DEAR ALUMNI AND FRIENDS—

This December 2002 marked the launch of a new Divinity School publication, the Martin Marty Center’s Religion and Culture Web Forum, designed to bring the cutting-edge research of our faculty, fellows, and students into a “virtual” discussion with the wider public. Recent commentaries include an analysis of Mohammed Atta’s meditations on September 11 by Bruce Lincoln, a consideration of the letter from prison in Christian history and theology by W. Clark Gilpin, an analysis of Martin Buber’s vision of utopia by Paul Mendes-Flohr, and an argument for a capabilities approach to justice for mentally disabled citizens by Martha C. Nussbaum. In upcoming commentaries, Wendy Doniger will explore the mythology of self-imitation, and Jean Bethke Elshtain will offer her thoughts on war and justice. We hope the Web Forum will provide an important resource for anyone interested in the ways in which the study of religion relates to themes, problems, and events in world cultures and contemporary life, and invite you to visit the forum’s website (http://marty-center.uchicago.edu/webforum) to engage in its discussions.

As the Web Forum communicates current Divinity School research in a way that has relevance for the wider public, Criterion continues to provide a sense of the ongoing life at Swift Hall to the School’s alumni and friends. We are proud to offer you yet another stimulating issue, featuring the usual assortment of Divinity School activities.


Following this is “Blessed Usefulness,” a Bond Chapel sermon by Cynthia Gano Lindner, the Divinity School’s new Director of Ministry Studies. The Reverend Lindner delivered this sermon on October 9, 2002, at the commissioning service for second-year M.Div. students beginning their required internships in local congregations.

Next come the remarks made at the October 30, 2002, Dean’s Forum by Wendy Doniger, Margaret M. Mitchell, and Martha C. Nussbaum. The forum, which convenes each quarter at a Wednesday lunch, involved a discussion of two of Nussbaum’s essays in The Sleep of Reason: Erotic Experience and Sexual Ethics in Ancient Greece and Rome (University of Chicago Press, 2002), a volume she recently coedited with Juha Sihvola.

Concluding this issue is a speech delivered by Dean Richard A. Rosengarten in Swift Common Room on December 11, 2002, in tribute to Curtis Bochanyin, who retired recently as the Joseph Regenstein Library’s Bibliographer for Religion and the Humanities.

I hope you enjoy this issue,

JENNIFER QUIJANO SAX, Editor
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ne of the lasting images of the Elián Gonzalez affair is the untitled cartoon showing the head of the young Cuban boy attached to the body of a chess-piece pawn. Discovered drifting at sea on November 25, 1999, Thanksgiving Day in America, Elián was the survivor of an ill-fated attempt to reach Miami that cost the lives of his mother and ten other Cubans. Almost immediately he became a cause célèbre. Until April 22, 2000, when he was seized by federal agents and restored to his father, little Elián was used as an argument, not to say a pretext,

by a variety of political interest groups arrayed in complex relations of opposition in principle and alliance of convenience. What is conveyed by the image of Elián as a pawn is the interpolation of these greater national and international struggles into the family drama over custody of the child: a meaningful-structural magnification of the interpersonal relationships that gave them correspondingly large political effects.

Within days of Elián's installation in the house of his great uncle, Lasaro Gonzalez, in Miami, the Cuban exile community in Florida and the Cuban government apparatus in Havana had each made Elián's cause their own in the conflict with the other. The question of whether a minor who has lost his mother comes under the custody of his father, easily resolvable in American law, had been translated into ideological contraries as irreconcilable as they were abstract. In Miami, the argument of why Elián should not return to his father was democratic freedom versus communist dictatorship; in Havana, the reason he should return to his father was revolutionary morality versus capitalist perversion. Soon both sides were objectifying these values in daily mass demonstrations. Large crowds gathered outside the Gonzalez house nightly and all day on weekends, chanting the boy's name and beseeching his appearance—which they greeted with something like adoration. Cuba answered with state-organized mass demonstrations, rallying people in the thousands all across the island, complemented by several hours of television coverage and discussion daily. "Here in Cuba," came the report, "it is all Elián, all the time" (Washington Post, 17 April 2000). In Miami, the "miracle child" (as Elián was widely known) was accorded the seat of honor at the annual Three Kings Procession. In Havana, the "boy martyr" (as Elián was widely known) shared the limelight in absentia in the annual celebration of José Martí's birthday. Granma, the C.P. daily, also compared Elián to Che Guevara, saying the boy "had been converted forever into a symbol of the crimes and injustices that imperialism is capable of committing against an innocent" (AP, 29 January 2000). This comparison could only confirm the Miami Cubans’ worst fears for Elián, were he to be repatriated. Indeed, not long after he did return to Cuba, one of his Miami relatives observed, "They’re teaching him to be like Che—an assassin and an asthmatic" (Miami Herald, 25 May 2000). In Miami, as already implied, the ideology of liberation was more messianic than revolutionary,

This essay is based on the John Nuveen Lecture Professor Sahlins delivered on October 17, 2002, in Swift Lecture Hall.
The Elián affair raises not a few questions of historical agency.

associating the boy with Christ and Moses rather than Che and José Martí.

These kinds of associations, these political and religious relays of the macrocosm to the register of the familial and the personal, playing out national and international affairs in domestic relationships, are the topic of this lecture—together with some general asides on historiography and anthropology. The Elián affair raises not a few questions of historical agency. Among them is how certain, quite ordinary people may incarnate larger communities and collective forces, and thereby become big-time historical movers and shakers. Defying Federal court orders and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service—thus the Justice Department, the Attorney General, and, ultimately, the President—the Gonzalez family of Miami was able to hold Cuban-American relations hostage to their own intransigence. Moreover, there would be long-term and large-scale historical residues, not excluding (as it happened) the decisive effects of the Elián affair on the U.S. presidential election of 2000. (So to turn anthropological theory into chaos theory, not without some justification: no Elián, no war in Iraq.) Here are fateful conflations of different cultural registers or structural levels, interpolations of the national into the individual, with the dialectical effects of endowing national-political issues with the character of family values and family issues with national-political consequences. The relations between states, which ever since Thucydides we have believed to be governed by Realpolitik, are entangled in sentimental dramas of kinship.

Call it, then, historical melodrama. Britain recently went through one with Lady Di. September 11 has had such dimensions to it. Every body recovered from the World Trade Center debris was wrapped in an American flag. The crafted New York Times pieces on the personal lives of the victims made each one seem like another verse of “God Bless America.” Such syntheses of the national with the interpersonal are also familiar from anthropological studies of soap operas, notably including the very popular Latin American telenovelas—which are probably metonymically as well as metaphorically pertinent to the Elián case. A report in the Washington Post reads:

In the barrios of Washington and other cities across the country, Latinos are following the saga of Elián Gonzalez like a real-life soap opera, one full of political intrigue and family strife. They know all the characters—the father Juan Miguel, the uncle Lasaro, Cuban dictator Fidel Castro looming in the background—and they understand the plot all too well, particularly how immigration can separate parent from child. (9 April 2000)

In the telenovela, social categories and universals on the order of the state, classes, and ethnicities, as well as general moral principles, all take on the emotional charge of the human relationships in which they have been instantiated, such that these categories and customs are then narrated allegorically, and their destiny is configured as the denouement of a poignant story of private lives. We should take note, in this connection, of the many reports of great emotionalism over Elián in Little Havana: a fervor of which I will give examples presently, and for which the Anglo community had as little sympathy as it had understanding. But in Miami, the symbolic correspondences of the historical melodrama were right on top, enough to be explicitly articulated, as by the popular local priest Francisco Santana. “I am absolutely certain that communism began in Cuba by dividing the family” he said, “and communism is going to end in Cuba when this family is reunited.” His argument was that “if the boy’s battling family, his communist father and his anti-communist Miami relatives, can make peace, then Castro will fall” (Washington Post, 20 April 2000). At the same time, similar political capital was being made of the plight of “kidnapped Elián” in Cuba. After he had been repatriated, the president of the Cuban National Assembly told the New York Times correspondent that, regrettably, the agitation of recent months would have to be scaled back: “You cannot ask people to have the same emotional level about a boy without a mother, separated from his father, for a discussion of the [U.S. immigration] adjustment law” (NYT, 5 July 2000).

Here, then, is another critical point about these interchanges between the collective and the personal: not just any
old story will do. It has to be a good old story, structurally speaking—which it was, in several ways. As often remarked in the American press, the whole Elián affair would have been over in an instant, passed without public notice, if it had been the child’s father who was lost at sea and his mother who remained in Cuba. Who could have made a cause of keeping the child from his loving mother? Another felicitous aspect was Elián’s youth, hence an innocence and helplessness that could be an argument either for restoring him to his father or protecting him against brutal governments—alternatively, American or Cuban. Then there were the structural virtues of the focus on close kinship: a common ground for all the parties concerned, upon which they could proceed to develop their working misunderstandings. For Cubans, this was a somewhat different and larger issue than for Anglos: an all too familiar one of an extended kindred torn apart by immigration. From the Cuban vantage, the relationships of the people involved in Elián’s affair were at least four generations deep, including the siblings of the boy’s grandparents and distant cousins. Americans were fixed singularly on the nuclear kinship of mother, father, and child. So it passed almost without notice in the American media that while two of Elián’s great uncles, Lasaro and Delphin Gonzalez, were fighting to hold him in the country, their brother Manuel, also in Miami, believed the boy should be returned to his father—which made Manuel a lonely and heckled man, “a communista and a traitor,” on the streets of the city (Washington Post, 7 April 2000). Again, notwithstanding that Elián’s mother “sacrificed her life for his freedom,” as Miami Cubans generally saw it, her own mother, living in Cuba, came to America to lobby for Elián’s repatriation to “Communist Cuba.”

The *dramatis personae* of this historical melodrama also occasion some reflection on just who get to be the history-makers, and in what circumstances. Clearly the structural goodness of the story is more critical than the character of the historical agents it empowers. The devolution of international relations on the likes of Lasaro and Delphin Gonzalez was not a sterling example of the Hegelian cunning of Reason. One is reminded rather of Marx’s remark about Louis Napoleon: that the class struggle in France had “created circumstances and relations which allowed gross mediocrity to strut about in a hero’s garb.” The Elián case is even more remarkable, because, unlike Louis Napoleon or his illustrious uncle, the Gonzalez folks were not enabled as historical agents by their command position in the national-institutional order. The French emperors ruled a hierarchical system that was designed precisely to transmit and implement their will—or, for that matter, whatever they did or suffered. (That all the same Louis Napoleon was only so-so should occasion no surprise to Americans, who have become so accustomed lately to mediocrity in high places.)

Clearly we need to make some distinctions about the different cultural orders of individual agency, notably whether such agency is derived from a position in an institutional system or in the historical conjuncture. Where Louis Napoleon’s powers were structural, the Gonzalezes’ were circumstantial. The Gonzalezes owed their “fifteen minutes” to a certain constellation of forces rather than an office of authority. Indeed, a lot of cultural work went into the historical magnification of the Gonzalez clan—including a lot of religious work, which is a main reason I chose to talk about it here. But before we get to their empowerment, a further word about the characterological ironies.

As I say, those upon whom history devolves are not necessarily avatars of the progress of Reason. Some just have greatness thrust upon them. So it was for Lasaro, Delphin, and Lasaro’s daughter Marisleysis, the principal Miami players. It has to be admitted, however, that, at least on the score of DUI charges, Lasaro and Delphin Gonzalez had almost as many qualifications for leadership as George W. Bush and Richard Cheney. And Lasaro, an unemployed auto mechanic, did have the gumption to hold off the American powers-that-be, finally forcing the feds to seize Elián in an armed raid. This defiance fit the macho image he sometimes adopted for appearance in U.S. courts, dressed up in shiny black shirts with shiny purple ties—another working misunderstanding. Marisleysis, Elián’s second cousin once removed (by standard American reckoning) was popularly considered his “surrogate mother,” apparently because she had primary care of the boy—when she was
A tired revolution in Cuba faced off against a waning counter-revolution in Florida . . .

not being rushed to the hospital for one of her frequent “anxiety attacks” (Salon, 29 June 2000). A dropout from the local community college, twenty-one-year-old Marisleysis was in and out of the emergency ward six or eight times during Elián’s stay. Taken as a sign of her spirituality and her sufferings, her faintings made her all the more beloved in the Little Havana community. But a disposition that many Anglos perceived rather as hysterical, while it brought her a lot of television time, did not garner a lot of sympathy from the larger American audience. Indeed, the U.S. media generally held her in some contempt, called her “the actress,” or worse, according to Gene Weingarten of The Washington Post. Weingarten’s long piece, “A Modern Play of Passions,” is easily the best reportage I have seen on Elián, although his observation of Marisleysis’s behavior could be reminiscent of the uncomprehending missionary accounts of the funerary rites of South Seas savages: “Marisleysis often seems cold and haughty, and overly made up and flagrantly fingernailed, and she can sometimes be seen laughing with friends moments before turning to the cameras and crying over Elián” (7 April 2000). From the mainstream American perspective, the supporting characters of the Elián melodrama were even more dubious. The two cousins who often came over to play with the boy were both felons with long rap sheets. (One was under indictment for an armed robbery committed a half-mile from the Gonzalez home.) It is not clear whether these were the same as the two ex-cons acting as lookouts when the federal raid went down. Then there was “El Pescadore,” the ‘fisherman’ who had helped rescue Elián. He was a frequent visitor at Lasaro’s house, a hero in the neighborhood and an always eager TV interviewee, although in real life he was neither a fisherman nor even Latino. Danato Dalrymple was a guy of Scotch-Irish and Italian descent from Poughkeepsie, New York, who cleaned houses for a living, and happened that day to go on a fishing trip for the first time in his life when his cousin asked him to come along to drive the boat. Otherwise, however, with two arrests for domestic violence and three failed marriages, El Pescadore did fit the profile for Elián’s guardians. As Weingarten put it, “The Elián Gonzalez saga has made several people unlikely celebrities, and the unlikeliest may be Donato Dalrymple” (Washington Post, 7 April 2000). “Unlikely celebrities”—that’s the historiographic point.

But as you may imagine, a lot of political effort had gone into making such unlikely historical agency. In Havana and in Miami, Cubans in both camps were moved to raise the political stakes in Elián by the declining fortunes of their foundational political causes. A tired revolution in Cuba faced off against a waning counter-revolution in Florida, the hard-liners on each side sensing the decline of their original fervor, especially among younger people. Prominent in the drive to keep Elián in Miami was the conservative Cuban American National Foundation, for example, notorious for its anti-Castro activities. Dario Moreno, a Cuban-American political scientist, commented on the old guard’s interest in Elián:

Before Elián Gonzalez, we were growing up, moving to another stage, less extreme, less passionate. Elián Gonzalez allowed the old guard to reestablish control over politics, because Elián was the perfect symbolic case. (Washington Post, 7 April 2001; cf. NYT, 16 January 2000, 2 September 2000)

Echoed The Guardian headline, speaking of Cuba, “A small boy bails out the old dictator” (12 April 2000). Clearly, what helped make Elián’s case felicitous was its value for a politics of youth. Accordingly, schools became primary sites of agitation on both sides of the straits. In Cuba, school children turned out en masse to demonstrate their solidarity with “the boy hero.” While Elián was in Miami, his empty desk in Cuba was used as a symbol of perfidious capitalism; when he returned to Cuba, his empty desk in Miami became a symbol of perfidious communism—indeed, his Miami classroom was dedicated to him with a plaque, and plans were made for a permanent display of his schoolwork. In statements that likewise mirrored each other, spokesmen on both sides commented afterwards on the political silver they had gained in recuperating their younger people—a “silver lining” in the one case, if a “silver
The mobilization of the Miami Cubans intersected in complex ways with American national politics...
The Elián story broke in the same year as the massacre . . . at Columbine High in Colorado.

would amount to the worst form of child abuse—and just the kind of thing encouraged by the relativist multiculturalism now running rampant in America. For multiculturalism, Locke said, “maintains no way is right and everybody has his own opinion. If you accept multiculturalism, then everybody is equal. Castro is no different than Thomas Jefferson.” But, the professor continued, what else could one expect of the Attorney General, Janet Reno, who in a matter of months had not only managed to “sentence a boy to slavery in a dictatorship,” but (referring to tobacco liability cases) “to destroy a whole industry” and (referring to Microsoft) “to crush America’s most successful company.” Regarding the damage suits against cigarette manufacturers, Locke thought it “preposterous to abrogate the rights of sellers because buyers abuse products that give them pleasure” [does that go for heroine dealers?], even as it is preposterous to penalize Microsoft because some “resentful laggards” convinced the government to give them a competitive advantage that “they could not earn by their own effort.” Hence the obvious connection to Elián Gonzalez, who was similarly dispossessed of the freedom to maximize his own interests:

Whether the issue involves a whole industry, a single company or a single individual, the fundamental principle is the same. Either people possess the right to their own life, which includes the right to trade freely with other men, or they do not. (Capitalism Magazine.com, 23 April 2000)

Thus, Edwin Locke. For possessive individualism, John Locke could not have said it better.

Another value contradiction incited by Hurricane Elián swept all across the political spectrum, although it may also have caused more damage to the Right. Some of the American opposition to keeping Elián was fundamentally self-critical. It came from the uncomfortable and not always subtle doubt, based on experience of the contemporary U.S. youth culture, that Elián’s future as an American kid would be as beneficial as the champions of his “right to freedom” were claiming. It could be even worse here than there. Nor were the images broadcast of an Elián loaded down with toys and other goodies—including the toy guns he liked to shoot off—reassuring to a lot of Americas coping with problems of teenage violence and self-indulgent drugging. The Elián story broke in the same year as the massacre of students and teachers perpetrated by teenagers at Columbine High in Colorado. So even a conservative South Carolina columnist writes:

Under the cloak of freedom we have lavished him [Elián] with toys, made him a celebrity, handed him a puppy, taken his picture, raised his hands in a victory sign, and then asked him if he wants to go back to icky Cuba. Could we say we want to keep him because our society is permeated with drugs, sex and violence? (Parker, Chicago Tribune, 19 June 2000)

The extravagant consumerism of it all: the house full of battery-operated toys, including the dune-buggy Elián could drive himself, the wrist watches, cell phones, sporting equipment, clothing, etc., etc. Most of this stuff was gifted by Miami Cubans. And no doubt it had local meanings and functions, ranging from bribing Elián’s affections to affirming his status as a “special child,” something approaching King of the World. Elián was taken to Disney World barely two weeks after he was rescued, where he “was personally received by Mickey Mouse . . . at 11:00 a.m.”

Yet the images of a super-indulged Elián could appear otherwise to middle Americans. As in the cartoon published in the Green Bay, Wisconsin, paper showing Elián with a playmate from whom he has taken what appears to be a G.I. Joe doll, while in the background are a man and woman identified as Elián’s relatives plus a caricature of Janet Reno labeled “Feds.” Elián shouts at the other child apropos of the doll: “You can’t have him back! He’s mine now! You’re never going to get your hands on him! Not now! Not ever!” At which one of his relatives says, for Reno’s benefit, “See! Elián truly is one of us!”

Again, the journalist Richard Rodriguez, on the PBS NewsHour, evokes other representations of Elián that speak to the embarrassment Americans harbored about “the people they had become”: 
Break here for an anthropological reflection on order in culture. This whole involuted complex of political positions, with its chiasmatic relationships and dialectical oppositions, should be of some relevance to the current postmodern disposition to “always disconnect.” I mean the perverse satisfaction that many in the human sciences, following the lead of certain cult-studs, seem to derive from finding incoherencies in culture and cultures. You know, the celebrations of contested categories, fuzzy boundaries, polyphony without harmony, the impossibility of master narratives and the other sly delights of deconstruction. In this connection, the question raised by the politics of Elián is whether there is anything systematic going on. Certainly when we look at something like the dialectic schisms in the American Right between individual freedom and parental rights, or the reservations about growing up in America in an important fraction of the middle class, or the emphasis on youth in Havana and Little Havana, the answer seems yes: the positions are not aleatory. Perhaps we have been too quick to equate differences, as of “conflicting discourses,” with disorder. It then becomes all too easy to call off the search for relationships in and of the differences—to call off the search, as it were, a priori, on the grounds that such systematicity is impossible. I prefer Bourdieu (quoting Goethe) on this tactic: “Our opinion is that it well becomes a man to assume that there is something unknowable, but that does not have to set any limit to his inquiry.” Or Julian Barnes: “When a contemporary narrator hesitates, claims uncertainty, plays games and falls into error, does the reader in fact conclude that reality is being more authentically narrated?” I am arguing something more than that the political positions taken on Elián are, as differently situated subject positions, coherently motivated by the respective interests of these parties—although that is already...
The national political storm spreading out from Little Havana was being continuously whipped up by a powerful religious afflatus. 

saying something systematic, as Bakhtin tells us. These subject positions stand in specific logical and sociological relationships to one another, and thus imply a larger, complex order, marked by a dynamic of contrasting moral and political doctrines. Yes, George (Jim, or whoever), there is a culture. There could even be a master narrative, though with its diverse cast of characters and complex plot, it would not be a simple one. End of theoretical break.

Meanwhile, back in Miami, one of the regulars outside the Gonzalez house says that, “If Elián were just a child, Fidel would not have bothered him. Fidel knows he is divine, and wants to destroy him” (NY Daily News, 9 April 2000). The national political storm spreading out from Little Havana was being continuously whipped up by a powerful religious afflatus. “The Miracle Child” (El Niño Milagro) or, indeed, “The Child King” (El Niño Rey), Elián had come to redeem the sufferings of the Miami exiles, to destroy their pharaonic or herodic oppressor Fidel Castro, and to restore them to their homeland. “I have the feeling he will be the one,” said Marta Rondon, a woman who had joined one of the vigils of people anxious to see Elián (Miami Herald, 10 January 2000). Something like a saintly procession of the child around the Gonzalez yard before an adoring crowd was a regular feature of the Elián phenomenon. This time, when the boy finally emerged on the shoulders of Delphin Gonzalez, making V signs with both hands and then pretending to douse the crowd with an empty water gun, Marta was overcome: “I feel such emotion, such warmth in my heart for him. He’s a special child. Definitely, he’s a special child” (ibid.). Many of the Cuban Catholic clergy thought so too—although the Anglo hierarchy in Miami was skeptical of the supposed miracle, let alone prepared to join in Elián’s canonization. “Herod—Castro—is waiting in Cuba,” said the Reverend José Luis Mendez, pastor of the Corpus Christi Church. “Pontius Pilate is washing his hands in Washington, and that is President Clinton. And the suffering of this child is the suffering of the Cuban people” (Washington Post, 20 April 2000). Or, to put it succinctly, as on one of the banners outside the Gonzalez house, “Elián is Christ. Castro is Satan.”

The correlated buzz on Miami Spanish radio and in Cuban coffee shops—as well as the official Elián website—was that the boy had been saved by dolphins that surrounded the rubber tube to which he was clinging, and protected him from sharks. “Any Cuban would know this is a story right out of the Bible,” another follower told a Miami Herald reporter (8 January 2000). Actually, it isn’t in the Bible, although it is in Aristotle. Indeed, “shipwrecked sailor saved by fish,” or something similar, is a worldwide mythical topos: e.g., “Escape from sea on fish’s back” (Stith Thompson motif B541.1), “Fish carries man across water” (B551.1), “Sea beast allows voyager to land on his back” (B556), or “Magic salmon carries hero over water” (B175.1)—among other analogous themes (B256.12, F1088.3.2, B551.5). Similar stories are told of Cuba’s patron saint, Our Lady of Charity: of how she miraculously intervened to calm a storm and save a fisherman; or brought one fisherman, or three fishermen, or a little boy, safely to shore in a storm. Poems were written about the dolphins’ rescue of Elián.

And the child sailor was protected by dolphins Who resembled little angels hovering over the little rafter. (José Manuel Carballo, Miami Herald, 23 January 2000)

Cartoons, paintings, and murals depicted Elián floating in the sea encircled by dolphins who were being benignly directed from the heavens by flying angels, Our Lady of Charity, or the hand of God. A more elaborate folk mural, synthesizing Christological and Santeria motifs with icons of the political struggle, is described in Religion in the News:

Elián floating on the sea in his inner tube with Our Lady of Charity, Ochun [The Orisha], and Eleggua [son of Ochun] in the tube with him. Three dolphins circle around, while overhead preside the hands of God and a tiny Virgin and Child. The scene is framed by a larger scale of justice in which repose the head of Pope John Paul II on one side and that of President Clinton on the other. In the background hover two shadowy images of Fidel Castro, a grim-faced Statue of Liberty, Jesus himself and an archangel holding another scale. (Vol. 3, no. 2, 2000)
Talk of raising the historical stakes of a family melodrama! Part Jesus, part Moses, and part Orisha, to name only the most salient identities, Elián’s iconization as a messianic hope thus gave cosmic significance to the kindred relations and political conflicts in which his fate was being worked out. More than ideological reflexes, these religious representations were, as I say, structural relays, motivated mediations, by which the history of the national was transmitted to the interpersonal, so that in the event, what the Gonzalez folk did became the event. We have had some indication already of the Christological aspect. “Elián did the stations of the cross to get out of hell,” said the Miami weekly *Libre* in a special publication on Elián. “He saw his loving mother, as she placed him on the inner tube they had shared so that he could be saved. His life was saved as he was surrounded by dolphins that protected him from the sharks.” Signs of Elián as Jesus were often sighted in the crowd around the Gonzalez house: like the poster that read, “After the crucifixion, Elián and Cuba will rise up too” (*Washington Post*, 20 April 2000); or the homemade crucifix with a baby doll displayed after Elián’s repatriation, together with the sign, “Clinton, Reno crucified Elián” (*Religion in the News*, vol. 3, no. 2, 2000).

As might be expected from the circumstances of Elián’s survival as well as the religious tradition, the theme of Elián-as-Christ was also marked by Marian symbolism. Elián’s own mother was celebrated ritually and enshrined in bricolage altars. On the day Elián was sent back to Cuba, a woman was heard to say, “Maybe his mother will show up and this will be over” (*Miami Herald*, 28 June 2000). The Virgin Mary had already shown up twice: as an image on the mirror of Elián’s bedroom in the Gonzalez house, and more publicly on the window of a bank a few blocks away. The bank’s image was unmistakable, according to a teller, Maria Rodriguez, even though “you could not see the body or the face.” This Virgin of Totalbank, 468 Northwest Twenty-seventh Avenue, attracted varying degrees of veneration, ranging from the mothers who came to press their babies against the window-pane to the skeptic who declared the so-called Virgin a residue of Windex (*Miami Herald*, 26 March 2000). Perhaps the unbelievers were convinced some time later, not long after Lasaro Gonzalez had purchased the famous house at 2319 Northwest Second Street, when 2–3–1–9 hit on the Florida lottery—paying $5,000 each to 192 ticket holders, most of whom must have been Cuban.
Given the well-known oppositions of Catholics and charismatics, the ecumenicalism was another miracle attributed to Elián.

Of course the mother figure also played a part in the topos of Elián as Moses (Chicago Tribune, 17 January 2000; Washington Post, 22 January 2000, 20 April 2000). “A Cuban Moses,” reads the caption on the back cover of a local Spanish-language magazine. “God’s will is absolutely inscrutable to man’s mind,” observed a former political prisoner of Castro’s, “but the characteristics of this case point to Elián being something like Moses” (Washington Post, 20 April 2000). A brilliant exegesis of Elián’s story by José Marmol, a columnist of a Miami Cuban paper, made the point for point case for a second coming of Moses. Moses’ mother, too, had set him adrift in hopes of sparing his life, said Marmol. And then,

The daughter of the pharaoh took in Moses and this changed the history of the Hebrews. . . . Moses lived to lead his people out of Egypt to the promised land of Israel—about the same as our exile from Cuba. (Chicago Tribune, 17 January 2000)

The logical motivation of such symbolic amplifications of Elián is impressive. It extends also to the boy’s incorporation in Santería as an Eleggua or a son of Eleggua, the Orisha whose powers include the opening and closing of roads. This identification was not necessarily contradictory to Elián’s figuration as the Christ Child, since the latter is one of Eleggua’s many forms. Santería, moreover, had the general value of making a direct and malevolent link to Castro. Like Santería itself, Castro was outside the established church, and thus could be credibly perceived as under the influence of the Orishas and their priests, or even as a secret adherent. A piece of paper furtively handed to the Washington Post’s Gene Weingarten by a demonstrator outside the Gonzalez house seems to say it all:

It is indeed astonishing. It says that Fidel is a devotee of the mysterious Afro-Cuban religion of Santería. It alleges that the Cuban dictator fears he has run afoul of the mighty Santería saint Eleggua. It says he has consulted snail shells, and “thrown coconuts,” and sacrificed monkeys and goats and bulls and sheep, to no avail. It alleges that he believes Eleggua has taken up residence in the body of Elián González, and that for Castro’s luck to change, to save his regime, he must get Eleggua back. It implies that when he gets him back, Elián will be sacrificed to the god that inhabits him. (7 April 2000)

Despite the furtiveness, Weingarten subsequently learned that this document was no secret. It was available all over Miami as the lead story in a Spanish tabloid under the headline “The Boy and the Beast.” The newspaper was free. Weingarten picked up a copy from the giveaway stack in the office of the Honorable Alex Penelas, Mayor of Miami-Dade.

Some of the ritual performances of Elián’s sanctity were even more public. Not the Santería sessions or the countless private prayers, of course, but certainly the many Sunday church services and, by the end of Elián’s stay, the nightly services in and around the Gonzalez house. Six nights a week a mass was held inside, thanking God “for the miracle that brought six-year-old Elián Gonzalez safely to them” (Miami Herald, 10 April 2000); while each night in front of the house from 5:30 to 11:30, six Catholic and six Evangelical pastors, “numbered like the twelve apostles,” took turns leading a prayer service—except on Friday, the day of the crucifixion, when all twelve officiated jointly (ibid.). Given the well-known oppositions of Catholics and charismatics, the ecumenicalism was another miracle attributed to Elián. It did not, however, extend to liberal American Protestants who, as represented by the National Council of Churches, actively supported Elián’s repatriation.

Although the religious enthusiasm in Little Havana helps account for public opinion polls there running 83 percent or more in favor of keeping Elián, the same could be a turn-off in the Anglo community, as witnessed the accompanying Miami Herald cartoon.

Still, the miracle could reach some Anglo hearts—of a certain conservative bent. Peggy Noonan, Republican intellectual and former speechwriter for President Bush the First, filled The Wall Street Journal with surprisingly banal pieties about the Elián story—a story, she said, that was marked from the beginning by “the miraculous” (24 April
2000). For it was “a miracle that when he was tired and began to slip, the dolphins who surrounded him like a contingent of angels pushed him upward.” (Just for the record, neither the fishermen who found Elián nor the Coast Guard rescuers could confirm the presence of dolphins.) A miracle, too, Noonan wrote, that Elián was saved on the American Thanksgiving Day, even as it was a sign of Democrat blasphemy that he was abducted by federal agents on the eve of Easter. “Too bad Mr. Reagan was not still president,” she said, “Mr. Reagan would not have dismissed the story of dolphins as Christian kitsch, but seen it as possible evidence of the reasonable assumption that God’s creatures had been commanded to protect one of God’s children.” There it was: “Miracle! Miracle! Read all about it in The Wall Street Journal”—a tract that has always been a firm believer in the Invisible Hand in any case.

Then finally there was Tom DeLay, the Republican Majority Whip in the House, who called Elián “a blessed child” on Larry King Live (24 April 2000)—prompting the Star Tribune to editorialize:

And it came to pass that Tom DeLay the Righteous appeared to Larry the King in a dream. And Larry said unto him, “What doest thou make of the boy Elián snatched up by agents of the Emperor Bill?” And DeLay the Righteous said unto Larry, “This is a blessed child. Two days he was in the waters and the great fishes bothered him not, neither did they devour him. Neither did the hot sun blister him.” (Hamrick-Stowe, 27 April 2000)

All this piety in high places convinced the journalist Richard Cohen that Elián had truly been saved for a purpose—“to make fools of politicians” (Washington Post, 12 April 2000).

And thus, to make history

ENDNOTES

1. Karl Marx, preface to The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 2nd ed. (Hamburg, 1869).
2. Elián: Album (Miami, Fla.: Libre, 2001), 16.
It is for me a delight and an amazement to be standing once more behind the very same pulpit, in the very same chapel, where I preached a student sermon some twenty autumns back. I was launched from this place well equipped—I had been shaped in my studies here by the minds of Barth, Bultmann, the Niebuhrs, and Tillich, and nourished for my spirit’s journey by the teaching and example of Professors Gamwell, Gilkey, and Gustafson; Professors Browning and Marty; Professors Tracy and Carr.

I judged myself ready to bring that reasonable religion, which had so enlivened my own experience of the holy here at Swift Hall, into the eager hearts and minds of congregations. I lacked, it seemed to me back then, only one thing: some outward and visible manifestation of the authority and wisdom of the ministerial office. I decided that I needed a robe. Never mind that I was born and raised a Disciple, that most democratic and pragmatic of denominations, among folk who assumed that if the preacher wore a robe, it was because he or she had something to hide. I had, by the time of my leave-taking from this place, actually served in several Disciples congregations, but none of them saw the need to give me a robe.

But that didn’t mean that I didn’t need one. So, on my way out of town, I stopped at the bookstore run by the Lutheran School of Theology, because I knew that the Lutherans would be sympathetic toward this Disciple who had one foot in democracy and one foot in authority. I knew the Lutherans kept robes as well as books in their stores. I looked around for only a few moments, and then, quickly, off the rack, I bought a robe, tossed it into the car and drove west, into the sunset, into ministry, into the arms of the church.

I thought, as I vested up for my first Sunday’s duties in my new church, that I looked pretty good: elegant but austere, traditional but contemporary, of the people but a bit set apart, theological, thoughtful, authoritative. And it was so, for a little while. I prepared adult classes that were thoroughly theological, preached intelligent and respectable sermons patterned on the mentors that I had loved and admired, all while wearing this robe, my security blanket, my totem, my vanishing cloak.

But it wasn’t too long before my ready-made mantle of authority began to show signs of wear and tear. It was white, after all, symbolic of purity, no doubt; but what this really meant was that the robe was easily soiled and spotted and wrinkled and stained. After a year or so, the robe spoke of other things, things besides elegance and austerity. Its hem...
...we can't borrow someone else's authority or authenticity, we can't purchase that off the rack.

The writer of Matthew’s Gospel preaches his own sermon on the ministry and purpose of the church by offering us Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount, some unexpected and fairly subversive teaching about the nature of authority, aimed at some overwhelmed and underequipped disciples. Although not one of these second-year students is underequipped, and they will not be overwhelmed (repeat this: we will not be overwhelmed), there is good reason, I think, why the builders of this chapel, a monument to power and intellect, chose this particular text with which to surround present and future teachers of the academy and leaders of the church, phrases toward which our eyes cannot help but be drawn every time we enter and leave this place. “Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are the meek, for they will inherit the earth. Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they shall be satisfied.”

These beatitudes, familiar words that we love, and that we love to misunderstand, are in Jesus’ hands, or maybe more accurately in Matthew’s, more than simple wisdom about what qualities might make us makarios—fortunate, blessed. They are more, too, than prophecies about whom will get what, and when. They are not lists of admirable virtues to strive for; they are not advocating that people find more ways to be poor or sad or self-effacing, nor are they recipes for “happiness” or self-fulfillment. Makarios is not happiness; rather, it is what it says it is: blessedness, at-one-with-Godness, usefulness to the cause of the reign of God that is always breaking in around us, in us, and through us. “Useful to God’s purposes,” says Jesus, are those who have a sense of their own poverty and an inkling about God’s sufficiency. “Useful to God’s purposes,” says Jesus, are those who know their lives are not under their own control, nor under the control of anyone else, who renounce the often violent methods of the powers of this world and dare to be dependent on God. “Useful to God’s purposes,” says Jesus, are those who mourn the present condition of God’s people and God’s program in the world, and who hunger and thirst for a serving of justice, for a sip of wholeness.

You see, Jesus is not saying that we must become something bigger, something more, something perfect in order to
be useful. Jesus is saying that what we are already, collectively, in this place and in every place, what we all are by virtue of our very humanness—poor and powerless and hungry, wrinkled and spotted and stained—what the church is even now, is blessed. We are already blessed, already useful to the Kingdom's coming to be, already part of God's grand design, simply because God declares us to be so. You are blessed, you second-year students, with all of your rich learning and personhood, but more importantly with what you know that you do not know. You are blessed, you teaching pastors and congregations, with your wealth of experience and your heart for the church, and, most significantly, with your willingness, even now, to be challenged by these students to understand your own call more fully. You are blessed, you worshippers, hungry for more than the Wednesday lunch; you continue to seek out this place, to listen, to pray, to ponder, to proclaim, and, on occasions like this one, to send each other out in hope and in love, because you know that the Kingdom is near at hand. But it is not completely said, nor is it completely done—not fully. You are lonely and hungry and longing for a taste of that righteousness.

The beatitudes, say our scholars of scripture, are not orders for us to work harder at all of these things; they are written in the indicative voice, telling us who we already are, what already is, and not what we ought to do—with one notable exception. There is one imperative in this entire passage—and it is an important commandment for this moment, in this place. As Jesus sends forth the disciples, and as Matthew blesses his church, there is but one charge: "Rejoice!" So in the spirit of the blessedness that surrounds us, in the spirit of rejoicing with which Jesus sends his own into the world, let us commission our friends, students, and pastors for their service together in the church, and let us commission each other for their care. ✡
Each quarter at a Wednesday lunch, Dean Rosengarten convenes several Divinity School colleagues from different areas of study to discuss a recent faculty work. This fall, the forum brought historian of religions Wendy Doniger and New Testament and early Christian literature scholar Margaret M. Mitchell into a discussion with philosopher Martha C. Nussbaum. The discussion focused on two essays by Nussbaum in a volume she recently coedited with Juha Sihvola, entitled *The Sleep of Reason: Erotic Experience and Sexual Ethics in Ancient Greece and Rome*.

Erotic Experience and Sexual Ethics in Ancient Greece and Rome (University of Chicago Press, 2002).

The volume, which contains essays by an international group of philosophers, philologists, literary critics, and historians, considers two questions normally kept separate: how is erotic experience understood in classical texts of various kinds, and what ethical judgments and philosophical arguments are made about sex? From same-sex desire to conjugal love, and from Plato and Aristotle to the Roman Stoic Musonius Rufus, the volume’s contributors demonstrate the complexity and diversity of classical sexuality. They also show that the ethics of ἔρως, in both Greece and Rome, shared a number of commonalities: a focus not only on self-mastery, but also on reciprocity; a concern among men not just for penetration and display of their power, but also for being gentle and kind, and for being loved for themselves; and that women and even younger men felt not only gratitude and acceptance, but also joy and sexual desire.

At the Dean’s Forum, Doniger engaged Nussbaum’s essay “Erōs and Ethical Norms: Philosophers Respond to a Cultural Dilemma,” while Mitchell engaged Nussbaum’s “The Incomplete Feminism of Musonius Rufus, Platonist, Stoic, and Roman.”

Their remarks are printed below, followed by a response by the author.

A RESPONSE TO “ERŌS AND ETHICAL NORMS: PHILOSOPHERS RESPOND TO A CULTURAL DILEMMA”

Wendy Doniger

In “Erōs and Ethical Norms,” with great humility and the noblesse of a true scholar, Martha Nussbaum corrects her own previous attempt to move Greek ideas into the modern world without noting change of context. She does this by going back to the Greek context and arguing that, in fact, we can learn from the Greeks. Although she is very careful to examine Greek assumptions and to excise Christian assumptions, she is not so careful to examine the assumptions about the bases on which cross-cultural comparisons can be made. These, too, cannot be taken for

The Dean’s Forum took place on October 30, 2002, at a Wednesday lunch in Swift Common Room.
granted. Noting with approval that Foucault had pointed out that Greeks do not problematize sex as Christians do, Nussbaum suggests that “it does seem reasonable to look to Greek culture for a set of erotic norms that are not colored by a specifically Christian problematization of sex” (60)—norms, that is, that are devoid of the concept of original sin or homophobia. This is a good start, and her essay goes a long way to nuance it further. She also wisely remarks that “The study of Greek norms may illuminate some of our own best possibilities” (ibid.), and, citing Foucault, that “[the Greeks] free our thought so that it can think itself differently” (86). Her own hope is that “when one ceases to take [the particular Christian focus] one does not ipso facto become a raving beast deaf to all ethical questions. . . One may become, in fact, a sensitive ethical human being who does not happen to have a particular set of characteristic American obsessions” (86–87). The solution, however, is not to follow the “worthy paradigms” (87) of the Greeks; they are not us, and they had some human values that I, for one, would not embrace.

No, we have to go on to ask: Is there a universal sexual ethic? One way to nuance and complexify the discussion is to avoid the polarization of “the Greeks” and “the Christians” by nuancing the Greeks, as Martha Nussbaum does here; one might also nuance the Christians. But another, better way is to add a third player to break up the hall of mirrors effect, and of course my favorite player is ancient India, which just happens to have a textbook on sex, including, in its fashion (as in “true to you darling in my fashion”), the ethics of sex. Indeed, I know very little about the Stoics, and having read Martha Nussbaum’s essay, I realize that they, rather than Ovid’s Art of Love, supply the classical parallel to the Kamasutra. So let me triangulate the comparison as I go along.

Let’s start, as Martha Nussbaum does, with dualistic thinking. Greek popular morality was dualistic about erōs: a divine gift, source of education, but a disruptive force, a madness that threatened virtue and the good conduct of the lover toward his partner. Nussbaum refers to the Stoics as having “what appear to be contradictory theses” (56) about the passions: the passions should be extirpated, but they can also do great good. She speaks of the “doubleness of erōs” (57), and of the Lysias character in Plato’s Symposium, portraying these parts of erōs “not merely in tension but as incompatibles” (ibid.). She singles out two problems with Christian approaches to sex: original sin and homophobia. And she alludes, in passing, to the Phaedrus passage, describing the soul as a pair of winged chariot horses pulling in two different directions: “We say one is good and the other bad” (246ff, and 254d). This is a basic ancient Indian metaphor as well: the yoking of the dichotomized spirit is like the yoking of two chariot horses. And horses are also used, in the Kamasutra, to express the dark horse side of sex:

For, just as a horse in full gallop, blinded by the energy of his own speed, pays no attention to any post or hole or ditch on the path, so two lovers blinded by passion in the friction of sexual battle, are caught up in their fierce energy and pay no attention to danger. (2.7.33)

Here we may ask, Is dualistic thinking about sex a peculiarity of Greek thought? Is it a universal pattern? Is dualistic thinking about everything a universal pattern (as Lévi-Strauss thinks)? And so on.

Foucault, as Martha Nussbaum notes, had compared sex with eating, but she points out that this is not a very close analogy: “For the glutton does no harm to food, nor the drunkard to wine” (58). The Kamasutra, too, compares food and sex.

Vatsyayana says: Pleasures are a means of sustaining the body, just like food, and they are rewards for religion and power. But people must be aware of the flaws in pleasures, flaws that are like diseases. For people do not stop preparing the cooking pots because they think, “There are beggars,” nor do they stop planting barley because they think, “There are deer.” (1.2.37)
According to Nussbaum, “What is at stake in sex is not only one's own self-mastery, but also the well-being, happiness, and ethical goodness of another” (58). This matters. But we might debate whether it is a universal ethical norm or simply our modern opinion; here, again, assumptions must be examined. Martha Nussbaum does take this up, arguing, contra Foucault, that although ethical norms do indeed tend to enshrine power and constrain freedom, and some people make them and enforce others to follow them, nevertheless “I think that some moralizing is a good thing” (ibid.). She points out that the Greeks did moralize about sex, though not precisely the way that modern Americans do—and, I would add, not the way that the ancient Hindus did. Moreover, “We could hardly avoid using ethical norms in the process of saying what is wrong with . . . bad norms [such as homophobic norms], and why they should be resisted: they insult people’s dignity, they treat them as unequal when they are really equal, or whatever” (59). This gets us into the tricky contemporary debate about whether the concept of human rights is not in itself an imperialist, Euro-centric idea that must be resisted. I don’t think this is the place to debate this argument, but it does, I think, at least warn us that we cannot assume that dignity and equality are, in fact, universal human ideals.

If, however, we assume that it is not a good thing to hurt another human being, we can find that idea in other cultures, and that’s the way to begin. Even the starkly hedonistic Kamasutra takes into account the possibility of physical harm to a partner, as described in a passage that includes the verse about the horses out of control:

Marks made in this way can be seen on the chest of young women there. This is a particular local custom. But Vatsyayana says: It is a painful and barbarous thing to do, and not to be sanctioned. So, too, one should not take any other custom used in one particular region and use it in another. One should also avoid, even in the region where it is used, anything that is dangerous.

This is no matter for numerical lists or textbook tables of contents. [then the horses verse]

And so a man who understands the text will apply it only after he has come to know the delicacy, ferocity, and strength of his young woman, and his own strength. (2.7.24–27, 34)

But there is no discussion anywhere in the book about possible psychological harm to a partner.

Another dualism comes in, then, with the speech of Pausanias in Plato’s Symposium, which acknowledges “a doubleness in éros” (64), but this time of the love of the body versus the love of the soul. Are there not other possibilities? He speaks of lovers who “are willing even to choose relatively ugly youths, so long as they are noble and excellent” (ibid.). But is the love of beauty a universal, as (I think) Martha Nussbaum thinks?

She then moves from Phaedrus in Plato’s Symposium to Phaedrus in Plato’s Phaedrus, where the argument takes up something that was said by Lysias—something exciting. Socrates’ teasing remark to Phaedrus (“Show me first, my dear fellow, what you are holding in your left hand under your cloak: I bet it’s the speech itself” [65]) reminded me of Mae West’s famous remark to a suitor: “Is that a present for me [or, in some versions, a gun] in your pocket, or are you just glad to see me?” Phaedrus argues that love can and will endure if it is based on “something deeper than the evanescence of bodily beauty” (68). And here Martha Nussbaum objects, saying, “We all know that éros is hooked on bodily beauty and is a kind of madness born of that beauty” (ibid.). We Greeks, presumably? Or we everybody? Here I am, as ever, tempted to reach for the old Lone Ranger and Tonto joke, of which the punch line is, “What do you mean ‘we,’ Kimo Sabe?”

I think Martha Nussbaum is too quick to accept the Greek idea that everyone falls in love with beauty. Plato certainly believed it; even the two chariot horses are distinguished in that way:...
There are lots and lots of people walking around with beautiful souls and faces that their own culture regards as very ugly.

The right-hand horse is upright and cleanly made; he has a lofty neck and an aquiline nose; his colour is white, and his eyes dark; he is a lover of honour and modesty and temperance, and the follower of true glory; he needs no touch of the whip, but is guided by word and admonition only. The other is a crooked lumbering animal, put together anyhow; he has a short thick neck; he is flat-faced and of a dark colour, with grey eyes and blood-red complexion; the mate of insolence and pride, shag-eared and deaf, hardly yielding to whip and spur. (Phaedrus 253d)

The poet William Butler Yeats certainly believed it:

Wine comes in at the mouth
And love comes in at the eye;
That's all we shall know for truth
Before we grow old and die.
I lift the glass to my mouth,
I look at you, and I sigh. ("A Drinking Song")

But poets can lie, as even Plato pointed out in a different context. I think Martha Nussbaum is too quick to accept even the modified Greek idea that beauty may be a beauty of the soul that transfigures the face; thus, Socrates’ “solution” to Lysias is to explain “how, in fact, excellence of soul can manifest itself in the features and shape of the body” (70). No. There are lots and lots of people walking around with beautiful souls and faces that their own culture regards as very ugly. This is the Quasimodo scenario. And in fact the love of someone who is not necessarily physically beautiful is described in a passage that Martha Nussbaum cites to make a different point, the passage in which the young boy falls in love with the older man (72), who is certainly not defined by his beauty as the boy is. Old is ugly; you’ve had it by twenty-eight in the Greek world. (This gets Stoics into trouble, as Martha Nussbaum points out, when they paradoxically insist that young people are actually ugly, since they have not yet become good [79], that is, educated.)

The Greeks have only one word for good and beautiful, kalos, as in Euripides’ wonderful line in the Bacchae, ho ti kalon philon aie, which Gilbert Murray translates, loosely but hauntingly, “And shall not Loveliness be loved forever?” We have different words, and so we have films called The Bad and the Beautiful. I’m on the side of Epicurus, at least when he says, as Martha Nussbaum quotes him, “I have spat on the kalon and all those who gape at it in an empty fashion” (74). I’m against Cicero when he asks, rhetorically, “Why is it that nobody loves an ugly man, or a beautiful old man?” (81) It’s not true; people do. Martha Nussbaum herself notes that Freud pointed out other reasons why we fall in love (usually with the wrong people); Freud said it was because they resemble our parents (or because they do not resemble our parents). We need to take into account the arbitrariness of what beauty is in each cultural norm: big and fat in Hawaii and parts of Africa, little and skinny in America today.

Naomi Wolf, in The Beauty Myth, and Elaine Scarry, in On Beauty and Being Just, have raised big questions about the cultural construction of beauty and about the manipulation of ideals of beauty within a single culture. Martha Nussbaum’s essay on the cultural construction of sex is an important step in this ongoing process of self-examination.

A RESPONSE TO
“THE INCOMPLETE FEMINISM
OF MUSONIUS RUFUS,
PLATONIST, STOIC, AND ROMAN”

Margaret M. Mitchell

I have been asked to respond to Professor Nussbaum’s enjoyable and important essay, “The Incomplete Feminism of Musonius Rufus, Platonist, Stoic, and Roman.” Her goal in this chapter of the book (as in other of her admirable works) can be broadly described as a task of critical retrieval of potentially valuable resources from ancient philosophical traditions for the sake of enhanced inquiry and more just living in the present. In this study, she seeks to explore the “feminism” of Musonius Rufus, a
first-century Roman Stoic who is now known especially for his discussions of such questions as “Should Daughters Get the Same Education as Sons?” “What is the Goal of Marriage?” “Whether Marriage is an Impediment to Studying Philosophy,” and “That Women Too Should Study Philosophy.” Nussbaum contends, quite rightly in my judgment, that one cannot fully understand, or, concomitantly, evaluate, Musonius’s ideas on these hot topics without a rigorous examination of the progression and inner logic of his arguments. She proposes to do that in full for two treatises (those on daughters being educated and women studying philosophy), while also tracing the genealogy of some of Musonius’s arguments (and omissions) to assess how “novel” or “unique” he was in his attitudes toward women.

Her conclusion is that Musonius represents a mixed legacy for those who search for “ideas that will help us” (313) in the present. In her own words: “Musonius Rufus remains a remarkable character. Viewed in the most generous light, he combines the radical Stoic commitment to sex equality with an appreciation of the possibilities of marriage that he derives from a Roman culture in which mutually loving companionate unions had become an accepted goal, and to a large extent a reality. Viewed in the least generous light, he compromises the original Stoic dedication to sex equality by his acceptance of Roman traditions of patriarchy and female purity. Both assessments say something true about Musonius, and about the goals of feminism. If one plausible feminist goal is to make it possible for men and women to be fully equal in education and in self-command, to enjoy full civic and legal equality, and to love each other on terms of autonomous choice and full equality, Musonius has indeed mapped out a part of the route to that goal—but only a part. And in giving us that part he has rejected Platonic, Cynic, and Stoic ideas that seem in their own way essential for the full articulation of the goal” (ibid.).

On the whole, Nussbaum’s thesis that Musonius represents a dual legacy as regards women is largely persuasive. I decided to introduce here via a comparison between her work as a philosopher engaged in both past and present, with biblical scholars/theologians who seek to do constructive theological work on the basis of historical-critical exegesis of ancient biblical texts. When I reframe her inquiry in what might at first seem the alien lexicon of biblical studies—canon, text, literary criticism, translation, and truth claims—I am more and more aware of how many hermeneutical dilemmas she shares with those biblical scholars and theologians who turn to the ancient biblical texts for wisdom for modern communities. These similarities in concern may be the basis for much more conversation; my response today is an initial attempt to see how the template corresponds to the interpretive and methodological dimensions and dilemmas of each endeavor.

Nussbaum’s first task in this essay is to defend why Musonius Rufus actually deserves a place in serious philosophical study on issues of women, sex, and marriage. She does so on the basis of an appeal to tradition, both ancient (Origen and others on “the Roman Socrates”) and modern (de Ste. Croix, Foucault, Treggiari). But she also wishes to read against the grain of the modern tradition, at least to question the unbridled enthusiasm for Musonius’s liberal views of women championed by those scholars. So hers is an authorizing though critical reading of some texts, which ends with a call for a kind of broader “canonical reading” of Musonius—i.e., read him, but supplement with Plato, the Cynics, and other Stoics. I would agree, but remain somewhat puzzled by the word “incomplete,” which encapsulates her judgment of Musonius in the essay. Are we to infer that he has somehow failed an implicit expectation of canonical texts—that they be complete? If so, who is to bring about that “completion”—the author, or the reader who will create “completion” by a hermeneutic of caritas (à la Augustine, of whom one thinks when hearing Nussbaum pause between “generous” and “ungenerous” readings)?
How could we possibly get a “complete” Musonius from this “incomplete” record?

How can one recover the feminism of Musonius Rufus, Platonist, Stoic, and Roman? Nussbaum begins biographically, stating that this tripartite identity is key to an analysis of his thought. This judgment seems indisputably true for the historical Musonius, a man of apparently captivating personality who had in many ways a heroic life in pursuit of the integrated excellence of his life and teaching. But how do we know his thought, in particular, his “feminism”? As with Socrates, or Jesus of Nazareth, with the exception of one possibly reconstructed epistle, we do not have any documents penned by Musonius. What we have are fragments of twenty-one popular philosophical discourses which are dominated by a strong first-person voice, and which have been attributed to him in medieval copies of the early-fifth-century anthologist Johannes Stobaeus, and thirty-two anecdotes, quotes, and aphorisms preserved in the writings of his student Epictetus, and Galen and Aelius Aristides. Nussbaum’s essay draws, not on that entire complement of sources, but on three incomplete larger discourses and two partial excerpts from others, for which she provides a translation. Her analysis and, especially, evaluation proceed, however, on the assumption that we have a complete account of Musonius’s thoughts and utterances on the topics of women, sex, and marriage, such that in the evaluation section of the essay there is a continual refrain about what “I find lacking in Musonius” (308, with other arguments and expressions on 300–13). Nussbaum’s analysis expertly shows surprising gaps or lacunae in Musonius’s use of some traditional extended topoi from Plato and elsewhere; to the degree that one can demonstrate that he has deliberately omitted an element in a source he is following, her critique of Musonius seems justified. But given the difficulty of that task, especially with this kind of informal speech (known as the “diatribe”), perhaps it is important to emphasize more than Nussbaum has that we do not even have the complete text of any of the discourses in which these philosophical units were embedded, let alone any idea of other records of his teaching for which no extant testimony exists (to say nothing of actions—political, pedagogical, or otherwise—in which Musonius engaged on behalf of or to the detriment of women). And, after all, the first of the collected fragments (not treated here) argues the thesis: “That There is No Need of Multiple Arguments/Proofs for a Single Matter”! How could we possibly get a “complete” Musonius from such an “incomplete” record?

LITERARY CRITICISM

What is the nature of the sources we do have for reconstructing Musonius’s thought? The extant remains are a third party’s account of Musonius’s teachings, reported in the form of the chreia or diátribê, rather than his own extended arguments. In terms of method, that means that we must have the same kind of critical engagement one applies to the Platonic dialogues in asking about the philosophy of Socrates, or the sayings of Jesus in the Gospels. This means that the “I” who speaks in them is a literary “I,” not an autobiographical voice; it is a rhetorical construct embedded in a particular literary form that generates specific expectations. The chreia, for example, is a means of preserving anecdotes, often by providing them with a secondary, or even tertiary (and completely artificial) setting, quite independent of any original context in which the memorable words were uttered. The incomplete scraps of reconstructed philosophical dialogue have now probably come down to us as written up by Musonius’s student, whom the manuscripts call “Lucius” (otherwise unknown), and then definitely edited by Stobaeus (we know this because of a third-century Rendell Harris papyrus from which we can reconstruct his editing of fragment XV). This literary fact raises the following questions:

1. Should Nussbaum’s quite salient insistence upon the need to attend to argumentative context and progression in these discourses not be joined by more attention to literary context? In general, it is worth questioning whether one can really comprehend any extended argument without the ending. As one instance of how this might affect Nussbaum’s particular conclusions, her reading (and translation) of fragment XIII A without X I IIB (both of which
are on “What Is the Chief End of Marriage?”), and of excerpting just the first half of XIV, may have led to an underappreciation of the importance of procreation in marriage for Musonius, a value better represented in the undisputed portions.7

2. Should not the literary form of these works call into question interpretations based largely upon the assumption that the “I” who speaks addresses a clearly delineated, and historically specific, audience? Fundamental to Nussbaum’s analysis is the supposition that the discussion of whether women should study philosophy (III) is directed at an “irate provocateur” (294), who is “the reluctant husband” of a would-be woman philosopher (296), whereas the fragment on education of daughters (IV), she avers, is directed at fathers (she observes as “a truth of experience” that men may react differently in the two cases, since “fathers can frequently countenance in their daughters a strength and independence that would strike them as deeply threatening were it to be found in the wives by their sides” [296]). But, in fact, there is nothing in either text to support this conjecture. It must be created entirely out of a completely colorless, probably redactional, ”someone” (or phasi tineis, “some say”), who is the foil for Musonius’s wisdom. Furthermore, if the literary form is diatribe, then that might suggest a school setting, in which case not just Roman husbands or fathers would be the hearers of these words. Nussbaum states at the outset that these are “apparently public speeches” (283); we do not know, but if that were the case, would it not contradict the idea that a completely discrete sociological segment of the population is being addressed in each? From a formal point of view, chreiai could formulate any kind of setting (and many secondary ones). The fact is that these texts do not really provide the specific context where the words were uttered, which could originally have been a classroom, a public speech, a dinner party, addressed to a single individual, to men (some of whom might be both fathers and husbands), to women, or to a mixed group. And, furthermore, even when a literary setting is provided, we cannot simply equate that with the historical setting.

3. Should not an analysis of these documents set up a critical distance between three Musonii—the historical Musonius, the literarily-enscripted Musonius, and the anthologistically excerpted literary Musonius? For example, is it possible that we have in the Hense edition fragments a domesticated Musonius, or perhaps even twice-domesticated Musonius? Or was he radicalized by these editorial shapings and selections, which so emphasize discussions about women? The “Rufus” who appears six times on the pages of the school notes memorializing the teachings of Musonius’s other student, Epictetus, for instance, does not mention women at all. So we are left to wonder: has Lucius replicated his teacher’s interest in this topic—or his own? What about Stobaeus? And which Musonius should be most authoritative?

TRANSLATION

Every act of interpretation of an ancient text involves its translation into a modern idiom, even as every translation, as the commonplace has it, is an interpretation. To bring the word “feminism” into juxtaposition with Musonius is to create a quite intended, jarring disjunction. I am in favor of this move, because it creates the conditions for a lively conversation between past and present. And sometimes it takes a jolting translation to get people to see what is really at stake in a text and its meaning. But the translator must make a thousand choices a minute in trying to maintain a balance between competing loyalties to the ancient and modern contexts. When along that continuum does the line in the sand marking “anachronism” or “projection of modern norms” appear? In my judgment, Nussbaum’s translations of the five fragments are valuable, on the whole more reliably closer to the Greek than Cora Lutz’s (though not always differing greatly), and I have already recommended them to students. They should deservedly be consulted by everyone who works with these texts. But there are also some places where it seems to me Nussbaum’s translation goes too far in coloring an ancient text in particularly modern, or at least modern-sounding, values. Let me cite two quick examples, both from the same section of fragment III. Nussbaum translates the Greek
... scholars are in some sense creating out of this fusion of horizons new texts that become the basis for renewed conversations.

Idiom *mega phronein* there as “to have self-esteem” (in the sentence “For in fact she has schooled herself to have self-esteem and to think that death is not an evil, and life not a good”). But the two usual meanings of the phrase are both quite suitable to this context. It means that she “thinks on a higher plane,” which enables her to face threats with fearlessness; hence it is a reference, to some inner psychological disposition (like “self-esteem”), but to a woman’s philosophical contemplation of the Stoic teachings about *adiaphora* (“matters of indifference”), which would render her implacable in the face of danger. *Mega phronein* here is also a double entendre, for the idiom can in addition mean to be “high-minded” in the sense of arrogant, and therefore deliberately foreshadows and preemptively reinterprets the critique of women as *authadeis*, “arrogant,” which will be quoted a few lines later. In this same passage, Nussbaum translates the adjective *autourgikê* as “autonomous.” But this is almost the opposite of what Musonius is talking about here: the kind of “self-employment” of the elite woman head of house who is “willing or able to work with [her] own hands” (i.e., wet-nurse her own children, serve her husband with her own hands—laundry, cooking, worse?), even do some chores suitable for slaves. Hence, the woman philosopher’s virtue, according to Musonius, is neither “self-esteem” nor “autonomy,” but “thinking on the higher plane,” and “hands-on domestic management.” The values Nussbaum’s translations invoke are indeed important to us, but I am not convinced (at least on the basis of this lexical evidence) that they were part of Musonius’s feminism (either on the enthusiastic or the reluctant side).

I invoke these two instances to illustrate an important methodological point: all who seek to bring ancient texts into modern conversations (whether they be philosophers or biblical theologians) are always, and of necessity, engaged in the craft of translation, which demands of them an allegiance to both linguistic-cultural systems which often pulls them one way and the next. In attempting to “translate” not just words but ideas, one must weigh the value of generating a response from the modern reader to real-life issues he or she holds in common with the ancient texts against the danger of “projecting” modern terminology and ideas to the point of distortion onto works which either are not about that topic or conceptually treat it in very different ways. In doing this work, both philosophers and biblical scholars are in some sense creating out of this fusion of horizons new texts that become the basis for renewed conversations.

**TRUTH CLAIMS**

This is where it really gets challenging, and I am glad I am running out of time! Simply put, contemporary biblical scholarship is still under the shadow of Krister Stendahl’s classic essay on biblical hermeneutics from the 1960s, which argued for a differentiation of roles of biblical scholars who determine what the text meant, and theologians who determine what it means. The intervening four decades have seen an erosion of that dichotomy from both sides, with some scholars eschewing the constructive task altogether (or at least for themselves), others from critical-theoretical perspectives challenging the “positivism” implicit in the model, some working hard to establish publicly verifiable criteria for authentic theological witness, and still others continuing to expatiate theologically on the texts regardless of their possible historical meanings. The relevance of this state of affairs in biblical scholarship for my evaluation of Professor Nussbaum’s essay is that she is breathtakingly both—the expositor of historical meaning and broker of it for contemporary feminism. And this is, I think, in many ways to the benefit of both sides. What is striking, though, is that Nussbaum does not here defend the construct of feminism which guides her decisions about what is and what is not applicable to the critical appropriation of Musonius. She does not so much need to do so, perhaps, for me, as I largely agree with her judgments and values about the centrality of “the dignity and equality of women” (306; but whether we might mean the same thing by these terms, of course, might merit discussion). This is perhaps similar to inner-denominational biblical scholarship, which can move rather seamlessly to constructive claims based on a shared body of doctrines and commitments that
A RESPONSE TO WENDY DONIGER AND MARGARET M. MITCHELL

Martha C. Nussbaum

I am extremely grateful to Wendy Doniger and Margaret Mitchell for their illuminating criticisms of my two articles in this edited collection. I shall begin this response by describing, briefly, the project Juha Sihvola and I undertook in editing it. I chose this book for the Dean’s Forum in preference to one of my own recent “solo" books because it seemed to me to offer a lot, historically and methodologically, to Divinity School students and colleagues, so I shall hope to explain that judgment. I shall then more briefly describe my intentions in the two articles I wrote myself. Finally, I shall attempt to reply to my two excellent critics.

The ethics of sexual conduct is a topic of perennial interest, and of central interest, certainly, to anyone who thinks about the interactions of religion, philosophy, and culture in the ancient Greco-Roman world. But this topic is unusually difficult to study. Prudery and reticence have inhibited frank scholarly inquiry, as has the strength of scholars’ own moral convictions, which frequently cast a long shadow over the ancient texts. When I was a graduate student, it was very difficult to inquire into the explicit sexual passages in any ancient work, because little basic philological work had been done on the meanings of terms and the workings of sexual metaphors. Consulting the lexica then available for both Greek and Latin, one would come upon translations such as “a beastly act,” or “unnatural vice,” terms that showed more about the views of the lexicographer than about the ancient term. Often these same translations were used for more than one term, so that the student was left to ponder, “But which one?” The Loeb Classical Library, which prints English translations opposite the Greek or Latin original, declined to do so when sex was in the offing. Instead, one would find, amid the English, stretches of Latin opposite Greek originals, and, more peculiar still, stretches of Italian opposite the Latin originals of many verses of the poet Martial, as if any foreign language at all would provide a screen between the dangerous text and the impressionable student. (These editions have now been replaced.) Even some scholarly editions contained lacunae: Fordyce’s Catullus, a scholarly edition published by the venerable Clarendon Press, omitted all the poems relating to same-sex relations, describing them as poems “for good reason are rarely read.” (A self-fulfilling prophecy, if ever there was one.)

By now all this has changed. Research into the sexual dimensions of ancient Greek literature, art, and philosophy

Can one engage in critical retrieval of ancient philosophical wisdom from a contemporary “ecumenical” perspective?
Research into the history and ethics of sexuality needs to be multi-disciplinary.

is a burgeoning industry, and the topic has attracted some of the best minds in the field—not surprisingly, since there is, for once, new ground to be broken. Kenneth Dover’s Greek Homosexuality, a monument of careful, unbiased scholarship and sound methodology, set a standard for all other work in the field, opening up for frank discussion the previously taboo topic of same-sex relations. Michel Foucault’s History of Sexuality, volumes 2 and 3, while resting heavily on the scholarly contribution of Dover, added new theoretical structure to the debate, demonstrating clearly some salient differences between Greek and Christian ethics.

There remained, nonetheless, some pervasive deficiencies in much of the work in this field. Research into the history and ethics of sexuality needs to be multi-disciplinary. Philosophical texts on the topic cannot be properly assessed without attention both to their literary form and to their historical content. Literary texts, too, need to be situated in their historical context; and, especially in the Hellenistic era, when philosophical ideas enjoyed broad cultural dissemination, they need to be set in their philosophical context as well. Historical discussions of social institutions need to be informed by a detailed knowledge of what philosophers and poets were saying.(An honorable example of success in this area is Susan Treggiari’s Roman Marriage.)

But the study of the ancient Greco-Roman world is highly segmented along disciplinary lines. Greco-Roman philosophy, pursued most often in philosophy departments, has too often been studied with little attention either to literary form or to historical/cultural context. (This usually means, inter alia, that Roman texts are not read in their entirety, but are plundered as materials toward the reconstruction of original Greek Hellenistic positions.) Where the ethics of sex are concerned, such ways of reading give especially bad guidance: here, if anywhere, the philosophical arguments must be studied in their cultural setting, in order, for example, to know whether a given proposal is novel or commonplace. One of my essays in The Sleep of Reason contains a criticism of my earlier work on Plato’s Phaedrus for not asking such questions. Philosophical points are also lost through inattention to the literary form in which the philosophical ideas are purveyed: Plato’s Symposium, for example, makes its points by stylistic choices as well as by explicit argumentation.

For their part, historians of sexuality have frequently been insufficiently attentive both to literary form and to philosophical argument. Thus bits of text are sometimes used as evidence for the history of popular views, without asking enough questions about the genre in question and its characteristic expectations. Kenneth Dover’s sensitive work on oratory and comedy is an honorable exception. And philosophical figures are used as evidence for historical claims without paying much attention to philosophical structure: some very fine historians have drawn on Musonius Rufus, for example, with insufficient attention to the arguments that were his primary mission.

Literary scholars, like historians, are often afraid of philosophy and therefore don’t engage with it rigorously and thoroughly; thus they may neglect connections between a literary text and the more technical discussions of the philosophical schools. Such neglect is particularly problematic in the Hellenistic world, when philosophical views, especially Stoic views, enjoyed broad cultural dissemination. (Simon Goldhill’s article in the present volume shows that Hellenistic writers casually allude to rather technical details of the Stoic theory of perception.)

One central purpose of the volume, and of the conference (at the Finnish Academy in Rome) that preceded it, was to address these methodological deficiencies by bringing scholars together from the three sub-disciplines to exchange ideas with one another and to urge one another in the direction of more responsible interdisciplinary work on sexuality. The papers show, I believe, that we were successful in that aim.

Our second aim was to urge that the study of ancient Greek and Roman sexuality focus more attention than it typically has on ethical norms and ethical argument.
Rather rapidly the field moved from an era of moralizing to an era that neglected ethical questions. Kenneth Dover and Michel Foucault argued correctly that the ancient Greco-Roman world (before the Christian era) found no grave ethical problem about sex per se. The problem taken seriously was one of self-shaping and self-control that involves all the appetites similarly. A dominant cultural view suggests that the good person is not at the mercy of any appetite; but it does not single out the sexual appetite as the source of special problems. They also argued, correctly, that the gender of one’s sexual partner is far less ethically central in the ancient Greco-Roman world than it is typically for us. But Foucault and some of his followers, in keeping with Foucault’s general critique of “normalization,” went further, suggesting that all ethical norms are inherently tyrannical, and that the Greek world was attractive because it manifested an ethic of self-shaping that steers clear of ethical norms altogether. Such a position ignores a complicated set of ethical discourses that unfold in the ancient Greco-Roman world. To be sure, these discourses typically do not focus on the gender of the partner: attraction between males is as a rule regarded as healthy and normal; the gods themselves are imagined as enjoying such relationships. But there are complicated issues of an ethical kind, such as: Is erotic love necessarily selfish, or is it compatible with a genuine concern for the other person’s well-being? Is it necessarily linked to damage to the self, or can it be part of a balanced and rational life? Can there be genuine consent in love, when there is a disparity of age and developmental stage? And so forth. In my essay “Eros and the Wise,” I argue that norms of the sort I have described are absolutely central to ancient discussions of eros, both popular and philosophical.

– IV –

In “Eros and the Wise,” I begin from a problem in our sources for Stoic ethics. The Stoics say that all emotions are bad and must be eliminated as forms of vulnerability and uncontrol. But they also say that the wise man will fall in love. They envisage a city held together by strong erotic ties, both male-male and male-female. I situate this complex Stoic proposal in a continuous history of worrying about love’s connection to moral development. This history prominently includes Plato’s Phaedrus, to whose three different speeches on love I devote a good deal of attention. I then examine the sources for what Stoic eros is, and the ensuing debate about whether Stoics are really entitled to use that name for the moralized and rationalized relationship they propose. I suggest that the Phaedrus may provide a better solution to the cultural dilemma about eros than the Stoics did, because it includes “madness” and real passion.

My second paper focuses on Musonius Rufus, a Roman Stoic of the first century AD, an important but neglected figure. Was he a great feminist, whose contributions were wiped out by the misogyny of the early church, as G. E. M. de Ste. Croix argues? Was he just a rhetorician, with no real ideas, as sometimes is suggested? I argue that only an interdisciplinary approach can do justice to him: one that takes seriously the diverse strands of the philosophical tradition that are woven through his thought, and also the Roman cultural milieu. When we dissect Musonius’s works on women’s education that way, we find a mixed situation. On the one hand, we do find some bold educational proposals that are pretty radical, even in a Rome where women already play a much more prominent role than in ancient Athens. We also find bold proposals for the reform of marriage, an attack on the sexual double standard, and other criticisms of tradition. On the other hand, Musonius allows himself to be fairly constrained by Roman reality, proposing only slight changes in women’s situation, rather than the more radical changes that seem to have been suggested in Greek Stoic writings.

– V –

Commenting on “Eros and the Wise,” Wendy Doniger raises one of the most difficult questions in moral philosophy: How, if at all, can we justify universal norms of ethical conduct? I can hardly answer this question here, but let me at least suggest some directions in which I think an adequate reply should go. First, I think that the question,
“Are there any values that can be justified as good ones in the sexual realm for all societies in the world?”

“Is there a universal sexual ethic?” must be broken down into two questions, one descriptive and the other normative. The first question, then, is whether there are any ethical values in the area of sex that are recognized by all societies in the world, or, even, all people in the world. Now, I think that the conceptual variation on which the book lays emphasis makes it extremely unlikely that at the level of fine-grained detail we will actually find any such universal values. But the failure of Greco-Roman concepts to map in detail onto modern American concepts (for example) does not preclude the discovery of some very general norms common to most societies—norms against cruelty, for example, and in favor of sexual consent.

When we search for such values we ought to bear in mind that no culture is a monolith; all contain plurality, dynamism, and contestation. The voices that speak loudest across the ages are usually the voices of the most powerful groups or classes. We know a great deal about what well-to-do literate men in Greece and Rome thought. We know relatively little about what women thought, and next to nothing about what slaves thought. So the fact that a dominant stratum in a society denies that consent is important for women (say) would not show us that this society does not contain the value of consent for intercourse for women. For women themselves might well have endorsed this norm as good; only their voices are missing from the record, for reasons not unconnected with their exposure to bodily constraint. Thus, it would always be impossible to show that ancient Greco-Roman culture did not contain a given value; all we can do is to sift the highly incomplete evidence we have, remembering that it is not only incomplete, but also biased.

Furthermore, we ought to remember that a value might be present in two cultures while its application to actual people and groups might be very different in the two. Thus Amartya Sen has convincingly argued that many ancient non-Western cultures contained all the building blocks of the modern Western notion of human rights—only these entitlements were thought to belong only to some people and not to others, not to women, or lower-class men. (Of course, the very same thing is true in ancient Greece and Rome.) Thus we might find in the sexual ethics of ancient Greece and Rome values, such as kindness and concern for the soul, that are similar to values that modern Americans endorse—only in Greece and Rome they tend to be applied primarily to male-male relationships, until at least the Hellenistic era, when they do get extended in some ways to male-female relationships.

That is the descriptive question. The normative question, “Are there any values that can be justified as good ones in the sexual realm for all societies in the world?” does not require a prior affirmative answer to the descriptive question. For we may judge that there are some norms (non-cruelty, respect for consent) that are very good for all human beings, but that human societies, defective as they are, do not recognize them as often as they should. Any reasonable norm of social justice is likely to be critical, and to find all existing realities defective in various ways—so too, I think, any reasonable norm for sexual relations, especially, perhaps, for relations between men and women, which have so often been characterized by gross unkindness and injustice.

How does one go about justifying a norm, critical or otherwise? Here I myself make a strong distinction between political justification and ethical justification. Given that all modern societies contain a plurality of religious and secular views of the meaning and purpose of human life, together with the different ethical norms that are attached to those conceptions, it seems wrong to enforce on all people in such a society any one comprehensive set of values. And yet a political conception is, as John Rawls and Charles Larmore put it well, a “partial moral conception,” containing values that we can expect all citizens to endorse for political purposes, attaching it to the rest of their own comprehensive religious or secular conceptions of value.

Political justification must, then, take account of the fact of pluralism, and seek agreement only on a small group of core political values. In the process (I again agree with Rawls), we must abstain from using contentious metaphysical concepts, such as the concept of the immortal soul, and other such ideas that divide people along lines of
religion and belief. In Women and Human Development, chapter 2, I work out an account of political justification for core political values that follows Rawls’s account of argument aimed at “reflective equilibrium.” We proceed Socratically, testing our most secure judgments against the competing theories we encounter, always seeking consistency and fit in our set of judgments taken as a whole.

Sex is an area that is especially likely to divide people along lines suggested by their religious and ethical conceptions. This means that we need to ask very carefully what and how many norms in this area a pluralistic society can make part of its political conception. On the one hand, we don’t want to leave this important area entirely to the individual religions to sort out: for there are important issues of justice in this domain, including issues of non-discrimination, bodily integrity, and equality of opportunity. Any society that permits child marriage, or that does not effectively enforce laws against rape, including rape within marriage, has permitted a gross injustice, whether or not these policies receive the endorsement of some religion. On the other hand, too much state interference with the family is clearly violative of the free exercise of religion. Many difficult legal cases flow from this tension. (See my 2000 Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association.) On the whole, my approach is to be highly protective of choice and opportunity for children, and then to allow adults wide latitude to enter into consensual relationships of their own choosing.

Outside of the political domain, ethical justification is free to draw on norms contained within the particular religious or ethical tradition that one inhabits. Thus, for example, my education of my daughter drew on the tradition of Jewish ethical values. Most of the arguments of the Greeks and Romans that I survey are in this more informal category of ethical advice. Indeed, one of the great drawbacks of Greek and Roman thought, from my viewpoint, is that they typically do not distinguish between political values and ethical values. That is not because they fail to recognize what Rawls and Larmore call the “fact of reasonable disagreement”: some Roman texts, at least, show a recognition that some reasonable people are Stoics, others Epicureans, etc. And Greek religion was itself somewhat pluralistic and loosely organized: thus, some reasonable people go in for the Dionysian cult, others for the Eleusinian mysteries, etc. Nonetheless, there seems to be no concerted effort to articulate the distinction between the ethical and the political, or to argue that respect for different ways of life suggests that we should refrain from recommending politically the entirety of our normative conception. In practice, there is much toleration of diversity; but this toleration is not theorized. Thus a very important part of Wendy Doniger’s question goes unanswered.

Is beauty a central norm in the sexual sphere in all cultures? Both descriptively and normatively, I agree with Wendy Doniger that the answer is no. And I also agree that, despite the fact that the Greek term kalon has a broader reach than the English term “beauty,” including moral as well as aesthetic “fineness,” nonetheless the evidence shows how remarkably obsessed the Greeks were with physical beauty, especially that of young men. To suggest that one may love a physically unattractive person always has an air of paradox. I believe that things do change to some extent at Rome, along with the development of norms of marital companionship that focus on shared activity and emotional bonding.

And yet, something important remains missing. This is the imprint of the past. The Greeks and Romans, when they categorized emotions, thought that all of them were directed either at the present or at the future. They omitted the past as a relevant category for shaping one’s emotional life. This means that they thought little about retrospective self-blame and guilt. It also means that they thought little, when talking about erotic love, of the impact of early memories and experiences. They lacked not only the concept of infantile sexuality, but also, for the most part, the idea that infancy is a time when psychologically important things happen. We know real-life cases of intense love between mothers and sons, fathers and daughters (Cicero’s devotion to his daughter Tullia is just one very moving case in point). But theories of sexual desire do not mention the
parent as a (forbidden) object. Indeed, even the treatment of incestuous relations is remarkably lacking in psychological depth. Oedipus is simply not imagined as pursuing a lost and hidden image of his mother, locked away somewhere in his psyche. (Probably he never saw her, given the role of nurses in the wealthy Greek household.) For Sophocles, his incest is a tragic accident, just like his parricide.

So I agree with Wendy Doniger that the obsessive focus on beauty is inadequate to account for what happened, even at Greece and Rome. But I would say that this focus is explained by a far greater and more general difficulty: the lack of an interest in infancy and childhood, and what they do to the mind.

– VI –

I am extremely grateful to Margaret Mitchell for her detailed and extremely helpful comments on my Musonius essay. I cannot hope to comment on every point she raises, so I will confine myself to three issues: (1) the parallel with constructive theology, (2) the discussion of literary form, and (3) the discussion of points of translation.

1. My engagement with Musonius, like many modern philosophers’ engagements with ancient Greek and Roman ethical texts, does have interesting parallels with the use of canonical texts in “constructive theology.” In both cases, the scholar is motivated to seek out the text by a sense that it contains something of lasting value, something worth bringing back to modernity, and even something with which one might challenge modernity. At the same time, the scholar is typically aware that the ancient world did not have the last word on what is good and just, and that all ancient texts also need to be subjected to scrutiny in the light of modern ideas and conceptions. I view the dialogical process that results as a part of the longer conversation with oneself that leads, if it ever does, to “reflective equilibrium” (in either the political or the more general ethical sphere). When as a graduate student I turned to the study of Aristotle and the other ancient philosophers, it was with a sense that the modern ethical landscape was impoverished, and could be made richer by a renewed attention to ancient conceptions of virtue, flourishing, and the rest. At the same time, throughout my career, I have drawn attention to significant gaps and omissions in the ancient sources—as I just did in writing about the emotions and childhood in response to Wendy Doniger.

Interpretation and evaluation are difficult to keep separate when one’s project is constructive. For if one begins with a presumption that the text contains something of lasting value, it makes sense to choose, among available interpretations, one that makes the best constructive sense of it, making it say something plausible rather than implausible. And yet, at the same time, if learning is what one wants from the text, and enrichment of the present, one must preserve a sense of the strangeness of the past, not too quickly interpreting in a way that makes the text conform to modern stereotypes. (Thus it was wrong to interpret Aristotle as either a Kantian or a utilitarian, although this pitfall was quite natural for philosophers who believed that all good thinkers must be either one or the other.)

When one approaches texts dealing with the position of women, things begin rather differently from the way they do when one’s topic is virtue or happiness. For here one would be foolish to presume that the text does offer something good to modernity. We know too much about the position of women in the ancient Greek world to expect much help in this area; women’s place is more like the place of the stars in the solar system than like the nature of virtue, in the sense that we usually expect what ancient texts say to be radically in error. But one should also be prepared to give credit to bold ideas where they do turn out to be present—not simply assuming, for example, that Plato’s proposals regarding women in the Republic are a joke (an idea that never had much going for it, given the historical evidence about Spartan women, etc.). In the case of Musonius, the works seem so startling and bold that scholars have treated him as if he really is to feminism as Aristotle is to virtue ethics—the best place to begin in crafting a modern account that we can believe. My paper argues that things are really much more complicated: the texts contain some

... women's place is more like the place of the stars in the solar system than like the nature of virtue ...
good ideas, but they also pull back from good ideas that were available to Musonius.

By “incomplete” I mean two things. First, I mean, “incomplete” from the point of view of what we can agree to be good today. I argue, then, that de Ste. Croix and others are wrong to find Musonius a heroic figure who embodies contemporary values, or pretty nearly. But I also mean, second, that his feminism is incomplete even by his own school’s standards: Greek Stoicism had a much more thoroughgoing set of commitments to women’s equality.

2. Margaret Mitchell is correct, of course, in saying that Musonius did not write his works down himself. In that, he is similar to Epictetus, whose surviving works are also discourses that a pupil recorded. How different is this situation from that of the writings of other Greek philosophers? We know that most writings were dictated, not written out by hand (although personal letters often were handwritten, and Cicero indicates that this is a mark of intimacy). Aristotle’s surviving works are lecture notes or records of lectures that someone wrote out, but whether it was he, or a servant, or even a listening pupil, is impossible to settle. So my first point is that works that Mitchell takes as cases of “writings” are usually dictated, not written out by hand (although personal letters often were handwritten, and Cicero indicates that this is a mark of intimacy). Aristotle’s surviving works are lecture notes or records of lectures that someone wrote out, but whether it was he, or a servant, or even a listening pupil, is impossible to settle. So my first point is that works that Mitchell takes as cases of “writings” are usually dictated; my second point is that works that are written down by someone else may be nonetheless “writings,” in the sense of deliberate compositions whose style and substance are carefully chosen by the thinker in question. (In the modern era, we should remember that an exacting a stylistic masterpiece as James’s The Golden Bowl was dictated, not written out in longhand.) So I see no reason to conclude that we know nothing about Musonius’s style. Assuming that the recorder was intent on accuracy, as seems to have been the case with Arrian writing down Epictetus’s discourses, the nearest parallel, we can cautiously assess the works for evidence of style as well as argumentative content.

Mitchell suggests that one might do more with the literary form of the diatribe in analyzing the text. I welcome this suggestion, although I would add that we know all too little about diatribes in this period; it is difficult to know how far later texts provide evidence for what a first-century diatribe was like. I myself think that a more appropriate comparison might be to the contemporaneous dialogues of Seneca, in all of which we find the constructed persona of the philosopher and also a constructed interlocutor of some type, who keeps on raising questions. Musonius’s “some say” has the function of inquit in these Senecan texts.

Now in the case of Seneca, we know something about the constructed addressee because he tells us who it is: his brother Novatus, his friend Lucilius, or whoever. But even then, we need to focus on what we can glean from the text itself; it is dangerous to flesh the portrait out from material gathered from other sources. Thus, all my remarks about the “audience” of the two works I analyze are meant as accounts of the constructed persona of the interlocutor in the text. The real-life audience would, very likely, have been much more diverse.

Why do I suggest that “That Women Too” is addressed to husbands? First of all, I hope we can agree that the imagined interlocutors are male. Women are constantly talked about, but not imagined as present in the discussion. Second, a specific setting is imagined throughout: that of a well-to-do household that needs a lot of management and that contains children and servants. The women whose education is being debated are imagined as wives in such households. Third, the person addressed asks, throughout, the sort of question that a husband would have about such a wife: Will this education make her chaste or bold? Will it make her a good or a bad mother? Will it make her talk too much? And so on. I would say that Musonius, by narrowing the women in question to wives of husbands, has also, at least in a very general way, narrowed the profile of the interlocutor to husbands of such wives.

Why do I say that “That Sons and Daughters” is addressed to an interlocutor who is imagined as a father? Well, first of all, there is the matter of the title (repeated in the first sentence of the work). The children are not imagined as “boys and girls,” as they are in Plato, but as someone’s “sons and daughters.” Now we could say that both father and mother are implicitly addressed. But, in fact, in the
I am puzzled by the suggestion that self-esteem is a modern value...
seems clearly pertinent to the context, for what Musonius is explaining is why the woman he describes will “not be intimidated by anyone because he is well born or powerful or rich or, by Zeus, because he is a tyrant.” To explain this psychological firmness, it seems pertinent to cite the fact that she has a high estimation of herself: the big shots don’t seem bigger than her own soul. Of course, Mitchell’s candidate, namely the woman who has studied Stoic philosophy, is in the picture here as everywhere. For that is the way in which Musonius thinks such a woman gets the right understanding of everything, including her own soul. So I’m not saying that Mitchell’s suggestion is wrong; but it does seem a little less specific than mine, with its links to the virtue tradition. Moreover, I think Mitchell misunderstands both me and Stoicism when she contrasts the woman’s philosophical thoughts with “some inner psychological disposition (like self-esteem).” For, of course, the woman’s contemplation is an inner psychological condition, as the Stoics repeatedly insist; and, on the other side, the candidate I mention, self-esteem, like all psychological dispositions for the Stoics, is a cognitive disposition, and consists in having certain sorts of thoughts.

What about autourgikē? Here I need to say first of all that I am not using the term “autonomy” in any specifically modern post-Enlightenment sense. I mean simply taking charge of one’s life oneself, being self-governing. Thus, I understand autourgikē to be close to Greek autonomos, and “autonomy” was meant to bring out that relationship. Autourgikē is derived from autos, “self,” and erg-, the root for “functioning” or “doing.” In Greek philosophy, the term ergon and associated terms have an extremely broad sense and are by no means limited to craft labor. The ergon of the human being is Aristotle’s topic in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics; it is Plato’s topic at the end of Book I of the Republic, and so on. It would be very odd for any philosopher in this tradition to think of an ergon primarily as a piece of craft labor. It is any deed, act, or function, so the autourgikē is one who functions, or acts, or does deeds, on her own hook, under her own guidance. I thought of “autonomy” as an imperfect way of capturing that idea in English. The Liddell-Scott-Jones passages cited by Mitchell that associate the idea of an ergon primarily with craft labor postdate Musonius; we need to think of the philosophical tradition as he would have encountered it.

One more work is significant. Sophocles’ Antigone, an extremely important text for all ancient thinkers, continually draws attention to Antigone’s unusual independence and self-government with the prefix aut-. Thus, autonomos (821); autognōtos orga, “self-invented passion” (875); and, at line 52, Ismene calls the burial of Polynices something done autos autourgōi cheiri, “you yourself with a self-functioning hand.” Picked up later by autonomos and autognōtos, the word denotes Antigone’s defiant temper, as she takes into her own hands functions that don’t properly belong to any woman. Thus, I agree with Mitchell that there is a deliberate playing on ideas of female boldness, I just think that the resonance of the word supports, rather than undermines, the case for thinking of the erga in question as acts generally, and thus of self-government as the central idea in question.

These brief and inadequate comments show how much Margaret Mitchell’s thoughtful analysis has stimulated my thinking. I am extremely grateful to her for these criticisms, and for the deeper methodological questions they raise. ✷
A TRIBUTE TO CURTIS BOCHANYIN

Richard A. Rosengarten

My public introduction to Curt Bochanyin occurred about fifteen years ago, at a faculty meeting in this room. Now, to appreciate this introduction, you must understand that Divinity School faculty meetings are characterized by two qualities—only one of which is associated explicitly with the Library’s values—rarity and brevity. We meet once per quarter, and the successful dean is able to conduct the business of the meeting and adjourn the session by 12:45 p.m. at the latest.

Colleagues do a good deal to encourage this brevity: no one exactly levitates out of the room, but any number of our colleagues do seem to be lifting up out of their chairs as the big hand on the clock passes the “6” and heads toward the “9.” It is fair to say that, if the room is not tense, it is nonetheless the future tense that is most on the minds of those present.

Curt was about to report to the faculty on the divinity collection, and, as is the case with such reports, it was scheduled at the end of the agenda. On this particular day, when my predecessor Chris Gamwell called on Mr. Bochanyin as the big hand teetered between the “7” and the “8”—that is to say at about 12:37 p.m.—I would estimate that fully half of the faculty were levitating.

As Curt stood, they immediately returned to their seats. Heads turned, brows furrowed, concentration took over. This was a man who commanded the respect and attention of this faculty. What struck me about his report was its utter command: both synthetically, in terms of generalizing about the collection, and in its careful, detailed response to all the specific questions that were raised. This was a man who spoke ex cathedra, enjoying the imprimatur that the University accords: he knew what he was talking about! There were, indeed, questions, and we left at 12:47 p.m. that day. No one complained.

My personal introduction to Curt Bochanyin occurred in the summer of 2000, when I became Dean and contacted him to learn more about the collection and the Divinity School. I was charmed and captivated by the quiet, self-effacing man who possessed that wry, soft-spoken humor and displayed, on occasion, moments of steely principle that peeked through his unassuming air. He spoke again with authority about the collection, but the overwhelming sense was of two things that seem to me, if I may be so bold in a company of librarians, to be the hallmarks of your profession: custodianship and service. It was plain that Curt loved the divinity collection, and that his utterly magisterial understanding was a function of that love, and that the love was expressed in his care for it, and in his eagerness to make it the most powerful tool it could be for the faculty who used it. It was without question one of the most heartening, even ennobling encounters I had at the outset of my work as Dean, and for this I shall always be thankful.

Dean Rosengarten delivered this speech on December 11, 2002, at a retirement reception in Swift Common Room in honor of Curtis Bochanyin, the Joseph Regenstein Library’s Bibliographer for Religion and the Humanities. In attendance were Mr. Bochanyin’s Library colleagues as well as Divinity School faculty, students, and staff.
grateful to Curt. I came away with a magnified sense of what my own professional responsibilities were.

You all know Curt’s achievements, so I shall not go on at great length, other than to note that he seems to know every relevant language and to have a personal command on the history of scholarship in religion that is unequalled. His work with Kathleen Arthur and Sherry Byrne on the restoration and renovation of the divinity collection is remarkable, and to my knowledge utterly unparalleled in higher education. Certainly the preservation fund grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities was at the time, and remains today, the largest such allocation ever made to a divinity collection in the United States. Without question we have, in large part, Curt to thank for that fact: no one has understood the collection and its significance so fully and so comprehensively, or made the case for its enduring value so compellingly.

Curt also commands enormous respect from this faculty. Colleagues such as Buzzy Fishbane, Chris Gamwell, Martin Marty, Margaret Mitchell, and Susan Schreiner could not be here today but asked me to convey to you their gratitude. The fact that Curt worked so well with so many distinguished scholarly personalities is a matter that warms a dean’s heart even as it excites his admiration (and envy). That Curt elicited from them the same praise is a wonderful testimony to his professionalism.

Sincere thanks, Curt, for complementing a world-class faculty with world-class librarianship. We wish you only the best of times in your retirement. We shall miss you intensely, but are grateful for the standard you have set and the foundation you have established in the divinity collection you tended with such love and discernment.

ENDNOTES FOR MITCHELL, continued from page 27

1. The essay early on alludes to the famously provocative contrast de Ste. Croix made between Musonius and Paul: “Musonius is both more rational and more humane than St. Paul in his attitude to women, sex and marriage, and he is exceptionally free from the male-dominated outlook, desiring the subjection of women to their husbands . . .” (G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World [London: Duckworth, 1981], 110). Nussbaum responds that “[de Ste. Croix’s] claim had, and has a certain plausibility, despite the rhetorical excess with which it was expressed.” Although I cannot take up this important and complex question here (though I would welcome doing so in the future), it should be remembered with appropriate caution that the basis for de Ste. Croix’s judgment was the questionable premise that the “male-dominated outlook” was “stronger among Jews than among many pagans (the Romans above all) and was implanted in Paul by his orthodox Jewish upbringing” (110). One need not hold to this outdated assumption in order to argue that Paul was not as liberal as Musonius in regard to women. But one cannot reach a judgment without attention to the issue of “which Paul?” (to which I shall bring the analogue of “which Musonius?” below).

2. To those who read biblical scholarship, Nussbaum’s complaint about Musonius’s deficiency in naming or representing real women (see 311–12) sounds remarkably like Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza’s famous critique of the evangelist Mark’s patriarchalizing suppression of the name of the woman who anointed Jesus (Mark 14:3–9) in In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins (New York: Crossroads, 1983).

3. De doctrina christiana 3.10.15–16, etc.

4. Hence it is inaccurate to refer, as Nussbaum does, to “his writings” (285). On 321 n. 2, Nussbaum acknowledges that “we simply do not know whether he wrote treatises,” but she does not discuss the literary history of the works in question, or, more to the point here, give it significant attention in her analysis.


7. Nussbaum argues that “this partnership is not simply for the sake of reproduction . . . the goal is a complete sharing of life” (298). But there is much evidence that Musonius places a high valuation on that purpose, toward the propagation of the human race (Nussbaum appreciates this more on 308–9). Rather than placing koinōnía over paidopoiía, Musonius seems to hold the two as twin or parallel values in XIIIB, lines 2–5, in XIV, lines 65–67, he says “we all suppose that all these gods (Hera, Eros and Aphrodite) have engaged in the work of bringing a man and woman together for/with an eye to having children” (pros paidopoiían, my translation). Nussbaum points to the important line in XIII A, line 6, but has not quite rendered it accurately when she translates “this is not yet enough for marriage.” What Musonius says (more problematically from a feminist standpoint!) is that the bearing of a child is not yet sufficient for the husband (ho gamōn; as clearly contrasted in line 1 of the first fragment with the woman, he gamaonēn). 8. For example, in my Josephus seminar last spring, in the height of violence in the Middle East, we had profitable discussions about the value and accuracy of translating the word stasis/stasis, which Josephus uses for Jews who fomented revolt against Rome, as “terrorist.”


11. Ibid., 284. This is also consistent with Musonius’s other uses of the term and its cognates; see fragment XI, lines 6 and 40 (on farming with one’s own hands); XIII B, line 6. Nussbaum herself translates the cognate verb autarkein in the continuation of this passage (III, line 71) as “to act for herself” (not “to live with self-esteem”).


THOMAS BERG, M.A. 1992, Professor of Law at St. Thomas School of Law in Minneapolis, coauthored, with Michael McConnell and John Garvey, *Religion and the Constitution* (Aspen Law and Business, 2002). Mr. Berg was also the chief drafter of the “Joint Statement of Church-State Scholars on School Vouchers and the Constitution,” sponsored by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (www.pewforum.org, 2002).

ALAN L. BERGER, M.A. 1970, Raddock Scholar Chair of Holocaust Studies at Florida Atlantic University, has coedited *The Continuing Agony: From the Carmelite Convent to the Cross at Auschwitz* (Global Publications, 2002).

FRANK BURCH BROWN, M.A. 1972, Ph.D. 1979, Frederick Doyle Kershner Professor of Religion and the Arts at Christian Theological Seminary in Indianapolis, will be the inaugural Luce Visiting Professor of Theology and Art at St. John’s School of Theology and Seminary in Collegeville, Minnesota, in the fall of 2003.

JEFFREY CARLSON, M.A. 1980, Ph.D. 1988, has been appointed Dean of the Rosary College of Arts and Sciences at Dominican University in River Forest, Illinois.

WARREN G. FRISINA, M.A. 1979, Ph.D. 1987, Co-dean of the Honors College and Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religion at Hofstra University, has published *The Unity of Knowledge and Action* (SUNY Press, 2002). In this book, Frisina builds upon insights from the sixteenth-century Neo-Confucian Wang Yang-ming, the American pragmatist John Dewey, and the process philosopher Alfred North Whitehead to argue that knowledge is best understood as a form of action. According to Frisina, many of the most puzzling philosophical problems in the modern era can be given by the late university board member Ruth Wray to honor her husband and to recognize Wittenberg's humanities faculty, whose work she greatly admired.

WILLIAM DEAN, M.A. 1964, Ph.D. 1967, Professor of Constructive Theology at Iliff School of Theology in Denver, Colorado, has recently published *The American Spiritual Culture: And the Invention of Jazz, Football, and the Movies* (Continuum International, 2002). The book describes the common American spiritual culture and its affect on the concept of God, and illustrates its argument through discussion of three popular American arts. Mr. Dean has also cofounded *Res Publica*, a national organization devoted to discussion of faith and American public life.


WILLIAM I. ELLIOTT, B.D. 1957, Professor Emeritus of English Literature at Kanto Gakuin University in Yokohama, Japan, retired from teaching in 2002. That year, he was also appointed editor of Kanto Gakuin University Press, and he published a bilingual Japanese and English translation of Shuntarō Tanikawa’s poetry collection *Minimal* (Shinchosha, 2002).

WARREN R. COPELAND, M.A. 1971, Ph.D. 1977, Professor of Religion and Urban Studies at Wittenberg University in Springfield, Ohio, was appointed the Kenneth E. Wray Chair in the Humanities at the beginning of the 2002–3 academic year. The appointment was made upon the recommendation of a group of faculty colleagues from each of the university’s humanities departments. The endowment for the chair was given by the late university board member Ruth Wray to honor her husband and to recognize Wittenberg's humanities faculty, whose work she greatly admired.
traced to our tendency to assume that knowledge is separate from action. Letting go of the sharp knowledge-action distinction makes possible a coherent theory of knowledge that is more adaptive to the way we experience one another, the world, and ourselves. By responding directly to problems raised by contemporary thinkers like Charles Taylor, Donald Davidson, Richard Rorty, Daniel Dennett, Mark Johnson, George Lakoff, and Robert Neville, the book maps out a strategy for making progress in the contemporary quest for a “nonrepresentational theory of knowledge.”

WILLIAM HARMAN, M.A. 1972, Ph.D. 1981, was recently appointed Professor in and Chair of the Department of Philosophy and Religion at the University of Tennessee in Chattanooga.

DAVID HEIN, M.A. 1977, Professor and Chair of the Department of Religion at Hood College in Frederick, Maryland, has published a new article, “Episcopalianism among the Lakota/Dakota Indians of South Dakota” in The Historiographer 40 (Advent 2002): 14–16.

JOHN CLIFFORD HOLT, Ph.D. 1977, William R. Kenan, Jr., Professor of Religion and the Humanities, received an honorary Doctorate of Letters from the University of Peradeniya (formerly the University of Ceylon) in recognition of his contributions to Buddhist and Sri Lankan studies. He has also coedited, with Divinity School alumni JONATHAN WALTERS (M.A. ‘86, Ph.D. ‘92) and JACOB KINNARD (M.A. ‘89, Ph.D. ‘96), Constituting Communities: Theravada Buddhism and the Religious Cultures of South and Southeast Asia (SUNY Press, 2003), a collection of essays in honor of Frank E. Reynolds, Professor Emeritus of the History of Religions and Buddhist Studies at the Divinity School.

BARBARA JURGENSEN, M.A. 1975, D.Mn. 1982, has published Psalms of Comfort: Comforting Passages from the Book of Psalms (Fairway Press). Each page, in a separate conversation with Jesus, presents a person coping with a difficult situation, quotes pertinent words from the Psalms, and concludes with insights and promises from the Gospels.

PETER O'LEYAR, B.A. 1990 (College), M.A. 1994, Ph.D. 1999, Lecturer at the School of the Art Institute of Chicago and coeditor of the literary journal LVNG, has published Gnostic Contagion: Robert Duncan and the Poetry of Illness (Wesleyan University Press, 2002). In 2001, Mr. O'Leary published a volume of poetry, Watchfulness (Spuyten Duyvil), and edited To Do As Adam Did: Selected Poetry of Ronald Johnson (Talisman House).


DAVID E. SINACORE-GUINN, M.A. 1996, has been appointed Executive Director of the International Human Rights Law Institute of DePaul University College of Law, where he also serves as Adjunct Professor. Mr. Sinacore-Guinn has also published his sixth book, Faith on Trial: Communities of Faith, the First Amendment, and the Theory of Deep Diversity (Lexington Books, 2002).

JOHN G. STACKHOUSE, JR., Ph.D. 1987, the Sangwoo Youtong Chee Professor of Theology and Culture at Regent College in Vancouver, Canada, has published four books in the last few months. They are as follows: Humble Apologetics: Defending the Faith Today (Oxford University Press)—which features a commendation by former Divinity School Professor Paul Griffiths; Evangelical Futures: Facing Critical Issues of the Day (Baker Academic)—a series of academic essays on North American evangelicalism; Church: An Insider's Look at How We Do It (Baker Academic)—a popular-level collection of shorter articles on various aspects of contemporary church life; and What Does It Mean to Be Saved? Broadening Evangelical Horizons of Salvation (Baker Academic)—the third volume of theological essays that the author has edited for the Regent Theology Series with this publisher. Mr. Stackhouse, who trained under Martin E. Marty at the Divinity School, suggests that “for this one year in my career I get to feel like Marty felt for every year in his.” He also thanks the Louisville Institute, headed by JAMES LEWIS (Ph.D. '87), for a grant that helped support the sabbatical term in which these books were completed.

JEFFREY TRUMBOWER, M.A. 1984, Ph.D. 1989, Professor in and Chair of the Department of Religious Studies at St. Michael's College in Colchester, Vermont, earned the top college scholarship award from that institution for 2002. St. Michael's faculty and colleagues selected Mr. Trumbower for outstanding teaching as well as scholarship, for his contagious enthusiasm, for his gifted and animated storytelling, and for "making ancient literatures come alive and the issues they raise relevant." Mr. Trumbower is the author,
most recently, of Rescue for the Dead: The Posthumous Salvation of Non-Christians in Early Christianity (Oxford University Press, 1992).

ROBERT WILSON-BLACK, M.A. 1992, Ph.D. 2002, Vice President for Institutional Advancement at Meadville Lombard Theological School, has been appointed the new Vice President for Development at the University of St. Francis in Joliet, Illinois. In his new position, Mr. Wilson-Black will focus on building alumni programming and giving as well as cultivating a major donor base.

JOHN R. WIMMER, Ph.D. 1992, has been named Program Director in the Religion Division in the Indianapolis-based Lilly Endowment, Inc. Mr. Wimmer was formerly the founding director of the Indianapolis Center for Congregations, an Endowment-funded program of the Alban Institute.

RALPH WOOD, M.A. 1968, Ph.D. 1975, University Professor of Theology and Literature at Baylor University in Waco, Texas, was recently named a Distinguished Alumnus by his undergraduate alma mater, Texas A&M in Commerce. As a result of his essay on J. R. R. Tolkien, he has been asked to give lectures at a host of schools, including Oberlin College, Duke University, and Notre Dame University, among numerous others. The remarkable interest in the theological implications of Tolkien's work has been stirred up by Peter Jackson's hugely successful film version of The Lord of the Rings.

MARTIN E. MARTY, Ph.D. 1956, Fairfax M. Cone Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus of the History of Modern Christianity at the Divinity School, celebrated his seventy-fifth birthday among friends at the Hinsdale Golf Club in Hinsdale, Illinois, on January 23, 2003. (Marty’s actual birthday was February 6.) Hosted by Divinity School alumna LINDA LEE NELSON (Ph.D. ’95) and her husband Randy Kurtz, the party included nearly one hundred guests who sang, joked, ate exceptionally well, and listened to wonderful music, much of it composed for the occasion. Toasts to Marty were warm and heartfelt, and a splendid time was had by all.

In shock that sent tremors through the Geist, Franz Bibfeldt himself appeared at Marty’s party. Students of Bibfeldt’s work will recognize this as a landmark moment. Bibfeldt’s seminal study The Problem of the Year Zero (Vanity), rendered complex all dating of events, and had a corresponding unhappy effect on Bibfeldt’s capacity to keep his personal calendar: he was always already a year early or a year late for events, and had until this occasion never succeeded in attending a seminar or conference or even his children’s graduations in the appropriate year. His appearance, then, at this occasion was truly a special tribute to Marty.

While Bibfeldt did not speak, he did consent to posing for a photograph, a copy of which appears above. (Thanks to Micah Marty for this extraordinary “sighting”.)
GAYLORD PIERCE ALBAUGH, who took courses at the Divinity School in 1940, passed away at his home in Hamilton, Ontario, on December 20, 2002, at the age of ninety-three. Mr. Albaugh was a much-loved professor of Christian History at McMaster Divinity College in West Hamilton from 1943 to 1975. After retirement, he was able to complete his lifetime research project, *History and Annotated Bibliography of American Religious Periodicals and Newspapers, 1730–1830*, which he published in December 1994. He is survived by his wife, Barbara; his son, Gaylord P., Jr.; grandchildren Karen and Jennifer; and his sister, Enid Henderson.

WILLIAM CHESTER BUCHANAN, JR., M.A. 1966, passed away on January 27, 2003, in India, at the age of eighty. Born and raised in East Lansing, Michigan, Mr. Buchanan went on to earn a bachelor's degree in music from Michigan State University in 1944, and attended St. John's College in Annapolis, Maryland, from 1944 to 1947. He spent three years teaching and studying in France, which culminated in a master's degree from the Sorbonne through the Middlebury College language program. In 1966, he earned a master's degree in theology and literature from the Divinity School.

In addition to teaching English in France, Mr. Buchanan went on to teach at the Walt Whitman School in New York, at Lenox Academy, and then, for seventeen years, he taught English, French, and a great books sequence at Olivet College in Michigan. During his years at Olivet, Mr. Buchanan was the advisor to the *Garfield Review*, a literary magazine, and he was in charge of the Abbie M. Copps Poetry Contest. Before retiring from teaching, he spent two years at Olney Friends School in Barnsville, Ohio.

Mr. Buchanan published numerous book reviews and translations from French, a book of poems, and a book of essays and reminiscences. He spent seventeen years living at Vivekananda, a Vedanta Monastery and Retreat Center in Ganges, Michigan, and traveled extensively in Southeast Asia. He is succeeded by one brother, Robert Buchanan, a retired professor who lives in Lafayette, Indiana.


ROBERT W. TERRY, M.A. 1966, Ph.D. 1973, passed away on September 20, 2002, at his home in Minnesota of complications of ALS, or Lou Gehrig's disease. He was sixty-four. An ordained minister of the American Baptist Church, Mr. Terry worked as a management consultant based in Detroit for fifteen years, before being appointed, in 1981, to direct the Reflective Leadership Center of the University of Minnesota's Hubert H. Humphrey Institute, where he served for almost a decade. He left the institute in the early 1990s to do consulting work with his own company, the Terry Group.

Though his body deteriorated, Mr. Terry's mind remained sharp, and he was able to use a computer as he worked on his last book, which was about making spirituality central in leadership thought.

In addition to his wife, Cathy Polanski of St. Paul, who married him in 1991 and worked for the Terry Group, his survivors include sons Ross Goodheart, Steve Terry, Grant Hendrickson, and Thomas Hendrickson; a daughter, Holly Hendrickson; three grandchildren; a brother, David; and his mother, Lillian.

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ERRATA

The editor regrets the misprint in Avery Cardinal Dulles's essay "Catholic Teaching on the Death Penalty: Has It Changed?" which appeared in the autumn 2002 issue of *Criterion*. The reference to "canon law commentaries" in the second column on page thirteen of that issue should have read "theological literature."
CRITERION solicits your participation in keeping the Divinity School up to date on alumni professional accomplishments. We also invite letters to the editor. Please use the form below, or write to us separately, and mail to the address listed below.

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