudolf Otto’s analysis in his Idea of the Holy that he gives full prominence to the primacy in the worshipful of the dauntless or powerful as distinct from the ethical. On the other hand, Otto would seem to err in postulating a special 

sensus numinis and in identifying the 

mysterium tremendum with the irrational. Actually, the response to the numinous, even in its most primitive or unreflective forms, is not made without intellectuality. Nature in its strange and daunting aspects may induce strained attention and paralyzing fear in an animal. But this is not worship even in a minimum sense, for in worship there is ever a metaphysical presumption that the 

mysterium tremendum is somehow correlative with man’s solicitude regarding his destiny, and such a presumption entails a mode of intellectual activity, however rudimentary. Neither an acute feeling of helplessness nor a buoyant feeling of well-being can be properly described as religious, and a failure to recognize this truth accounts for the failure of romantic and existentialist theologies to present a satisfactory philosophy of the religious life. Of course one may legitimately distinguish among degrees of reflectiveness in religion, but one can never reach a point at which worship is wholly without metaphysical thought. The pure religious category of the numinous in Otto’s exposition must involve at least a vague concept of the effective possibilities of the 

mysterium. Otherwise it would be nothing more than a paralyzing or exhilarating shudder, a mere reflex action in the face of unusual and overpowering phenomena.

Hence, just as there is no unformed matter as an actual presence in Aristotle’s theory, so there is no religious worship bereft of all intellectual content. The act of worship is bound up with a metaphysical belief that reality in its transcendent character is not unfavorably disposed to human strivings. It could be argued that the elaboration of theological dogmas all too easily clutters up and thereby impedes the making of worshipful responses and that theological pursuits may become idolatrous substitutes for genuine acts of worship. But such considerations afford no warrant for the anti-intellectualist thesis that pure religion can exist without the aid of intellectual constructions. Ab initio religion contains 

a Weltanschauung, the worshipper holding that, limited and fragmentary though he is in face of surrounding cosmic forces, there is something within him capable of communication with the productive essence of all being. Needless to say, he does not necessarily personalize the object of his worship; he may be an absolutist, in the sense of primary Buddhism or of neo-Platonism, or he may be a naturalist, whose metaphysics could echo the sexual mysticism of the poet:

For she can light a lamp
In the freezing hollows of my soul,
Renew my vital rhythms and make me whole,
Remove the clammy fogs that damp
The inward flame,
And soothe
The fretted brain
With a soft essence,
The healing effluence
Of her bodily presence.
For her roots reach down,
Deep down,
To touch the bubbling fount of life,
Beyond the horizons of ephemeral strife,
Sounding the fecundating darkness of primordial night
Where creative flame and living water passionately unite.

Multifarious philosophico-theological elaborations have been made on the basis of religion’s primary metaphysical presumption concerning the sustaining favor of the numinous Beyond that is within.

The intellectual elaborations in question may be world-negating or world-affirming. Buddhism would seem to provide a classic example of the former kind. A dualistic opposition is established between the temporal world of sense and the immutable reality held to be beyond it. The finite individual is envisaged as being ordinarily in bondage to the concatenations of time, and a program is supplied for the individual’s deliverance through the supersession of the passions. The aim of the self-discipline under the program and methods to be applied are sketched in the Buddha’s four noble truths and the eightfold path of the dharma. Passional nature is to be surmounted finally in a nirvana that represents the individual’s salvation from the chains that bind him to the wheel of karma. Clearly, we are here presented with something much more than a personal ethic, namely, certain metaphysical affirmations concerning the essential structure of reality. It is implicitly claimed that the constitution of existence generally is such that it renders possible the attainment of nirvana and that the finite individual is spiritually correspondent with the stability of the Absolute, which subsists beyond the metem-

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1 B.B Perry, Realms of Value, p. 463.
3 See A. Schweitzer, Indian Thought and Its Development, where the distinction between world-affirming and world-negating Weltanschauungen is clearly brought out.
to breathe an ampler air. For they may serve to
detach him for a period from his daily preoccupa-
tions, aiding him to contemplate himself within
the living context of existence generally. Such an
important function has not infrequently been as-
sisted by the use of intoxicants, and it is arguable
that the tendency to dissociate wine and religion
in modern Western civilization is a sign of spiritual
degeneracy—an aspect of the secularization of
society. However this may be, fixed hours of so-
called worship may well impart something more
than rest to the soul. They may exercise it, help
to keep it alert and vital, sensitive to the impact
of the *mysterium tremendum* within whose per-
missive providence our lives are lived and our
destiny worked out.

Vigilance is nevertheless required; for fixed
orders of religious service, like routine periods
of drunkenness or sexual intercourse, can them-
selves all too easily be drawn into the ambit of
petrifying habit. When this happens they lose
their value as aids to worship. They fail to remove
the individual’s blinkers. They no longer help him
to perceive himself in his nakedness as a human
being situated amid the circumspect *mysterium*,
but come to have the reverse effect of fastening
the blinkers more tightly over his eyes. He ceases
to contemplate his finitude in the light of the
universal. Beyond that is within, religious ritual
degenerating into just one more customary activity
in a humdrum way of life. When such a state of
affairs becomes general a man of spiritual discer-
ment may arise and make a serious call to the
devout life, commending a piety that he may well
contrast—too sharply perhaps, because of the cir-
cumstances—with the unthinking lip service of
habitual religious performances. One way of re-
sisting such degeneration may be found in chang-
ing the pattern on occasion. For example, it could
be beneficial for a Quaker to participate in a form
of service in which music plays a prominent role
or for an Anglican to wait upon God in silence at
a small Quaker meeting. To be jerked out of one’s
habits is not infrequently a means of spiritual
renewal.

We must conclude then, that fixed forms of
worship, private or public, are not to be confused
with that worship which is the experience of the
numinous. Their function is to sharpen the in-
dividual’s spiritual wits. Properly practiced, they
can, even in modern mechanized society, help to
keep the mind sensitive to the wonder of the
universe and to the larger issues of human destiny.
Worship with a capital “W” cannot be prescribed.
Like the wind that bloweth where it listeth, it
eludes all endeavors to confine and dispense it
within the framework of a planned, liturgical
economy.