Dear Alumni and Friends —

Opening this Spring 2007 issue of *Criterion* are tributes to two scholars with strong ties to the University of Chicago Divinity School: Paul Ricoeur and Jaroslav Jan Pelikan.

Ricoeur (1913‒2005), one of the leading philosophers of the twentieth century, was the second John Nuveen Professor in the Divinity School — succeeding Paul Tillich — and taught here from 1971 until his retirement in 1991. Pelikan (1923‒2006), one of the foremost historians of the Christian church, received his doctorate from the University of Chicago in 1946 and served as a professor of historical theology at the Divinity School from 1953 to 1962.

In 2004 Ricoeur and Pelikan shared the Library of Congress’s John W. Kluge Prize for Lifetime Achievement in the Human Sciences, an honor sometimes called the Nobel Prize for the humanities.

In this issue, their legacies are examined by Divinity School faculty, alumni, and friends.

Concluding this issue is the 2006 John Nuveen Lecture, delivered on Thursday, November 2, in Swift Lecture Hall. Geoffrey Stone, Harry Kalven, Jr. Distinguished Service Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School and the most recent Nuveen Lecturer, discussed freedom of religion, the war on terrorism, and the courts.

As always, my thanks to Jeremy Biles, editorial assistant, and Robin Winge, designer.

I hope you enjoy this issue,

Terren Ilana Wein, Editor

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1 Contents & List of Contributors

2 Tributes for Paul Ricoeur
1913–2005
Don Browning
David Pellauer
William Schweiker

9 Tributes for Jaroslav Jan Pelikan
1923–2006
Hans Hillerbrand
F. Dean Lueking
Martin E. Marty

14 Freedom of Religion,
the War on Terrorism, and
the Courts
Geoffrey R. Stone

21 Alumni News
One of the leading philosophers of the twentieth century, Paul Ricoeur taught at the Divinity School from 1971 until his retirement in 1991. He was the second John Nuveen Professor, succeeding Paul Tillich. He died in 2005 in his native France.

Paul Ricoeur:
Hermeneutics without Losing Science

Don Browning

Paul Ricoeur’s contributions to contemporary scholarship are so wide and varied that it is impossible to write about them all. He contributed to the philosophy of the will, to phenomenology, to a new perspective on phenomenology called hermeneutic phenomenology, and to a fresh understanding of Freud and the role of symbolism, metaphor, and narrative in all thought, including philosophy.

He enriched philosophical and theological ethics in his monumental *Oneself as Another* (1992).

To simplify my task, I will write about how Ricoeur has influenced my own thought and the two sets of disciplines that I deal with the most: the social sciences and religious ethics. This has to do with the way he included science in his theory of hermeneutics, i.e., his philosophy of how we interpret the signs and symbols that convey our self-understanding.

Ricoeur’s theory of hermeneutics was influenced by Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, especially Gadamer. He agreed with Gadamer that we first come to understand ourselves through inherited language patterns—what Gadamer called our “effective history.” This flood of linguistic signs, symbols, metaphors, and narratives is mediated to us by surrounding communities, cultures, institutions, and traditions whose histories go back almost endlessly into the past yet still shape our experience in ways we do not fully comprehend. For Gadamer, the past is alive; it shapes us even when we think it does not. Human understanding, for both Gadamer and Ricoeur, is first a matter of interpreting the effective history that has shaped us and which, to some extent, we already know in dim and distorted ways.

All this Ricoeur accepts from Gadamer, hence his appre-
Humans were, for Ricoeur, embodied creatures, and science could discover fragments of truth at the level of natural inclinations and desires.

ciation for language, history, symbolism, and narrative. But Ricoeur brings a very important twist to Gadamer that makes a huge difference in how hermeneutic philosophy can contribute to both the social sciences and to philosophical and theological ethics. Ricoeur retains a role for science as a subordinate dimension of understanding and interpretation. How does he do that, and what difference does it make?

One of my favorite texts in the corpus of Ricoeur is his collection of essays titled *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences* (1981). In one place, Ricoeur is mildly critical of Gadamer. He says that the title of Gadamer's magnum opus *Truth and Method* (1982) probably should have been *Truth or Method*, since in reality Gadamer tended to pit truth and meaning against method. Truth in this title stands for the full understanding of human meaning-making words, symbols, and gestures. This understanding first comes through hermeneutical interpretation seen as a kind of dialogue between our situated questions and the world of meaning opened by the words and gestures of the effective history that made us. On the other hand, both Ricoeur and Gadamer use the word “method” to refer to empirical science and the procedures of observation, hypothesis building, and testing entailed in gaining scientific knowledge. Ricoeur, however, believed that Gadamer had gone too far and collapsed human understanding into a hermeneutics that finds no place for the empirical sciences.

Ricoeur is sympathetic to Gadamer’s goal of saving human understanding from collapsing into the foundationalist agenda of the empirical sciences. Ricoeur warns us about the nihilism implicit in the reductionist scientific trajectory—its implicit rejection of tradition, culture, and religion and the consequent alienation that follows from the loss of their wisdom, insight, and truth.

Ricoeur thought there was a way to accomplish this rehabilitation of tradition without rejecting science. I think he was right. Ricoeur did this by making science a submoment within hermeneutic understanding. In his early work on the will in *Freedom and Nature* (1966), *Freud and Philosophy* (1970), and *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, Ricoeur developed the concepts of “diagnosis,” “distanciation,” and “explanation” as a way of locating the role of science in gaining understanding. These were his substitutes for the more philosophical foundationalist idea of “objectivity.” He believed that the sciences never achieve the absolute objectivity that the philosophical foundationalists like to pretend. But the sciences do achieve—and helpfully so—a bit of explanatory “distance” from our historically shaped pre-understandings and pre-judgments—judgments or prejudices that may need the refinement of science but are nonetheless storehouses of the wisdom of the past and should therefore be preserved, even if critiqued and revised.

Ricoeur thought that we could learn the most about the human—its central features of freedom, will, aspiration, brokenness, and restoration—by interpreting it through the prism of the great symbols of creation, fall, sin, and poetic envisions of restoration. But he also believed—as he demonstrated in his early work on will, motivation, and the unconscious, as well as his later dialogue with the neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux in *What Makes Us Think?* (2000)—that there is a very important place for empirical psychology, psychiatry, evolutionary psychology, and neuroscience in diagnosing certain naturalistic conditions of human motivation. Humans were, for Ricoeur, embodied creatures, and science could discover fragments of truth at the level of natural inclinations and desires. But the felt experience of our bodies, mediated and interpreted by the classic learnings of the past, teach us even more vital truths, especially about how the body relates to our will, freedom, and aspirations.

Hermeneutic theory is now moving into both psychology and sociology, and Ricoeur is beginning to influence these disciplines. As this happens, the social sciences will pay more attention to history and tradition. As a result, the idea of a completely value-free social science will undergo moderation, and the gulf between the social sciences and philosophical and theological ethics will begin to be bridged. This, to me, is one of Ricoeur’s greatest contributions. ✠
He was someone who was always ready to talk philosophy, even with those who were not professional philosophers.

A Tribute to Paul Ricoeur

David Pellauer

It is almost two years now since Paul died. As I have said elsewhere, in other memorials to him, as time passes I find that the balance shifts in my work of mourning from what at first was an almost overwhelming sense of grief to what one day may yet become bearable as an enduring sense of loss.

Would that he could have lived longer and our conversations continued. Would that he could have completed that one more book he spoke of, although I know from talking with others who also visited with him the last few years of his life that he probably still had two or three more of them in mind. There were, after all, questions left open in what he had said. There were ideas not yet explored, detours still to be taken on the way to what he had at first conceived as a poetics of the will, then reformulated as a philosophical anthropology by way of a hermeneutic phenomenology, then reformulated again as a philosophy of the capable human being, one who sought, as Paul did, to live the good life with and for others in just institutions. To that I think we can add “before God,” in light of a hope expressed in terms of a how-much-more still to come and what he liked to call a logic of superabundance as opposed to one of mere equivalence.

Paul was a marvelous teacher. The number of students who flocked to his classes wherever he taught confirmed this. I suspect he was a marvelous colleague as well, and that those with whom he team-taught in this university will confirm that. He knew so much that I used to say that being able to work with him was my ongoing liberal education. When he saw a new question, he was not afraid to pursue it, and he did so fearlessly, never thinking it would prevent him from doing his real work, from answering his one question. I think one expression of this was that he always tried to think with, rather than against, others—even when in the end he disagreed with them. I saw this many times when he spoke in public and the assigned respondents attacked what he had said in the belief that this aggressive procedure was the best way to truth. He always took what they said seriously and often showed that he had already considered what they proposed and had even gone beyond that. Not surprisingly, the audience afterwards flocked to him, not to his critics, for further conversation.

I do not think he ever said “no” to a student who asked him to serve on a dissertation committee or for his time just to discuss an idea. In France, they say he outlived his enemies, meaning that it has turned out that he was right not to give in to or simply to adopt the latest intellectual fashions as they kept changing throughout his long life. He found what was good in these new ways of thinking even while he probed their limits and presuppositions, not allowing them simply to claim already to have said the last word. He was someone who was always ready to talk philosophy, even with those who were not professional philosophers. Few of us, I think, realized how influential he was outside the academy, for politicians, lawyers and magistrates, church leaders and laity. But these are stories that are now being told, or that eventually will be told.

In one of his last books, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, he spoke of the “small miracle” that is recollection, our capacity to remember and realize that we do remember, that we were there, that we did experience that event, that encounter, that joy or pain. He dedicated this book to his beloved wife, Simone, who had died before he did. I was lucky enough to know both of them and am grateful for their friendship and support. Death, Paul always maintained, is not the end of life in the sense of being its telos or utmost possibility. Death simply cuts off life and as such is a part of life. Paul’s death, like his kindness to me, is a part of my life and my memory. I will not forget him or the debt I owe him. 
A Tribute to Paul Ricoeur

William Schweiker

Some of my first memories of Paul Ricoeur involve seeing him lecture in Swift Hall, glasses poised on his forehead in a somewhat disheveled way, and yet always pushing thought forward by engaging thinker after thinker. It was the same experience I had when I began to read his books, and, with special interest, took his Ph.D. seminar that led to the publication of *Time and Narrative*. In every case, Ricoeur seemed to be following some fine thread of thought about matters basic to human understanding even if those threads could become lost to those with less knowledge of the history of thought than he (and who did not!).

Yet by the end of a lecture or a seminar session or book the thread would reappear and the point of what Ricoeur called “detours” through thinkers and texts would become obvious—or at least clearer. To study with Ricoeur or to read his books was always an adventure in the truest sense of that word. Not only did the insights of the great minds of the past suddenly appear with force and moment—a genuine *adventus*—but also, along the way, so did Ricoeur’s abiding concerns. Happily for me, I was able to join the faculty of the Divinity School while Ricoeur was still present, and, further, I helped to host one of the last conferences on his work which he both attended and at which he provided a stunning closing lecture. Of course, through the years I sought my own specific path of thought and inquiry, and I have disagreed, often radically, with Ricoeur’s work. How could it be otherwise at Chicago? Nevertheless, like many others I have felt drawn again and again to engage the thought of this philosopher who listened, and listened closely, to the Christian message—and all religious symbols and narratives.

For many readers of Ricoeur the endless detours that characterize his books are a distraction; they certainly frustrate those who want the straight line to truth (if there is such a thing) rather than to journey like ancient Hermes between realms of meaning. Yet something crucial is at stake in these detours, at least in my mind. To engage the greatest thinkers of a civilization’s past around basic human questions attests to several features of human existence that Ricoeur both understood and intellectually embodied. In retrospect, I am convinced that this pedagogy and method of writing exemplified Ricoeur’s formulation of the moral aim of life so succinctly and yet powerfully stated in *Oneself as Another*: the desire to live well with and for others in just institutions.

To engage other thinkers with hermeneutical sensitivity is to realize the incompleteness of any human project in and through an encounter with the thought and lives of others. But it is to do so under the aim of the struggle for some completeness, some wholeness—and so an idea of the good life. Ricoeur thought that human beings always face the reality of death, and so a finite end, but also, through the power of the imagination, the possible infinity of meaning. Incomplete beings we are, to be sure. Human fallibility and capability permeate finitude itself, but so does the ever-present desire for some enduring goodness. The meaning of our lives is to confront the facts of existence with and for others against the dual horizon of human life: the finitude of death and the infinity of meaning. We interpret in order to understand, Ricoeur taught, but we seek to understand because of the constraints on existence as well as the quest for meaning.

Even that is not all. Ricoeur was constantly aware of the force of evil and the power of violence in human life. A genuine encounter with other thinkers, the careful assessment of their thought, requires that one acknowledge human vulnerability to violence, since the hermeneut (to use that ugly word!) can too easily manipulate texts to her or his own end. The arduous work of interpretation is to enact the possibility of the triumph of understanding over violence, the triumph of *logos* against brutish forces of existence. The aim of the good life, Ricoeur held, is a kind of completeness with and for others. But that aim, he
Ricoeur’s work testified to the possibility of “man thinking” in an age and a culture weary of thought...
Jaroslav Pelikan was one of the modern world’s foremost historians of Christianity. He received his doctorate from the University of Chicago in 1946, and served as professor of historical theology at the Divinity School from 1953 to 1962, when he joined the faculty of Yale University. He died in 2006.

A Tribute to Jaroslav Pelikan

Hans Hillerbrand

I first heard of Jaroslav Jan Pelikan back in the early 1960s, when I was told about the brilliant young church historian at Chicago who lectured on the history of Christian thought without notes, just using 3-by-5 cards with citations from primary sources. I never checked the accuracy of this scuttlebutt but was, as an aspiring teacher of church history myself, overawed—though when I subsequently heard this young faculty was Lutheran, I concluded this came with the territory.

Born in 1923 into a family of staunch Slovak Lutherans (his grandfather had been bishop of the Slovak Lutheran church in America), Pelikan entered Concordia College in Fort Wayne in 1942, and subsequently graduated from Concordia Theological Seminary in St. Louis and, in 1946, from the University of Chicago, where Wilhelm Pauck, the towering Reformation historian of that generation, served as his Doktorvater. After brief teaching stints at Valparaiso University and Concordia Seminary, Pelikan joined the faculty of the University of Chicago Divinity School in 1953. In 1962, he became Roland Bainton’s successor at the Divinity School at Yale, moving to the History Department as Sterling Professor in 1972, where he taught until his retirement in 1996. In addition to these distinguished teaching positions, Pelikan was dean of the Graduate School at Yale (1973–1978), president of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1994–1997), and
Pelikan’s legacy is our enriched understanding of the history of Christian self-consciousness . . .


Not surprisingly for a Lutheran, Pelikan began his scholarly career with Lutheran tradition—a slender book called *From Luther to Kierkegaard: A Study in the History of Theology* (1950). At the same time, he and Helmut Lehman laid the groundwork for an ambitious English translation of most of Martin Luther’s writings, of which the first volumes began to appear in 1955, and eventually comprised a remarkable fifty-five volumes. During that time, Pelikan devoted his scholarly attention to Luther and wrote an insightful book—*Luther, the Expositor*—and established himself as the foremost theological interpreter of the German reformer in the English-speaking world. In the late 1950s, his interests and foci began to broaden, first with the Abingdon Prize-winning *The Riddle of Roman Catholicism* (1959), his first venture outside the Lutheran tradition.

From then on, Pelikan’s scholarly ventures ranged ever wider—with such book titles as *Christianity and Classical Culture; The Excellent Empire; Bach Among the Theologians; Faust the Theologian; The Idea of the University*—with ever new perspectives and ever more brilliant insights. Honors, prizes, and distinctions came with increasing frequency.

Pelikan saw himself as a scholar’s scholar, staying aloof from current ecclesiastical affairs and politics, his stance clearly being that he could be more influential through his writings than personal engagement. His conversion to Greek Orthodoxy, however, a few years before his passing, attracted considerable attention.

Pelikan’s legacy is our enriched understanding of the history of Christian self-consciousness, which he sought to illuminate both with broad strokes as well as focused vignettes. In particular, his conception of a multivolume history of Christian thought which placed what the church (rather than theologians) taught in the center of the development of Christian self-consciousness was a brilliant move, even though it did raise searching questions about whether the richness of Christian thought, particularly after the Reformation, must appropriate individual theologizing no less than the formal creeds of the churches. Adolf von Harnack, whose picture graced his office and who at least early in his scholarly career was his role model for his own ideal as a Christian public scholar, was famous for his declaration that we must overcome history with history. About Jaroslav Pelikan it might be said that he sought to affirm history with history. His motto, which he quoted again and again, came from Goethe’s *Faust*: “What you received as your legacy from your fathers, you must possess to make it your own.” All of Pelikan’s writings testify to his conviction that the past—including especially the rich theological past—continues to have relevance, that the theological articulation of two millennia continues demand, if properly understood, full allegiance. His eventual conversion to Orthodoxy was, so it seems, a symbolic expression of this commitment.

*Recquiescat in pace!*
... a full view of the man is incomplete without awareness of his deep roots in the concept of teaching as vocation ...
... he could wear any number of masks, adopt numerous poses, and demonstrate many kinds of expertise but always remain himself.

his part in seeing them through to excellence as they moved on from his tutelage. It was this spiritual lifeline, formed first in Lutheran congregations and later in Orthodoxy, that was at the heart of his vocational sense as one called and gifted by God to teach. A later and unexpected flowering of this lifelong spiritual core appeared in his eagerness, even delight, in experiencing with Sylvia the weekly Liturgy despite the lengthy Sunday drive from Hamden down to St. Vladimir’s in New York State. In his final illness the pastoral/priestly consolation given him and his family was priceless. It was of one piece with his lifelong calling as a teacher for whom students came first, a quality that I experienced one spring day in a conversation with consequences, a quality that had leavened the lives of countless others throughout his eighty-two years.

One more footnote to Pelikan’s attentive care for his students, and in this matter I may be unique: Together with Sylvia, he plotted the blind date whereby I met her sister, who became my wife. Here’s a footnote, then, to the list of accolades that describe him as teacher, scholar, author, and administrator: add Pelikan the yenta.

Jaroslav Jan Pelikan: An Appreciation

Martin E. Marty

Jaroslav—just among friends and alumni for the moment let’s call him ‘Jary’—once told me that he had two pictures on his wall. One was of Robert Hutchins, chancellor of the University of Chicago and devotee of the Great Books, and the other of Adolf von Harnack, historian of Christianity.

Scholars mount pictures on their walls for many reasons. Sometimes their motive is one of gratitude, sometimes of reverence, and no doubt sometimes as a dart-board featuring a nemesis.

Pelikan probably had many motives in his choice of pictures. He liked the fact that Chancellor Hutchins could combine scholarship with administrative work, of a sort. Pelikan served as dean of Graduate Studies at Yale and president of the nation’s most notable scholarly societies, but we never found out “of what sort” a president or chancellor he might have been.

His mounting of Harnack’s picture had to issue from many motives. Pelikan was such a protean person that he could wear any number of masks, adopt numerous poses, and demonstrate many kinds of expertise but always remain himself. Harnack was a founder of the discipline in which Pelikan excelled. He admired the Berlin scholar’s devotion to sources, prodigious learning, and the ability to put a stamp on the fields he gathered and about which he wrote. At the same time the German dismissed Gnosticism as “the acute Hellenization of Christianity” and busied himself sniffing out other evidences of such Hellenization. Pelikan did not favor Gnosticism, but he was not only not worried about Hellenization, but embraced it—to the point that late in life he set aside his Slovakian Lutheran mask and was received into Orthodoxy, Greek and Russian style.

If I would put Harnack and Pelikan pictures on my wall—and mounting Pelikan’s would come easily to me, indebted as I am to him as teacher, writer, friend, and examplar—it might be to suggest what I think I could easily defend: Harnack was unmatched as historian of dogma and doctrine in his century (1851–1930) and Pelikan was preeminent in his (d. 2006). He brought passion to subjects that were supposed to be boring to twentieth-century adults and made it exciting already as a youth and to young people through the years. One year Yale set him aside as a special scholar whose main duty was to give a lecture course on Jesus. Undergraduates by the hundreds jammed the lecture hall, and the townspeople demand was so strong that Pelikan delivered a version to crowds of adults in the evening.

Passion will only get you so far on subjects that demand Sitzfleisch, devotion, skill, and the long view. First off, to write as Pelikan did on Christian creeds and covenants around the world, it helps to know the languages. We lost count of those he commanded. I like to tell of the time I overheard him chatting with someone in a language utterly alien to me. “Oh, that was Albanian.” At that time Albania
So long as students here seriously study the Christian tradition, Pelikan will remain available to them . . .

was sealed from the world by the Curtain of Iron. “Albanian?” “Yes, he affirmed; “once you know one of those languages you can know them all.”

He loved tradition without being a traditionalist. I think it was he who coined the definition of tradition as the living faith of dead people and traditionalism as the dead faith of living people. He did agree that loving tradition was giving a vote to your ancestors. He made an epigraph out of three lines of Goethe: “What you have as heritage, Take now as task; For thus you will make it your own!” He could make debates over patripassionism, modalistic monarchianism, and Sabellianism as lively and—dare I say it?—relevant as anything being written by the “now” people, now largely forgotten, who were announcing the death of God and other relevancies in the journals of the 1960s and 1970s.

Pelikan accepted all kinds of lectureships and out of each issued short books, for instance on the meaning of Jesus, Athanasius and the Light of the World, Kierkegaard, the Christian Intellectual, and—no surprise to anyone who knows of Pelikan’s knowledge of and competence in producing music—work on Bach among the theologians. His life work, however, was the five-volume history of Christian thought which allowed him to deal with the grand themes in a sustained and enduring way. When the final volume came out, the University of Chicago Press threw a party at which Pelikan mentioned how authors sometimes feel a season of emptiness following a long task and major achievement: He cited a comment made by Edward Gibbon after that historian had completed the giant work on the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. If anyone but Jary had made that immodest allusion we would have called it an immodest allusion. In this case we called it appropriate and illuminating.

I wish we could have kept this alumnus at Chicago, a university he much loved, but he was drawn to an appropriate chair at Yale. Chicago awarded him a rare (to theologians!) honorary doctorate, at which time he could speak a kind of love letter to his alma mater. He was chosen to speak for the centennial honorary class, and did so in stunning fashion by making them characters in a detective novel.

So long as students here seriously study the Christian tradition, Pelikan will remain available to them, if only in print, his spirit haunting the sluggards but inspiring those who want to take the tradition seriously at its best, from the hands of the best. X
Freedom of Religion, the War on Terrorism, and the Courts

A fundamental question about the protection of religious freedom in the twenty-first century concerns, centrally, the role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional system. More particularly, it concerns the responsibility and capacity of the Supreme Court to protect the freedom of religion during the war on terrorism. The war on terrorism poses a unique problem in American history. It is the first time in our nation’s history that the enemy of the United States has been defined in religious terms.

In protecting ourselves against this enemy, it is therefore quite sensible to take religion into account in developing measures to preserve our security.

Consider the following: (1) The government targets its surveillance programs—including electronic surveillance and infiltration by undercover agents—at mosques and other Muslim organizations that are thought to harbor radical Muslims; (2) The government prohibits any person to preach the “glorification of terrorism,” which includes certain sermons by radical imams; (3) The government requires all Muslim airline passengers to undergo extensive security investigations before they are allowed to board commercial airplanes; (4) The government interns all Muslims in the United States, including Muslim Americans, in detention centers, where they will remain until they are individually determined to be loyal to the United States.

We have already instituted (1) and England has already instituted (2). It is easy to envision (3) following another round of 9/11-type attacks, particularly if it involves Muslim Americans, and although (4) may seem extreme, it is important to remember than the United States interned 120,000 individuals of Japanese descent, including some 80,000 Japanese Americans, during World War II. Put simply, the war on terrorism poses not only a serious threat to the United States, but a unique threat to the freedom of religion.

There are, of course, many constitutional doctrines, involving both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, which would guide the analysis of these questions, were they to arise. But constitutional doctrines are also subject to interpretation and to the exercise of judgment in their application to particular situations.

This essay is based on the 2006 John Nuveen Lecture, delivered on November 2, 2006, in Swift Lecture Hall.
Equally—indeed, more—important in times of national crisis is the general approach the Supreme Court takes to resolving conflict between national security and individual liberties.

How should judges approach the decision of cases involving the constitutionality of such measures if they are taken by the executive and legislative branches of government to protect the national security? As a matter of first principles, logic would seem to suggest that in addressing cases involving threats to the national security judges should start with a healthy dose of deference to military and executive officials. This seems sensible for several reasons.

First, individual judges have relatively little experience with national security matters. Such cases arise infrequently, and judges are relative novices when it comes to assessing the possible implications of their decisions to the national security. This cuts in favor of deference. Second, the stakes in such cases may be quite high. Unlike most legal disputes, in which an erroneous judicial decision will have only modest consequences and is usually correctible after the fact (if not for the parties, then at least more generally), the potential consequences to the nation if a judge is wrong in a case involving the national security may be truly catastrophic. Hence, a certain measure of deference seems wise. Third, for institutional reasons, judges should be reluctant to second-guess the judgments of military and executive officials in such conflicts because if they err in rejecting those judgments they may harm not only the national security but also the long-term credibility of the judiciary itself. Again, logic demands deference.

Not surprisingly in light of these reflections, judges have traditionally followed this logical course when addressing conflicts between individual liberties and national security. They have presumed that the actions of military and executive officials were constitutional whenever they acted in the name of national security. The three most dramatic twentieth-century clashes between civil liberties and national security illustrate this approach.

When the United States entered the First World War in April 1917, there was strong opposition to both the war and the draft. President Woodrow Wilson had little patience for such dissent. Only weeks after the United States entered the war, Congress enacted the Espionage Act of 1917. A year later, it enacted the Sedition Act of 1918. These laws effectively made it a crime for any person to criticize the government, the president, the draft, the war, the Constitution, or the military of the United States. The Department of Justice prosecuted more than 2,000 individuals for allegedly disloyal speech, and in an atmosphere of fear, hysteria, and clamor, most judges were quick to mete out severe punishment to those deemed disloyal. The result was the suppression of virtually all criticism of that war.

For example, Rose Pastor Stokes, the editor of the socialist Jewish Daily News, was sentenced to ten years in prison for saying, “I am for the people, while the government is for the profiteers,” during an antiwar statement to the Women’s Dining Club of Kansas City. D. T. Blodgett was sentenced to twenty years in prison for circulating a leaflet urging voters in Iowa not to reelect a congressman who had voted for conscription. The Reverend Clarence H. Waldron was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for distributing a pamphlet stating that “if Christians [are] forbidden to fight to preserve the Person of their Lord and Master, they may not fight to preserve themselves, or any city they should happen to dwell in.”

In a series of decisions in 1919 and 1920, the Supreme Court consistently upheld the convictions of individuals who had agitated against the war and the draft. Embracing the “logical” presumption for balancing civil liberties and national security concerns in time of war, the Court explained its reasoning: “When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.”

In the years after World War I, Americans came increasingly to recognize that these prosecutions had been excessive. Officials who had served in the Wilson administration conceded that the general atmosphere of intolerance had led to serious constitutional violations and criticized some federal judges for having lost their heads. Over the next few years, the federal government acknowledged that injustices had been done in the name of national security and every person who had been convicted of seditious
expression during World War I was released from prison and granted amnesty. In later years, the Supreme Court implicitly overruled its World War I era decisions, effectively acknowledging that it had failed in its responsibility to protect constitutional rights in wartime.

The critical civil liberties issue in World War II arose out of the Japanese American internment. On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which authorized the Army to “designate military areas” from which certain “persons may be excluded.” Over the next eight months, almost 120,000 individuals of Japanese descent were forced to leave their homes in California, Washington, Oregon, and Arizona. Two-thirds of these men, women, and children were American citizens, representing almost ninety percent of all Japanese Americans. No charges were brought against these individuals; there were no hearings; and they did not know where they were going, how long they would be detained, what conditions they would face, or what fate would await them. Many families lost everything. The internees were transported to one of ten permanent internment camps and placed in overcrowded rooms with no furniture other than cots. Surrounded by barbed wire and military police, they remained in these detention camps for some three years.

Why did this happen? Certainly, the days following Pearl Harbor were dark days for the American spirit. Fear of possible Japanese sabotage and espionage was rampant, and an outraged public felt an understandable instinct to lash out at those who had attacked it. But this act was also very much an extension of more than a century of racial prejudice against the “yellow peril.” Racist statements and sentiments permeated the debate from December 1941 to February 1942 about how to deal with individuals of Japanese descent.

Although the Department of Justice maintained that...
a mass evacuation of Japanese Americans was both unnecessary and unconstitutional, and although FBI director J. Edgar Hoover reported to Attorney General Biddle that the demand for mass evacuation was based on “public hysteria” rather than on fact, FDR nonetheless signed the Executive Order, largely for political reasons. Roosevelt did not want to alienate voters on the West Coast, and 1942 was an election year.

In *Korematsu v. United States,* decided in 1944, the Supreme Court embraced the “logical” presumption for dealing with conflicts between civil liberties and the national security. In a six-to-three decision, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, upheld the President’s action:

> [W]e are not unmindful of the hardships imposed . . . upon a large group of American citizens. But hardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships. . . . To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice . . . confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the [West Coast] because of hostility to . . . his race, [but] because . . . the . . . military authorities . . . decided that the urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the [area]. . . . We cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—now say that at that time these actions were unjustified.

In the years after World War II, attitudes about the Japanese internment began to shift. On February 19, 1976, as part of the celebration of the Bicentennial of the Constitution, President Gerald Ford issued Presidential Proclamation 4417, in which he acknowledged that, in the spirit of celebrating our Constitution, we must recognize “our national mistakes as well as our national achievements.” “February 19th,” he noted, “is the anniversary of a sad day in American history,” for it was “on that date in 1942 . . . that Executive Order 9066 was issued.” President Ford observed that “we now know what we should have known then”—that the evacuation and internment of loyal Japanese American citizens was “wrong.”

Several years later, President Ronald Reagan signed the Civil Liberties Restoration Act of 1988, which officially declared that the Japanese internment was a “grave injustice” and offered an official Presidential apology and reparations to each of the Japanese-American internees who had suffered discrimination, loss of liberty, loss of property, and personal humiliation because of the actions of the United States government. Over the years, *Korematsu* has become a constitutional pariah. The Supreme Court has never cited it with approval of its result.

As World War II drew to a close, the nation moved almost seamlessly into the Cold War. During this era, the nation demonized members of the Communist Party and the long shadow of the House Committee on Un-American Activities fell across our campuses and our culture. Red-hunters demanded, and got, the blacklisting of thousands of individuals and a fear of ideological contamination swept the nation.

The key constitutional decision in this era was *Dennis v. United States,* which involved the prosecution under the Smith Act of the leaders of the American Communist Party. The indictment charged the defendants with conspiring to advocate the violent overthrow of the government. In a six-to-two decision, the Court held that their convictions did not violate the First Amendment. The Court concluded that because the violent overthrow of government is such a grave harm, the danger need be neither clear nor present to justify suppression.

Over the next several years, in a series of decisions premised on *Dennis,* the Court upheld far-reaching legislative investigations of “subversive” organizations and individuals and affirmed the exclusion of members of the Communist Party from the bar, the ballot, and public employment. In so doing, the Court put its stamp of approval on an array of actions we today look back on as models of McCarthyism. As the historian David Caute has concluded, in the early fifties, “the Constitution was concussed in the courts,” and this was especially so in the Supreme Court, which too often served as “a compliant instrument of administrative persecution and Congressional inquisition.”

As these episodes illustrate, the dominant approach of the Supreme Court in the first half of the twentieth century to resolving conflicts between civil liberties and the national security was to employ the “logical” presumption. For all
the essential predicate for a policy of judicial deference in these circumstances is — predictably — lacking.

the reasons I identified earlier, the Court embraced a highly deferential stance, presuming that restrictions of civil liberties in wartime were constitutionally justified so long as the government could offer a reasonable explanation for its actions. But, as we have seen, this approach proved disastrous. These decisions have all come to be regarded as black marks on the Court’s reputation.

The problem, quite simply, is that although a presumption of deference to executive and military officials in wartime may be logical in theory, it fails in practice. With the benefit of hindsight, the reasons for this failure are evident. A policy of deference assumes that those making the critical judgments are properly taking the relevant factors into account in a fair and reasonable manner. If they fail to do so, the underlying rationale for deference is destroyed. As it turns out, the essential predicate for a policy of judicial deference in these circumstances is—predictably—lacking. Government officials charged with responsibility for the nation’s security tend naturally to exaggerate the dangers facing the nation both to protect themselves in the event they fail and to persuade legislators and the public to grant them as much power as possible. Moreover, government officials charged with responsibility for the nation’s security tend not to be particularly sensitive to the importance of civil liberties and are therefore too quick to sacrifice those liberties in order to achieve their primary goal of safeguarding the national security. Finally, opportunistic politicians tend to exploit periods of real or perceived crisis for partisan and personal gain. A time-honored method of gaining and/or consolidating power is to incite public fear, demonize an internal “enemy,” and then “protect” the public by prosecuting, interning, deporting, and spying upon those accused of “disloyalty.”

These three considerations are not exhaustive, but they are adequate to explain why the “logical” presumption of judicial deference to executive and military officials inevitably leads to unfortunate decisions. It is pointless, indeed dangerous, to defer to those whose judgments are likely to be distorted by such influences. As a practical matter, military and executive officials will invariably overvalue national security concerns at the expense of civil liberties. There may be sound reasons for judges to be cautious when they second-guess military and executive officials, but pragmatism— informs by experience—demands that courts be more rigorous in their exercise of judicial review if we are to avoid more such decisions in the future.

Of course, the comparative advantage of courts over the executive and legislative branches in interpreting and enforcing individual liberties is familiar. Responsiveness to the electorate may be essential to the day-to-day workings of democracy, but that responsiveness can lead the government too readily to sacrifice the rights of those who are regarded as different, dangerous, or disloyal. Judges with life tenure and a more focused attention on the preservation of civil liberties are more likely to protect our freedoms than the elected branches of government.

Because we know from experience that there is a repeated pattern of excessive restriction of civil liberties in wartime, courts in the twenty-first century must abandon the “logical” presumption of deference to executive and military authority and employ a more rigorous standard of review. In light of experience, we know that the “logical” presumption is counterproductive. The lesson of history is that courts must closely scrutinize invocations of military necessity and national security as justification for limiting civil liberties.

In fact, the Court, I believe, has already learned the lessons of history and has increasingly rejected the “logical” presumption. The Justices are acutely aware of the Court’s past failures, and no Justice wants his or her legacy to be similarly tainted.

Over the past half-century, at least five Supreme Court cases have posed significant “civil liberties versus national security” conflicts somewhat analogous to those during World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. The first two arose out of the Vietnam War, the latter three involved the war on terrorism. In each of these cases, the Court eschewed the sort of judicial deference that so ill-served the nation in the earlier era.

The two Vietnam War cases implicated the First and Fourth Amendments, respectively. New York Times Co. v. United States involved one of the most dramatic confrontations in American constitutional history. The U.S. government attempted to enjoin publication by the New York Times and the Washington Post of the Pentagon Papers,
... the twenty-first century has gotten off to a rather good start.

a “top secret” study of the Vietnam War, prepared within the recesses of the Defense Department, that had been made available to the newspapers through an unprecedented breach of security. The government maintained that continued publication of the Pentagon Papers would grievously harm the national security. In a six-to-three decision, the Court declined to defer to the executive's national security claim and ruled that the government could not constitutionally enjoin the publication. Justice Stewart insisted that the government could not constitutionally enjoin the publication because it had failed to prove that disclosure “will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation.”

Several years later, President Richard Nixon maintained that the executive is constitutionally exempt from the ordinary requirements of the Fourth Amendment when it undertakes national security investigations. In United States v. United States District Court (Keith), the Supreme Court unanimously rejected this contention, holding that even in national security investigations the President has no constitutional authority to wiretap American citizens on American soil without a judicially issued search warrant based upon probable cause.

More recently, the Supreme Court has addressed and sternly rejected Bush administration claims of executive authority in the war on terrorism. In each of these three decisions, the Court refused to grant deference to the executive. In Rasul v. Bush, the Court held that federal courts have habeas corpus jurisdiction to review the legality of the confinement of the Guantanamo Bay detainees. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court held that the government could not indefinitely detain an American citizen captured in Afghanistan without giving him a hearing meeting the requirements of due process. And in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court held that the procedures adopted by President Bush for military commissions violated the basic tenets of military and international law.

Capturing the spirit of these decisions, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor explained in Hamdi that it “is during our most challenging and uncertain moments” that our Nation’s commitment to the Constitution “is most severely tested,” and “it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.” In rejecting the government’s contention that the Court should play “a heavily circumscribed role” in reviewing the actions of the executive in wartime, O’Connor pointedly observed that “a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”

In terms of judicial review of conflicts between civil liberties and national security, the twenty-first century has gotten off to a rather good start. Having learned from the mistakes of the past, the Court (or at least a majority of the Justices) has jettisoned the “logical” presumption evidenced in the earlier era and replaced it with the more “pragmatic” presumption of close judicial scrutiny evidenced in Rasul, Hamdi, and Hamdan. This is a fundamental step forward in American constitutional history. Whether it will carry forward to possible restrictions of the freedom of religion as the war on terrorism unfolds remains to be seen.

Endnotes

2. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding the constitutionality of the curfew order); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 114 (1943) (same).
7. Id., at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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